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Professor Joel Simmons (Georgetown University)
Professor Kristina Miller
Professor Jóhanna Birnir






Coming into my Ph.D. program, my interests have always been close to the
influence of the economic elites in politics. Whether it be the participation of elites
in democratization processes or the more classical “Structural Dependence of the
State on Capital”, the intersection of private interests and politics, especially in
Latin America, have driven my curiosity. Yet, as a Latin American, the elites have
always been an elusive subject of study. Anecdotally, there are countless stories of
the economic elite meddling in politics, of midnight phone calls to this secretary or
that president, of legislation tailored to the preferences of the very rich. Empirically,
systematically observing the behavior of the economic elite has been, for scholars at
large, difficult to achieve.
Around the time I started to shape what would become an early draft of this
theory, a bill initiative proposing the creation of a state-run electronic currency
was debated in the Ecuadorian Asamblea Nacional. For weeks, news outlets cov-
ered the committee hearings, as presidents of the Chambers and of major banks
(but also union representatives and small-business associations) paraded through
the legislature, denouncing and supporting the initiative, exposing their views to
both politicians and cameras. They were trying to shape policy. And they were
doing it in public. So it was a “happy coincidence” to find such a wealth of data
on the elites (i.e. interest groups) in the very place where policy is being made: the
Ecuadorian Congress. The Archives at the Ecuadorian Congress had a registry of
all committee meetings dating back to 1979. It was an even “happier coincidence”
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to observe interest groups trying to shape policy in public. Even though it only
showed the tip of the lobbying iceberg, it elucidated various dynamics that changed
the usual interaction between politicians and interest groups as we know it. Rather
than a quid-pro-quo in the shadows of an office, the exchange was there, in the paper
and in cameras, for all to see.
The development of the theoretical framework presented in this dissertation
would not have been possible without the invaluable guidance and support of Ernesto
Calvo. It was thanks to Ernesto’s keen understanding of politics that I was able to
put together actors, motivations and structures into one (hopefully) coherent idea.
Ernesto was supportive both academically, and at a personal level. He was always
pushing me forward, challenging me intellectually, and helping me advance in my
career, and for that I will be eternally grateful. I want to extend my heartfelt grat-
itude to Joel Simmons, who commented and mentored this project from before it
was a coherent idea. Likewise, a special thank you to Isabella Alcañiz, who through
her feedback taught me the value of the one-page summary, and through her sup-
port has helped me beyond the pages of this dissertation. Few people have shown
more excitement and encouragement for this project than Kris Miller; there are few
things more intellectually stimulating than a conversation with Kris about legislative
politics. I want to thank all my friends and fellow grad students who, despite the
circumstance (you know, graduate school), were always there to provide a good con-
versation and a good laugh. Thanks to SoRelle Wyckoff and Evan Jones, who took
the time to read and comment earlier versions of this dissertation. A special thank
you to Joan Timoneda, whose friendship and support have been unconditional. Last
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but not least, without the help and patience of Ann Marie Clark nothing would get
done, including this dissertation. I wish her the best in her retirement.
I want to thank the highly professional and dedicated staff at the Archivo-
Biblioteca de la Asamblea Nacional in Ecuador. They went above and beyond to
provide me with all the necessary data that made this dissertation a reality. I would
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invitation of Asambléısta Gabriela Larreátegui. A special thank you to all the staff
members at the Asamblea Nacional you have answered all my questions, arranged
all the interviews, and provided all the access I requested. Thanks to Monica Vil-
lagómez, former president of the board of directors of the Bolsa de Valores de Quito,
who helped me setup many of the elite interviews, and provided an extensive and
detailed account of the life of an interest group representative.
At a personal level, I would not have been able to complete my Ph.D. program
without the constant and unfaltering support of my parents, Alina and Raúl. Above
all, this dissertation, as well as most of my adult life, has been emotionally and
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MUPP-NP Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik
NLP Natural Language Processing
PSC Partido Social Cristiano
STM Structural Topic Models
xii
Chapter 1: Introduction
In democratic politics, the participation of interest groups in policymaking is
commonly understood as a secluded affair; an exchange were interest groups actively
influence the fine print of statutory laws without being observed by the public at
large. Private lobbying is unobserved, removed from the strategic interactions of
legislators in committee and plenary floor. Where the public is concerned, lobbying
takes place in the shadow of democratic politics.
There are, however, instances of lobbying that make public this otherwise pri-
vate affair. Legislators oftentimes invite interest groups to participate and publicly
express their preferences. Companies, unions, and NGO’s are often called to public
forums in committee in the European Union; asked to participate in public com-
mittee hearings in the United States Congress; and invited by committee chairs in
Ecuador to comment on the details of bills under consideration. In this dissertation,
I examine the participation of interest groups in legislative committees. I ask, why
do legislators invite interest groups to participate in committee? When are legisla-
tor more likely to invite interest groups? And what are the determinants for this
participation?
The literature on the participation of interest groups in the policy-creation
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process has focused on the strategic interaction of interest groups and legislators
behind closed doors. Whether understood as an implicit quid-pro-quo exchange, or
as a transfer of information, the engagement of interest groups in formal political
activities usually ends in the office of the policymaker. Making these interactions
public changes the motivations of the actors, the possible gains from the exchange,
and the audience of the spectacle. I explore all these aspects of public lobbying and
develop a framework to study it.
I analyze how the organizational characteristics of the legislature, by granting
gatekeeping authority to committee chairs, determine the participation of interest
groups. Once we establish the control chairs have over the “flow of influence”, we
can also study how legislators coordinate with their parties to maximize the benefits
from the participation of interest groups, and what do interest groups get in return.
Concretely, I argue that legislators use the public participation of interest groups in
the legislative process as a means to raise the salience of issues they own.
Lobbying, public or otherwise, is ubiquitous. The accounts on the impact
outside influence have on the outcome of policy often emphasizes the resources and
capacities of interest groups or the role of policymakers vis-á-vis the direct gains
from their interaction with interest groups. This study incorporates into the mix
the broader party strategies, the organization of the legislature, and the electoral
motivations of legislators, to obtain a more nuanced understanding of lobbying and a
new dimension of congressional politics. To get a better picture of the role of interest
groups within the policy creation process, I look at those instances that transcend
the office of the legislator and place those interactions in the crux of legislative and
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party politics.
Empirically, the focus of this dissertation is on the rate of interest group par-
ticipation in committee debates. To support my argument, I collect original data
from the Ecuadorian Congress between 1979 and 2018. The central purpose of this
research is to explain the participation of interest groups in committee delibera-
tions. Using committee reports provided by the National Archive of the Ecuadorian
Congress, I successfully identify 838 unique interest groups, and 6,989 instances
of interest group participation in committee meetings.1 I complement these data
with the description of interest group participation from the committee reports, and
their demands and interactions with legislators during debates. In addition, I draw
upon over 30 semi-structured interviews with a range of actors participating in the
policy-creation process in Ecuador. In 2018, I spoke with interest group representa-
tives, legislators (including committee chairs), legislative staff, former secretaries of
state, and academics, and was present in committee debates. The discussions and
intuitions will draw upon these wide-ranging conversations and experiences, help-
ing fill the details about how standing committees operate, how legislators behave
within these committees, and the motivation for interest groups to both participate
in committees and approach policymakers informally.
Research on issue ownership in the U.S. and Europe uses detailed surveys that
1I first mined legislative documents from the National Archive of the Ecuadorian Congress
from 1979 to 2018, gathering bills and committee reports and meta-data at the bill, committee,
and party level. These include the party of bill sponsor and committee chair, ideological position
of bill sponsor and committee chair, the party of the president of Congress, activity within the
committee, and attention given to issues by the party and legislative period. Next, using Natural
Language Processing (NLP) on committee reports, I identified all interest groups that participated
in committee meetings.
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ask respondents which party is most competent at dealing with each of a series
of issues (Green 2011; Sides 2006; Wagner and Meyer, 2014). Such surveys are
not publicly available for Ecuador. I use an alternative approach to estimate issue
ownership: structural topic modeling (STM). From the literature, we know that
political parties strategically focus on the issues they own (Petrocik, 1996; Sides,
2006; Green and Hobolt, 2008; Busemeyer et al., 2013; Guinaudeau and Persico,
2013; Wagner and Meyer, 2014). Budge and Farlie (1983), Guinaudeau and Persico
(2013), and Walgrave and De Swert (2004) argue that parties devote most attention
to issues they have ownership over and are perceived as such by the voters at large.
Thus, as a proxy to issue ownership, I estimate the attention each party gives to a
topic by looking at the topic of the bill initiatives that each member introduces to
Congress. In the Ecuadorian Congress, most bills die before reaching committee, so
we are unable to know what topic most bill address. Further, the allocation of bills
to committees has a strong political component, one that biases the type of bills
that reach that stage. Therefore, by looking at all bill initiatives and estimating the
prevalence of topics for each bill, we can rank the attention of parties and obtain a
measure of issue ownership.2
1.1 A Theory of Invited Policy Influence
Most accounts of lobbying place the policymaker between the interest group
and the policy-creation process. When an interest group gains access to a legislator,
2The limitations of this measure, as well as the limitations of alternative measures, are described
in Chapter 5.
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the audience is the legislator. The strategic interaction between both parts is one
step removed from the intricacies of legislative politics, the preferences of fellow
legislators, and the judgment of voters. Be this a quid pro quo exchange (Austen-
Smith, 1996), the transmission of information (Grossman and Helpman, 2001), or
the support of natural policy allies (Hall and Deardorff, 2006), nothing in the process
needs to be public.
Making lobbying public changes the motivations and strategic decisions of leg-
islators. It also raises some fundamental questions: Why would policymakers want
to openly invite interest groups to participate in the policy creation process? Why
would interest groups accept? How does this change the strategic considerations of
legislators? In this thesis, I show that politicians gain benefits from inviting groups
to participate in debates aligning with the issues the party owns, while interest
groups benefit from managing the fine print of legislation.
Public lobbying differs markedly from private lobbying. In the former, the
incentives of legislators are more closely linked to the electoral benefits of raising
the salience of an issue than to the resources (i.e. information and/or monetary) the
legislator might obtain. Because of this, the strategic considerations of legislators are
marked by party preferences and the organizational characteristics of the legislature.
On the other hand, in private lobbying, interest groups that approach legislators
can exchange campaign contributions for policy. In Brazil, for example, it comes
in the form of government contracts (Samuels, 2002); in the U.S., in the form of
access Congressional officials (Kalla and Broockman, 2014); and in Italy, in the form
of long-term public contracts (Golden, 2003). Groups can also reveal information
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strategically to legislators in an attempt to move (or consolidate) the status quo,
plan legislative strategies, assist legislators in drafting new bills, broker logrolling
deals, and so on (Grossman and Helplman, 2001). Whatever interest groups buy
with their “hard” or “soft” money, through legal or illegal means, has no outside
audience. Making these efforts public changes the incentives legislators have, and
the rewards interest groups reap.
In this dissertation, I argue that legislators use the public participation of
interest groups in the legislative process as a means to raise issue salience. At the
heart of this strategy is the maximization of electoral benefits for the party: parties
gain when “owned” issues gain salience, and they can achieve this by inviting interest
groups to participate when “owned” issues are debated. Committee debates are
a formal and public venue where interest group participation takes place. When
interest groups participate in committee debates or meetings they attract attention
to the issue at hand, both from the constituents interest groups directly represent,
and from the larger population affected by the topic addressed. Thus, the audience of
these public performances is, primarily, voters. The ultimate strategy of legislators
when engaging in public lobbying is to extol the reputation of the party in the
eyes of their constituency. This, in part, challenges the conventional understanding
of politician and lobbyist interaction, where there is no external audience–when
lobbying takes place in private, e.g. Grossman and Helplman, (2001)–or when the
public pressure is a sole decision of the interest group–an outside strategy, e.g.
Kollman (1998)–.
Legislative committees are also a strategic stage in the organization of the
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legislature. Committee chairs are often endowed with gatekeeping prerogatives,
controlling the flow of legislation and setting the (committee) agenda. Chairs are in
charge of inviting interest groups to participate in committee debates as well. They
control the flow of influence. Thus, parties will strategically negotiate the allocation
of committee chairs, and chairs will, in turn, use their gatekeeping powers to benefit
the party. The literature has shown how gatekeepers are a fundamental actor in the
mechanisms determining legislative success–avoiding the advance of legislation that
will divide the party in the plenary floor (Cox and McCubbins, 2005)–, as well as
in taking advantage of the minority and majority status of the party (Calvo, 2014).
I show how, and why, chairs use their gatekeeping powers to control interest group
participation as a party strategy that maximizes the benefits of owning an issue.
1.1.1 Issue ownership and interest group participation
Issue ownership is a reputation for handling an issue well (Budge and Farlie,
1983; Green, 2011; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Petrocik, 1996; Sides. 2006; Vavreck,
2009). Parties hold an advantage on certain issues as the public believes that they
are better suited to deal with said issues; parties gain electorally by talking about
owned issues and when the issue they own raises in salience. In issue ownership
terms, parties and their members prime owned issues, using all available venues to
do so, from press releases (Grimmer, 2009) to the plenary floor (Pardos-Prado and
Sagarzazu, 2014); from the campaign trail (Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987;
Sides, 2006) to the legislature (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). I argue that making an
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otherwise private affair public, such as lobbying, is aimed towards that goal, too.
Committee meetings, much like plenary debates, are more about politics than policy.
Politicians “speak past one another” (Ceaser and Busch, 2001), in an effort to gain
notoriety rather than to establish exchanges on a policy. The performative nature of
committee extends to the participation of interest groups who often bring media and
raise the attention of the policy being debated. But a party only benefits from rising
salience if it owns the issue. Thus, committee chairs, exercising their gatekeeping
prerogatives, will invite interest groups to participate when the bill addresses an
issue the party owns.
Issue ownership is not always clear-cut. It is generally accepted by the litera-
ture that some issues–e.g. economic and fiscal issues–are rarely owned by one single
party and are often a point of contention among parties (Belanger, 2003; Brasher,
2009; Petrocik, 1996; Pope and Woon, 2009). In these cases, there is issue trespass-
ing, and parties are constantly looking to frame their position in a way that they
can claim ownership over these issues. To this end, committee chairs will also invite
more interest groups to participate in committee debates when they want to raise
the salience of those issues. When in contention with another party over unowned
issues, the capacity to frame and control the discourse gives the party the upper
hand over the competition.
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1.1.2 Motive to participate: Fine print of policy
Interest groups do not engage in this behavior selflessly. Interest groups gain
from this public participation: they are, among other things, granted access to
micro-manage policy–benefit from specific modifications of a law–. Interest groups
are interested in the marginal gains they can get from specific modifications of a
policy as much as in pursuing sweeping changes to the legislation. Given the negative
agenda-setting power of majority parties and coalitions (Cox and McCubbins, 1993)–
their capacity to stop legislation from reaching the floor–, and the pervasiveness
with which parties exercise this power, interest group are usually better off pushing
for specific modification of a law that has already started its journey, than from
proposing an initiative from scratch. At the committee level, the details of the
legislation are modified and adjusted, and gaining access to this process gives interest
group an opportunity to benefit from changes to the policy, often technical aspects,
that are plausible to achieve and generate benefits to the group.
1.1.3 Motive to participate: Diminish Bureaucratic Discretion
During interviews, interest group representative insisted on the importance of
participating in committee as an accountability mechanism. The former president
of the Bolsa de Valores de Quito3 argued that “[she] went to committees to be sure
that what was discussed in private was honored during the committee meetings.”
The participation of interest groups in committees, often coordinated with media
3Quito Stock Exchange
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presence, was seen as a way to raise the cost of legislators reneging of their private
promises. More generally, in contexts where lobbying is not regulated and most in-
teractions between policymakers and interest groups take place in informal venues,
participation in committees can serve as a formalization of agreements reached in-
formally.
1.1.4 Motive to participate: Organizational Benefits
Interest groups also gain institutionally, as access to the legislative process
is a tangible representation of the services they offer fee-paying members. This is
particularly important when obtaining policy benefits is a long and many times
unrewarding process. The outcome of bill initiatives can be unpredictable and the
benefits to the firms being represented by interest groups might not be seen for a
long time. Thus, every opportunity that, as an organization, interest groups can
showcase their presence in the policy-creation process it helps maintain membership
(and the resources from that membership), and attract new members.
1.2 An Alternative Information Model
The framework advanced in this dissertation is an alternative “information”
model of legislative activity and lobbying that departs from other models that em-
phasize the role of the party (Cox and McCubbins, 1993) or information (Krehbiel,
1991). In this framework, legislators answer and benefit from the strengths of the
party and the organization of Congress precisely by disseminating information (i.e.
10
raising the salience of an issue). The influence of interest groups in the policy
creation process takes a different path, one that relies heavily on the goals of the
party and the capacity the party has to achieve these goals through their control
of strategic positions in the legislature. This is not to say that there is a not a
disproportionate power of certain groups over the fate of policy (e.g. the “strong
upper-class ascent” of Schattschneiders (1960) heavenly chorus), or that interest
groups solely work as amplifiers and not as bearers of information. Rather, it pro-
vides an account of a rarely studied, yet common enough form of lobbying, that
complements the private, many times unobserved, means.
1.2.1 Alternative Hypothesis: Congruence Between Group and Leg-
islator
Do you need to agree with the groups that you invite? In this dissertation,
issue ownership and salience, rather than congruence, is what matters. Consider,
for example, a Democrat in the U.S. Senate that invites the CEO of Facebook to
discuss possible foreign interference in the 2016 election.4. Democratic senators did
not invite Mark Zuckerberg because they agreed with him, but rather to raise the
salience of an issue by publicly scolding him. Inviting someone to have a public
interaction sometimes means confronting them. In other words, legislators can still
raise the salience of an issue by inviting groups that they do not agree with. Even
though this might not be often the case, the theory advanced in this thesis does not
4“Mark Zuckerberg Testimony: Senators Question Facebooks Commitment to Pri-
vacy”, New York Times, April 10, 2018. Access: June 26, 2019. URL:
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/us/politics/mark-zuckerberg-testimony.html
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hinge on the ideological congruence between the policymakers and interest groups.
Rather, it stresses the importance of raising issues salience and is agnostic about
the means to achieve this.
1.2.2 Alternative Hypothesis: Weak Party Brand
The gatekeeping model presupposes that chairs, or any other actor with gate-
keeping authority, has a fiduciary responsibility to protect the party brand. At its
core, the gatekeeping model is party-based. Under a party system with weak party
brands (and weak parties more generally) protecting the party brand is not a prior-
ity for politicians. Thus, under these conditions, invitations to participate might not
be based on a broader party strategy but rather on the personal gains the politician
can obtain from interest groups.
Under weak party brands, legislators could be inviting interest groups to get
some outside benefit. Interest groups, keen in gaining access, might offer compen-
sation for that access in the form of a job (e.g. revolving door). If this was the
case, just like our theory predicts, we would expect to see more invitations to is-
sues owned by the party before elections. After all, people leaving want to show
their capacity to their future employer, and they can better achieve that by inviting
interest groups to issues they own.
To discard this possibility, I look at legislator up for reelection and compare
their behavior with those about to leave. Empirical evidence suggests that legislators
up for reelection are more likely to invite interest groups to participate before an
12
election in issues the party owns than legislators that are not. Furthermore, there is
additional empirical evidence of broader party coordination among different levels
of hierarchy. For example, when committee chairs share party with the president
of Congress, the strategy of inviting interest groups to debates of issues the party
owns is amplified.
1.3 Results and key findings
Using the above-described dataset, I show three substantive determinants of
interest group invitations to committee debates. First, I find that, indeed, com-
mittee chairs are more likely to invite interest groups to committee debates when
a bill is addressing an issue their party owns. Relying on the ideological position
of the sponsor of the bill, I provide further evidence of the strategic considerations
committee chairs use to invite groups, favoring those bills that are closer to their
own ideological position. The most compelling evidence for the theory is presented
in Figure 5.8, showing how, as elections approach, committee chairs are more gen-
erous with their invitations. For, it is during elections that the issue salience of
owned issues matters the most to politicians (Petrocik, 1996). Third, I show that
as the economic clout of groups increase, so does their participation in committees.
Economic clout has been connected to media salience (Calvo and Ponce, 2013), and
if the ultimate goal of chairs is to increase the salience of issues owned, it is not sur-
prising that chairs would be more willing to invite them. These findings all speak
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Figure 1.1: Predicted count of interest group participation across different levels of issue salience,
conditional on elections.
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interest groups to committee debates: a) the role of issue ownership, b) the impor-
tance of raising the salience of owned issues in key moments, and c) the relevance of
the impact interest groups have in raising salience in the chair’s decision to extend
invitations. These results also have not been previously noted or discussed in the
interest group literature. In the case of Latin America, these findings are the first
to address interest group behavior at the legislative level, and one of the first to
empirically study interest group participation.
1.3.1 From Political Dialogue to Party Dialogue
The literature suggests that politicians avoid political dialogue, choosing to
“speak past one another” (Ceaser and Busch, 2001). In this dissertation, I find that
parties legislate past one other, rather than with each other. There are strategic
benefits to focusing on legislation on topics owned by the party. Among the ones ex-
plored in this dissertation, it allows for parties to control the flow of influence, while
also gain from the participation of interest groups in committee debates (through
the raising of issue salience). From the Ecuadorian case, we see that parties mostly
introduce legislation in issues that they own, and are fairly consistent across time.5
This is not to say that most are single-issue parties, even though there are parties
that concentrate on fewer topics than others. Rather, that parties will legislate
across all issue but, when doing so, are looking inwards, to their own comparative
advantage, rather than outwards, to what other parties are doing.
5Issue ownership can change across time.
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1.3.2 A Gatekeeping Model of Influence
In the gatekeeping model of legislative politics, chairs prevent issues that can
divide the party from reaching committees and, subsequently, the floor. Chairs are
strategic actors that control the flow of legislation. I extend this logic to the flow
of influence. Chairs are not only strategically with legislation, but also with who is
allowed to publicly participate in its journey from bill to law. In this dissertation,
chairs are strategically preventing participation by limiting invitations strategically.
Just like with the advancement of legislation, chairs will open the gates when issues
owned by the party being discussed, and close them otherwise.
1.4 The Committee System in Ecuador
As already indicated in the previous section, the organizational structure of the
legislature is a central element in our framework of interest group participation. As
is the case in many legislatures in Latin America (Saiegh, 2005, 2010; Calvo, 2014),
the sequential organization of the Ecuadorian Congress decentralizes power to com-
mittee chairs6 and grants them agenda-setting prerogatives. The specific rules that
govern committee chairs and the legislative procedures have changed, sometimes
drastically, over the years, but the basic organization has remained. Committee
chairs have ample gatekeeping authority; they can cajonear bills–put bills “in the
drawer” and postpone discussion–, determine the order of the day, limit the time
6Party leaders in Ecuador have different mechanisms to whip legislators and maintain loyalty.
For starters, these posts are usually assigned to party leaders or to members with longer tenures
that have already proved their loyalty.
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spent on a bill, determine in what order can legislators intervene during debates,
and decide what interest group is invited to the committee.
The party system in Ecuador is highly fragmented. Since 1979, in every cohort,
there have been at least 10 parties or movements with legislative representation.
Only between 2013 and 2017 has one party held a majority of congressional seats.
This fragmentation has shaped the behavior of parties and legislators in Congress:
few stable coalitions, high turnover, and limited governability. The ethnic and
regional cleavages in Ecuador have also permeated to Congress, where despite the
national presence of parties, their regional nature often led to divided legislatures
(Mej́ıa Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, 2011). The regional focus was accentuated by
the ethnic cleavages that became politically relevant in the early 1990s (Van Cott,
2007).
Despite the party system and the various institutional reforms, the approval
of bills has remained fairly constant across time. Bill initiatives are introduced by
a lead sponsor, who can be a member of Congress, a member of the executive,
a member of the national judiciary, or, under special conditions, a citizen group.
The CAL, the Comisión Administrativa Legislativa, receives the bills and evaluate
the merits of the bill on technical grounds. The CAL will decide whether the bill
advances and to which committee it should go. Notice that, despite the technical
nature of the CAL, the decision is ultimately political. The chair of the CAL is
also the president of Congress and has the power to delay the advancement of bills
(probably the most-used prerogative), choose the committee they advance to, and
override any technical considerations that would support the advancement of a bill
17
initiative. Indeed, the first gatekeeper is the president of the legislature. Once a bill
reaches a committee, the committee has 45 days to review the bill and to elaborate
a report for its first debate on the plenary floor. From the plenary floor, a bill will
return to committee for a second time, and from the committee, it will be discharged
again to the floor for a final vote. All the time restrictions can be easily side-stepped
by committee chairs. Since there is a limited amount of time in a legislative period,
chairs (including the chair of the CAL) can always postpone the discussion of a bill,
enough to effectively kill it.
Committees do not vote formally on a bill but instead report to the floor for
the first debate. These reports are based on the committee debates and include
the participation of interest groups. In Ecuador, any legislator can invite an in-
terest group to participate in committee debates. Constitutionally, every citizen
has the right to participate in committee debates, and each committee must hold
socialización forums where bill initiatives are discussed with interested parties. It
is within the prerogatives of the committee chair to decide where the forums will
be held, and who will be invited. Furthermore, even when interest groups have
requested to participate in a committee meeting or legislators have requested for a
group to be invited, by changing the order of the day, committee chairs can post-
pone participation until time runs out. Ultimately, the only valid invitation is the
one the committee chair accepts.
Once inside the committee, the debates resemble a spectacle. According to
congressional staff, media presence is constant, even though the number of outlets
present would vary from topic to topic. As a pressuring strategy, interest group
18
will also bring media to committee meetings, feeding into the performative nature
of the debates. When legislators intervene, their remarks resemble the speeches in
the plenary floor: expository rather than interactive. Legislators will usually use
this opportunity to address the cameras, using their floor time as a platform to
gain attention. Indeed, one common complaint from interest group representatives
was the lack of attention the legislators gave the information delivered by guests.
Even these spaces are controlled by committee chairs. While there is a schedule
published prior to the meetings, chairs can, and will, change the order of the day.
Chairs have the discretionary power to stop short or extend the time a discussion
lasts (within a reasonable time frame), as well as the capacity to have invited guests
not to participate.
When interest groups are invited to committees, they are particularly cog-
nizant of the importance of addressing the “fine print” of policy, as well as the
broader picture. Even though the policy engagement between interest group repre-
sentatives and legislators is limited, it is important for interest groups to have their
position or policy demands on record.7 When the committee is elaborating the final
report before discharging a bill to the floor, they will review the changes suggested
by interest groups. Even though interest groups usually take general positions on
policy, they are not disingenuous about their capacity to influence policy. Thus,
they will cater to specific elements affecting their group and while as a class or a
sector they might have shared preferences, obtaining benefits for their own indus-
7Not all interest groups are there to demand policy changes. There are groups that participate
in a show of support for a bill. This type of participation is part of the mechanisms used to raise
issue salience. The might even be some degree of coordination between the party base and different
groups, even though this cannot be differentiated in the data.
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try is a priority. The level of specificity sometimes comes down to elements within
an article in the law. For example, in a bill sent by the executive to expand tax
collection and economic incentives, Chamber representatives would argue to change
the month public institutions will pay government contracts, or would request the
expansion of tax exemptions of one local industry to another.
Ultimately, the committee system in Ecuador grants enough gatekeeping au-
thority to committee chairs for them to control the flow of legislation and the flow of
influence. Despite the many legal and institutional changes since 1979, the Ecuado-
rian Congress has maintained a sequential organization that endows committee
chairs with power to be pivotal actors, not only to the ultimate approval of policies,
but also on how legislation changes along the way, and who is invited to provide their
input. Even though committee meetings are performative in nature, the politics of
these performances are important, for members of Congress can benefit from the
increased salience. The rise in importance of a topic can lead to increased exposure
and the electoral gains of owning a salient issue. The latter, particularly important
to determine when will gatekeepers open the doors of committees to interest groups.
1.5 Interest Group Participation in the Ecuadorian Congress
Since before the return to democracy in 1979, interest groups in Ecuador have
been linked to political parties and to policy outcomes. The Chambers of Agricul-
ture, Industry, and Commerce, for example, mounted in 1975 a media campaign
against the regime of then-dictator, General Rodŕıguez Lara, not only accusing it
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from a lack of favorable policies but also criticizing the exclusion of interested parties,
like the Chambers, from the decision-making process. Another commerce chamber,
the Cámara de la Producción de Guayaquil, backed León Febres Cordero for presi-
dent in 1984, to then have its president tapped as Minister of Industry. Indeed, the
presence of interest groups representatives in executive posts has been ample and
notorious, as has been their role in some of the most influential legislation approved.
In 1998, it was thanks to the pressure and the political involvement of the Chamber
of Commerce that the Ecuadorian economy was eventually dollarized (Acosta Mej́ıa,
2009). The participation of interest groups in the political life of Ecuador has been
extended to the legislature. Figure 1.2 shows the yearly number of interest groups
participating in committee debates.
Interest groups work on two levels with legislators: informal and formal. As
explained by interest group representative from Ecuador, the first approach to legis-
lators is in an informal setting.8 Interest groups representatives tap into previously
created networks or try to establish new networks with policymakers through pri-
vate, unreported meetings. Legislators, as well as interest groups representatives,
stressed the difficulties that come from not having rules regulating lobbying. There
is not a clear understanding of what type of interactions would be understood as
lobbying, and which would cross the line, yet both parts agreed that the only real
8While interest groups in Ecuador are not lobbying firm, part of the service they provide is
pressuring for policies that advance the preferences of their members. A paid membership is the
norm for interest groups in Ecuador. Interest groups have the common collective action problems
of free-riding, so they try to raise the cost of not participating. The president of Asobanca (Bank
Association) said they were constantly looking for ways to keep members engaged and coordinated,
not only by offering services but also showing results in policy outcomes. He said this is hard even



















































































































Figure 1.2: Interest Group Participation in Committees, 1979-2018. Total participation of inter-
est groups in committee meetings, from 1979 to 2018. The bump on interest group
presence after 2008 is due to a legislative reform that made the rules of participation
and reporting clearer.
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problem came when the exchanges devolved into unlawful management of public
resources. Despite these drawbacks, the meetings are the first step into influencing
policy. As suggested by the executive president of the main association for produc-
ers of food and beverages in Ecuador, “we move simultaneously in a formal and
informal setting [...]. Informal meetings get you access and a ballpark agreement,
formal [venues] allow us to validate what we propose.”9
Indeed, once they have gained access to a legislator, interest groups represen-
tatives expressed the importance of legitimizing their agreements and holding leg-
islators accountable to these agreements, through their participation in committee
debates. While most interviewees agreed that debates in committees were politi-
cized spaces, rather than spaces to reveal technical information, they also perceived
committees as a mechanism to have private agreements honored. Thus, a common
strategy was to coordinate their participation with media campaigns, a strategy
that feeds into the two-way logic of issue salience: a mechanism for legislators to
gain from issues they own, and a pressuring tool in the eyes of interest groups to
get legislators to act on specific topics. As member-funded institutions, the pres-
ence of interest groups in the policy-creation space is a tangible representation of
access, something interest groups offer to their (fee-paying) members. It also reveals
their technical capacity and policy position to all committee members and creates
possible links for the future.
Other interest group representatives described the role vis-á-vis policymakers
as that of “free advisors”. Interest groups, especially those whose comparative ad-
9Interview with Christian Walhi, Executive President of ANFAB. October 15, 2018.
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vantage was not in their numbers (e.g. such as labor unions) but resources (e.g.
such as Chambers), were able to provide technical information that was often unob-
tainable to legislators and their small supporting teams. The technical information
was often aimed to clarifying the context of those affected by the law, the possible
effects of the law, and how the law should be modified to improve that context.
This was also another mechanism to establish connections with legislators and build
a good rapport among legislative staff. Gaining access, after all, was a continuous
process.
There were various motivations for interest groups to attend committees. Even
though there is not one necessary condition for interest groups participation, they do
illustrate the importance of an invitation to committees. We know that invitations
are a strategic decision made by committee chairs looking to raise the salience of
issues the party owns. A descriptive view of interest group participation suggests
that this participation is, mostly, a political decision. For example, the most nu-
merous type of interest groups invited to committees is from the academic space.
Often, committees will invite university professors to clarify or expand on the pos-
sible legal effects of reform. Less frequent, but not uncommon, is for specialized
research centers to argue, on technical ground, the impact a reform can have on
the economy, on collective rights, or on the market. Yet, even these types of par-
ticipation have a political element. There are universities that, historically, have
been closer to economic groups and others that have been closer to labor. Public
universities, where labor groups and student unions are in constant dialogue, more
often coincide with worker unions than with capital groups. The opposite is also
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true, private universities, founded by and for the economic elite, participate more
often with Chambers than with unions.
1.6 From the Ecuadorian Case to the Rest of the World
To understand the determinants of interest groups participation in legislative
committees, I study in detail close to forty years of public lobbying and congressional
politics in Ecuador. I inform the theoretical process, as well as the empirical results,
with interviews with interest group representatives, legislators, and legislative staff.
Results from this research, however, inform broadly on the politics of interest group,
public lobbying, and legislative politics in other countries of the world.
The standard models of interest politics developed with private lobbying in
mind put the policymaker between the interest group and the policy-creation pro-
cess. Legislators are intermediaries of the interests of organized sectors and policy
outcomes. Yet, the dynamics of public lobbying change the consequences of the in-
teraction, the audience, and the outcomes. And instances of what can be understood
as public lobbying are not uncommon: interest group participation in parliamen-
tary committees in the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands (Pedersen
et al., 2015), interest group access to committee in the European Commission, the
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (Bouwen, 2004), interest group
participation in committees in the U.S. Congress (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1999), or
interest group participation in public hearing of the German parliamentary commit-
tees (Eising and Spohr, 2017), as well as audiencias públicas in Chile (de la Maza,
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2011) and socialización forums in Ecuador, among others.
However, little research has been conducted to understand how do legislators
and interest groups interact in these settings, and how do parties strategically be-
have. Furthermore, most countries in Latin America do not have laws regulating
lobbying or records that systematically report the interaction between lobbyist and
legislators.10 We do not know much about the participation of interest groups in
the policy-creation process, despite its obvious importance (Ames et al., 2012). The
role of business interests has been downplayed, often linked to, and dependent on,
the state (Schneider, 2004), and much of these gaps have been due to a lack of data.
While this dissertation only addresses one aspect of interest group participation,
revealing at most the tip of the lobbying iceberg, it is the first step into a more
nuanced understanding of the role of private interest in public policy.
Through the Ecuadorian case, I provide an alternative model of legislative
behavior where interest groups are part of the congressional game. As I show, the
sequential organization of the Ecuadorian Congress endows chairs with gatekeeping
authority, and chairs will use this authority to selective invite interest groups to
participate of committee debates, effectively granting them access to the policy cre-
ation process. Chairs will open the gates when issues they own are being discussed,
and close them otherwise. Many of the contextual conditions required for the model
are common to other countries. The division into committees and the power en-
dowed to the chair are similar across Latin America (Saeigh, 2005; Calvo, 2014),
10México, Perú and Chile are the only countries in Latin America where lobbying is explicitly
regulated. The first country to regulate lobbying activity was Perú in 2003, although the actual
law has come in conflict with the barriers imposed by the Peruvian legislation. Mexico approved
regulations for lobbying activity in 2010, while Chile did so in 2014.
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the United States (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1999), and Europe (Bouwen, 2004). The
sequential organization of the legislatures, and the capacity to control the flow of
legislation and participation is not endemic to Ecuador, and has been studied in
similar contexts–e.g. the U.S. Congress (Balla and Wright, 2001; Sterling, 2009)–.
Note that one fundamental aspect is the ability of the chair to invite interest
groups, thus effectively giving the control of external influence to the chair. In our
model of interest group participation, it is the legislator with gatekeeping authority
who ultimately decides what group will be allowed to participate in the policy
creation process. With this in mind, my research adds to previous theories on
legislative politics by introducing a new dimension to the incentives parties have
when dealing with legislation (Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Carey, 2007; Calvo and
Sagarzazu, 2011). In this alternative model, parties rely on the dissemination to
information (i.e. interest group participation) to advance the goals of the party.
The audience, rather than other legislators, are the voters, and linking the role of
interest groups to issue salience as a means to gain electorally, is an argument that,
without the connection being explicitly made, has already been hinted at in other
studies (Cullpepper, 2009; Calvo and Ponce, 2013).
Raising the salience of issues has been often studied as an interest group’s
“outside strategy” (Schattschneider, 1960; Lipsky, 1968; Etzioni, 1970; Schlozman
and Tierney, 1986; Walker, 1991; Heinz et al., 1993; Kollman, 1998). Groups lacking
a formal role in the policy-creation process seek to mobilize public support and gen-
erate favorable media attention to issues in order to exert pressure on policymakers.
Public lobbying gives control to the policymaker of the issues that gain attention.
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It addresses the two-way nature of issue salience: its ability to pressure policymak-
ers and the capacity of policymakers to obtain electoral gains from the increased
attention. While I show how parties in the Ecuadorian Congress take advantage of
the increased salience that comes from interest group participation, there are ample
examples in the literature that have shown how parties, in other contexts, coordi-
nate campaigns (Petrocik, 1996; Sides, 2006) and policy attention (Busemeyer et
al., 2013; Guinaudeau and Persico, 2013) around issue ownership and issue salience.
Finally, the party and Congressional politics in Ecuador have unique charac-
teristics that are likely to affect the way legislators and interest groups interact.
First, as previously shown, the party system in Ecuador is highly fragmented. Even
once-strong parties can be short-lived, and this inability to commit in the long term
affects the importance of loyalty from party members, the party brand, and the
cost for an interest group to create networks with policymakers. Even though the
high turnover rate of legislators in Ecuador is fairly common across Latin America
(Samuels, 2002), the opposite is true for more developed democracies (e.g. United
States, Europe). The same theoretical framework used here might yield different re-
sults in other institutional contexts. Second, gatekeeping powers endowed to chairs
are extensive in Ecuador. A similar organization can be found in Argentina (Calvo,
2014), and, to a lower degree, the United States (Cox and McCubbins, 2005) and the
European Union (Whitaker, 2005). But different organizational arrangements will
change how parties take advantage of public lobbying or how the different organiza-
tional arrangements affect the prevalence of public lobbying in the first place. After
all, the organization of legislatures is created by parties, to the benefit of parties
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(Cox and McCubbins, 1993), and this endogeneity will have an effect of what type
of interactions are carried out within each legislature.
1.7 Organization of this Dissertation
This dissertation unfolds as follows. In Chapter 2, I outline the framework of
interest group participation in legislative committees. I describe the organizational
characteristics of legislatures that endow gatekeeping power to committee chairs and
how chairs use this power in order to selectively invite interest groups to committee
debates. Next, in Chapter 3, I describe parties and the committee system in the
Ecuadorian Congress, paying particular attention to the way parties allocate mem-
bers to different positions of power. I also look at the life of a bill in the legislature,
and how interest groups intervene in this process. Chapter 4 hones in interest group
in Ecuador. Based on interviews, I address the motivation interest groups have to
participate in committee debates, and their interaction with legislators and policy.
In Chapter 5, I present empirical analyses testing a set of hypotheses derived from
the main theory and estimate the determinants of interest group participation in
committees. Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings of the dissertation and ad-
vances two extensions for the work. The first proposes a network model to study
the type of interest groups that are invited, by whom, and when. The second looks
at the possible effect interest group participation has on legislative success.
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Chapter 2: Gatekeepers of Influence
Lobbying is commonly understood as a private affair. It is confined to a leg-
islative office, where interest groups make (implicit) offers that relate prospective
contributions (of information or votes) to the policy chosen by the incumbent pol-
icymaker (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). In this view, interest groups are one
step removed from the policy creation process, and politicians act as intermediaries
of their preferences. The conventional lore on lobbying involves secrecy, backroom
deals, and unaccountable influence. Interest groups can secure private assurances
of support from politicians that, though private, should be sufficiently credible to
be enforceable. After all, interest groups can threaten to rally their members and
bring other resources to bear against politicians that renege on their end of the deal.
Indeed, nothing in this process needs to be public. In spite of the strong logic in
support of a private interaction, interest groups jockey to publicly participate in
legislative committees and politicians show no signs of discouraging this behavior.
What happens when interest groups step into the spotlight and lobbying becomes
a public affair? Why would policymakers want to openly invite interest groups to
participate in the policy creation process? Why would interest groups accept?
I propose a theoretical framework where legislators use the public participa-
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tion of interest groups in the legislative process to raise issue salience, as interest
groups gain the possibility to manage the “fine print” of policy. In politics, par-
ticipation in policymaking is not a free-for-all. Participation is by invitation only,
a prerogative exercised by legislators with gatekeeping authority, usually commit-
tee chairs in the sequential organization of most congresses (Cox and McCubbins,
2005).1 As gatekeepers, legislators are deliberate and strategic about whom they
invite to participate. We see this power exerted in the decision about whom to
invite to participate in the legislative process. This power is also revealed in terms
of which issues policymakers choose to advance/promote and which ones they leave
off the agenda. Since policymakers emphasize issues on which they are advantaged
(Petrocik, 1996)–prioritizing legislation on topics they are better regarded by voters–
, gatekeepers will open the gates of committees to bills addressing issues they own,
and they will do the opposite to bills addressing issues they do not own. When
interest groups participate in committee debates they attract attention to the issues
at hand, not only from the constituents they directly represent but also from the
population affected by the topics they focus on, potentially raising the salience of
the debated issue.
Interest groups do not engage in this behavior selflessly. Interest groups gain
from this public participation: they are, among other things, granted access to
1This understanding of the interaction of interest groups and legislators is similar to the role
of “access” in lobbying (Bouwen, 2004; Halpin and Fraussen, 2017). Interest groups invest in
gaining access to policymakers, rather than in changing policy. Access is the ability to meet
or to exchange information directly with policymakers (Beyers, 2004; Bouwen, 2004). Instances
of the latter include membership of closed advisory committees (e.g. Balla and Wright, 2001;
Binderkrantz and Christiansen, 2015; Fraussen et al., 2015) or (invited) committee hearings (e.g.
Leyden, 1995; Pedersen et al., 2015).
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micro-manage policy–benefit from specific modifications of a law–. Interest groups
are interested in the marginal gains they can get from specific modifications to
legislation as much as in pursuing sweeping changes to the legislation. Given the
negative agenda-setting power of majority parties and blocs (Cox and McCubbins,
1993)–their capacity to stop legislation from reaching the floor–, and the pervasive-
ness with which parties exercise this power, interest group are usually better off
pushing for specific modification of a law than trying to overhaul the status quo.
The remainder of this chapter explores more in detail how issue ownership and
issue salience condition interest group participation in committee debates. I look at
the importance of the sequential organization of legislatures and the role of legisla-
tors with gatekeeping authority in the invitation of interest group participation.
2.1 Issue advantage, issue salience, and interest group participation
Parties aim to talk as much as possible about the issues they own. Issue own-
ership is a long-term reputation for handling an issue well (Budge and Farlie, 1983;
Green, 2011; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Petrocik, 1996; Sides. 2006; Vavreck, 2009).
According to issue ownership theory, parties hold an advantage on certain issues
as the public believes that they are better suited to deal with them.2 The issues
a party “owns” are those policy areas in which its handling ability is particularly
highly rated by voters. Policymakers cannot detach themselves from this percep-
2There are two dimensions to issue ownership: competence and association. “Competence”
refers to the ability of a party to dealing with an issue, whereas “association” refers to the connec-
tion to that party to the issue (Walgrave et al., 2012). The distinction addresses how voters react
to issues and parties. Competence issue ownership might be assigned by voters to a party of their
choice, while associative issue ownership draws attention to a party when thinking about an issue.
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tion,3 but the implication is that, in most cases, they do not want to. Parties will
benefit when the issue they own gets the spotlight in the political discourse. Their
association with the issue may improve both their popular standing and coalition
potential; thus, parties do their best to promote it and increase their expected vote.
Note that the public agenda, in democracies, is rarely under the control of one party.
Parties can try to promote their linkage to their owned issues, but they will be suc-
cessful only to a limited extent.4 Regardless, talking about owned issues is better
than not talking about them (Sigelman and Buell, 2004), and politicians will do so
to increase the overall salience of issues in the campaign trail (Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar
and Kinder, 1987; Sides, 2006) as well as in the legislature (Cox and McCubbins,
2005).
The effect of issue ownership is expanded to the strategic choices of individual
party members. The reputation of a party is a public good to all members shar-
ing the party’s label, and will partially depend on the party’s record of legislative
accomplishments. Since legislating is a team production, policymakers collectively
prefer compiling a favorable record of legislative accomplishments, especially on is-
3According to Petrocik (1996), there is “party constituency issue ownership”, a long-term and
stable ownership, and a “performance-based issue ownership”, which suggests issue ownership
can change across time. Research suggests that political parties’ issue ownership is somewhat
stable across time (Seeberg, 2017), especially the associative ownership perceptions (Tresch and
Feddersen, 2018). In general, issue ownership might change across time, but it is a long process.
For example, the Democratic party in the southern United State was once the party of segregation
but now owns civil rights issues–it took a generation or more for this shift to occur (Dixit and
Londregan, 1996: 1135). However, this process can change in political contexts where parties often
enter and exit the system, and voters have to constantly rebuild the expectations they have from
newcomers.
4Budge (2015) makes a point of the misleading nature of the term “ownership”. “Ownership
implies that parties are free to do what they like with ‘their’ issues [...], and while they undoubtedly
try to do so, [...] they are often linked to certain issues regardless of the electoral advantages
(or disadvantages) they might bring.” A better name to “ownership” might be “advantage” or
“linkage.”
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sues they own. After all, politicians seek reelection and internal advancement in
the ranks, and a good reputation works in their favor. (Cox and McCubbins, 1993;
2005)
In issue ownership terms, parties and their members prime owned issues, using
all available venues to do so, from press releases (Grimmer, 2009) to the plenary floor
(Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu, 2014). Interest group participation in committee
debates can yield similar results. In Ecuador, interest groups often bring media
outlets to the committee debates or media outlets are attracted by particularly
crowded debates.5 Committee members will take advantage of the situation to
gain air time. While committee debates should be an exposition of information
and a political exchange, legislators will often address the media rather than their
interlocutor. In late 2018, the Tributary Committee of the Ecuadorian Congress
met to discuss insurance fees charged by banks to consumers. Representatives of
the mayor bank associations participated, as well as the Bank Superintendent (an
overseer of banks designated by the executive) and a number of affected consumers.
Journalists and cameras filled the room, and on top of the extensive use of their
floor time, legislators did not hide their keenness to face the cameras even though
they were addressing another person in the room. This anecdote reflects common
behavior, as was later confirmed in interviews with the committee chair, a committee
member, and various congressional staff from the Ecuadorian Congress. Note that
interest groups wanting to raise the salience of issue they represent and bringing
5Note that the effect of issue salience is a two-way street. Raising the salience of an issue can
be a strategy employed by interest groups to force legislators to address an issue.
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media to a committee debate is not at odds with other tactics employed by groups.
Interest groups use coverage by mass media as an “outside strategy” to influence
the political debate (Kollman, 1998; Thrall, 2009); they raise the salience of issue
through direct democracy initiative (Smith and Tolbert, 2004; Tolbert et al., 2009);
and air issue-advocacy ads, often times more credible than those aired by candidates
(Groenendyk and Valentino, 2002).
Thus, the main incentive legislators have to make public an otherwise private
affair, such as lobbying, is the opportunity to raise the salience of issues the party
owns. Since legislators gain collectively from the party’s reputation, legislators will
strategically invite interest groups to participate in committee debates in an effort
to raise the salience of owned issues. Having the prerogative to decide when interest
groups are invited grants parties a political benefit, and that prerogative often falls
on the legislators with gatekeeping authority. “Gatekeepers of influence” means
that parties invite interest groups that bring attention to the issues that they have
an advantage, either to attack groups on policies they want to defeat or to support
policies they want to put forward. Therefore, the institutional arrangements of
legislatures, as well as the strategic considerations of parties to take advantage of
these arrangements, are necessary to understand when parties will open the gates
and to whom.
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2.2 Delegating gatekeeping to party authorities
Legislators work and vote within the confines of a political and institutional
environment. Cox and McCubbins (1993; 2002; 2005) argue that parties act as
cartels that organize the institution for partisan benefits. These legislative cartels
use procedural powers to gain advantages for its party members. Mainly, majority
party members delegate authority to central agents (party leaders), who control the
legislative agenda to maximize success. To do so, legislators take advantage of the
gatekeeping authority bestowed upon committee chairs and prevent bill initiatives
that divide the party from reaching the plenary floor.6 While the decentralized
authority of committee chairs can result in divisive legislation that is not supported
by all senior members of the party, there are various instruments to prevent defection
from the partisan agenda. In exchange for loyalty, party leaders may offer side
payments to members in the form of distributive benefits or favorable committee
assignments (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Frisch and Kelly, 2006). In other cases,
“safety valves” can be placed to filter unwanted bills. In Argentina, legislation that
is reported from committees is subject to review in pre-floor party meetings, before
they can be scheduled for a plenary vote by the Chamber Directorate (Calvo and
Sagarzazu, 2011).
Gatekeepers in the legislature control the congressional agenda, granting them
a significant advantage over the rest of legislators. Gatekeeping authority in mul-
6A second mechanism suggested by Cox and McCubbins (1993) is the use of policy log-rolls,
where party members can extract district-specific benefits while supporting the partisan agenda
as a whole.
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tiparty legislatures is usually endowed to the largest party, which can impact the
direction of policymaking. In the U.S. Congress, there is rational anticipation by
committee chairs that serves to screen legislation that may divide or defeat the
majority party on the floor vote (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Indeed, one of the
emphasis of the party cartel theory is the negative agenda power afforded to party
holding the gatekeeping authority (Cox and McCubbins, 2005), something that has
been examined in the U.S. context (Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins, 2010; Finoc-
chiario and Rohde, 2008) as well as in Latin America (Amorim Neto et al., 2001;
Cox and Morgenstern, 2001; Aleman, 2006). As in the U.S. Congress, in most of
the Latin American legislatures, a majority of bills die at the committee stage. Ale-
man (2006) shows that approximately 50% of legislatures in Latin America impose
no deadlines for the consideration or reporting of legislation to the plenary floor,7
an institutional advantage for gatekeepers looking to avoid unwanted legislation to
continue its course. As Robert Bendiner (1964) more eloquently described it: “[A
congressperson] has two principal functions: to make laws and to keep laws from be-
ing made. The first of these [is achieved] with sweat, patience, and [...] remarkable
skill [...] but the second they perform daily, with ease and infinite variety.”8
The sequential organization of the legislative process in many Latin American
countries endows parties with a variety of resources to restrict the set of policy
choices available to legislators and to affect their voting behavior (Amorim Neto
7In the case of Ecuador, committees have 55 days to review a bill and elaborate a report for
the first debate in the plenary floor. In practice, committees chairs can hold on to a bill if they
decide to prioritize other initiative or if a majority of committee members are unwilling to discuss
it.
8Bendiner (1964) was referring to the U.S. Congress, but this characterization can be extended
to all legislatures where gatekeepers have agenda-setting prerogatives.
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et al., 2003). In a party-based legislature, for example, it is to be expected that
bills spearheaded by members of the majority party will have a higher probability
of passage than those proposed by members of other parties. In time-constrained
legislatures, members with control over the scheduling of legislation being debated
should be expected to prioritize the bills of their own party and, most importantly,
stop unwanted legislation to reach the floor (Calvo and Sagarzazu, 2011).
In countries where congressional committees play an important role in legisla-
tive success, the committee chairs have gatekeeping power with extensive control
over the scheduling of legislation being debated within. The scheduling preroga-
tives of committee chairs often extend to the participants of the committee, even
though these tend to be more context specific. Common examples include member-
ship to closed advisory committees (e.g., Balla and Wright, 2001; Binderkrantz and
Christiansen, 2015; Fraussen et al., 2015; Rasmussen and Gros, 2015) or (invited)
committee hearings (e.g., Leyden, 1995; Pedersen et al., 2015). Interest group par-
ticipation in committee debates in the Ecuadorian Congress falls closer to the latter,
even though, as previously suggested, the details of how gatekeeping authority is
exercised vary.
I have revisited the importance of the sequential organization of legislatures
and extended that logic to interest group participation. Gatekeepers control the
flow of legislation from committees, as much as they open and close the gates to
participate in committees. As suggested in the previous section, opening the gates
to interest groups raises the salience of issues, and committee chairs will use this
strategically to favor the party. Next, I analyze the underlying reasons for interest
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groups to accept these invitations.
2.3 Accepting the invitation: Interest groups and the micro-management
of policy
Scholars have conceptualized lobbying in three distinct, though not necessarily
exclusionary, ways: as a form of exchange, as a transmission of information, and
as a legislative subsidy. Exchange theory suggests that policymakers and lobbyists
engage in an implicit trade or quid pro quo, often vote-buying through campaign
contributions (Austen-Smith, 1996; Dekel et al., 2009; Groseclose and Snyder, 1996).
Theories on lobbying by the transmission of information understand the role of in-
terest groups as purveyors of information (Grossman and Helpman, 2001), revealing
the state of the world and the effect of policy on the status quo as a means of per-
suasion (Hansen, 1991; Austen-Smith and Wright, 1994). Rather than a mechanism
to change legislators’ preferences over policies, legislative subsidy theory argues that
interest groups “assist natural allies in achieving their own, coincident objectives”
(Hall and Deardorff, 2006).
Irrespective of the mechanism driving lobbying, interest groups are interested
in the marginal gains they can get from specific modifications to a policy initiative
as much as in pursuing sweeping changes to the legislation. The former will often
be a more effective strategy since incremental changes are more common than sub-
stantial ones (True et al., 1999). This is in part due to the organization of political
institutions (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; 1993), and in part due to partisanship
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(Baumgartner et al., 2009). In legislative politics, the devil is in the details. In-
terest groups seek to manage the “fine print” of policy, even when they have open
and broad positions about the state of policy. Interest groups are aware of the
complexities of the policy-creation process and the rigidity of the status quo and
hedge their investments by pushing for changes in articles or targeted additions to
a legislative initiative. Legislative success is conditional on institutional character-
istics and political interactions that are difficult to sway. As previously suggested,
negative agenda-setting power is the main driver of legislative success in legislatures
where gatekeepers have agenda-setting prerogatives. Even if interest groups have
the resources and the political acumen to move the status quo significantly, this
push would come before a policy is introduced into Congress, and not once it has
already entered the legislature. Given the characteristics of Congress and party car-
tels within Congress, the rare bill initiatives leaving committees are likely to change
the status quo, and at this point, interest groups are better off trying to scrape as
much as they can, especially at the margins.
Thus, interest groups gain more from riding the wave of a bill moving the status
quo than from investing in the creation of the wave itself. Take the case of Ecuador,
for instance, where interest group representatives were particularly cognizant of the
importance of addressing the “fine print” of policy, as well as the broader picture.
The former president of the board of directors of the Bolsa de Valores de Quito
(Quito Stock Exchange) said that “as an organization, [the Quito Stock Exchange]
has always been vocal in our position on financial regulations [...], and when the
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Código Orgánico Monetario y Financiero9 was being debated we expressed our con-
cerns about its technical flaws [...] and the effect it would have on [the Quito Stock
Exchange]. We made our opposition clear.”10 Regardless when asked about the
effect of their participation in the debate of the same bill, she pointed out that “we
pushed for the modification of certain articles of the law [...]. In the end, I would
say we got around 80% of the changes we proposed.”11 The complexities of the leg-
islative process also explain why most interest groups in Ecuador were reactive to
policy changes, rather than active participants. More prominent and better-funded
interest groups are usually the only organizations capable of moving policy in such a
drastic way. The Cámara de la Producción de Guayaquil –the Guayaquil Chamber
of Commerce– for example, has had, historically, great influence over the destinies
of Ecuadorian politics and policy. León Febres Cordero became president in 1984
backed by the Cámara de la Producción de Guayaquil (Freindenberg and Alcántara,
2001), and the Cámara de la Producción de Guayaquil was also instrumental in
the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy in 2000 (Acosta Mej́ıa, 2009). But
these are rare cases, an observation in line with incrementalist theories of policy
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993)
It is within this context that the implicit exchange if we can call it such a
9The Código Orgánico Monetario y Financiero is a law regulating the activities of financial and
fiduciary institutions in Ecuador. It was initially proposed by president Rafael Correa in 2014 and
was signed into law the same year.
10Interview with Mónica Villagómez, President of the Board of Directors of the Bolsa de Valores
de Quito (Quito Stock Exchange). October 18, 2018.
11The chair of the Tributary committee confirmed this behavior from interest groups, annoyed,
in part, by the lack of a “general to particular” view of policy. “Most [interest groups] are only
concerned with whether the tax exemption for new businesses should be for 3 years or 5 year or 7
years [...]. There are no [groups] that make claims about the spirit of the bill or their preference
for certain policy in the context of a broader view of the state.” He did mention that, at the very
least, these interventions reveal information about the interest groups themselves.
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thing, is realized: interest groups participate in legislative committees and raise the
salience of the issues discussed, while legislators allow interest groups to propose
marginal changes to legislation. This is the crux of public lobbying. The willingness
of interest groups to get access to committees is constant. Yet, on top of the capacity
to micro-manage policy, interest groups have additional incentives to participate
in committees. First, interest groups gain institutionally. Their presence in the
policy-creation space is a tangible representation of access, something interest groups
offer to their (fee-paying) members. It also reveals their technical capacity and
the policy position to all committee members and creates possible links for the
future. Note that “permanence” is not a quality of the Latin American legislator,
where the turnover of congressional candidates is high (Samuels, 2002), so networks
between politicians and interest groups need to be constantly created anew. Second,
as described by an interest group representative in Ecuador, public pressure “gets
[legislators] into action.”12 Previously, I argued that politicians invite interest groups
to raise the salience of an issue. Yet, the effect of issue salience is a two-way street.
Raising the salience of an issue can also be a strategy employed by interest groups
to force legislators to address it. Interest groups often bring media outlets to the
committee debates or use their participation in committee debates to bolster their
discourse in the media,13 and raising the salience of an issue provides an additional
benefit: politicians are forced to participate and act on salient issues (Feldman and
Zaller, 1992; Niemi and Bartels, 1985; Petrocik, 1996; Sides, 2006).
12Interview with Christian Walhi, Executive President of ANFAB. October 15, 2018.
13This strategy is not at odds with the idea of interest groups focusing on the “fine print” of the
law. Even when bills have broad impact on an issue, the discussion usually focuses on one or two
articles.
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Finally, there are benefits to interest groups that work in countries where
lobbying is not formalized and the institutional characteristics make the private
agreements between legislators and interest groups uncertain. Lobbying is mostly
unregulated in Latin America,14 and the interactions between interest groups and
policymakers are rarely carried out in formal venues. There are conversations and
negotiations between interest groups and policymakers that, while legal, are not
registered or reported (or observable). In Ecuador, the Cámara de Comercio de
Quito (Chamber of Commerce of Quito) routinely holds informative meetings with
public officials at different levels and branches of government.15 A former Ecuado-
rian minister of Coordinación de la producción, empleo y competitividad, a secretary
in charge of coordinating topics of production, employment and competitiveness,
held regular meetings with representatives of different sectors and organizations,
both to clarify the position of the government and to receive input about new leg-
islation being proposed or needed.16 The examples are context-specific, but they
help illustrate some of the consequences of unregulated lobbying. First, there are
is no legal definition of what constitutes lobbying, or who is a lobbyist. Are the
meeting and workshops held by the Cámara de Comercio de Quito lobbying? Is
asking for a meeting with a secretary of state to discuss policy lobbying? Second,
the legal lines between policymakers and lobbyists are blurred, even for them. It is
14México, Perú, and Chile are the only countries in Latin America where lobbying is explicitly
regulated. The first country to regulate lobbying activity was Perú in 2003, although the actual
law has come in conflict with the barriers imposed by the Peruvian legislation. Mexico approved
regulations for lobbying activity in 2010, while Chile did so in 2014.
15Interview with Patricio Alarcón, President of the Cámara de Comercio de Quito (Chamber of
Commerce of Quito). October 19, 2018.
16Interview with Nathalie Cely, former Ecuadorian minister of Coordinación de la producción,
empleo y competitividad. Octobre 19, 2018.
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not surprising that the informal interaction between interest groups and legislators
are as necessary for the ongoing discussions and negotiations of a bill as are the
public manifestation of this interaction. As suggested by the executive president
of the main association for producers of food and beverages in Ecuador, “we move
simultaneously in a formal and informal setting [...]. Informal meetings get you
access and a ballpark agreement, formal [venues] allow us to validate what we pro-
pose.”17 In other words, participation in committees formalizes agreements reached
in informal settings. While there are mechanisms to raise the cost of agreements
reached in private between legislators and interest groups,18 the private exchanges
between legislators and policymakers lack formal mechanisms of commitment and is
speculative in nature. Interest groups want private arrangements with legislators to
be materialized in policy or, at the very least, to be considered for a vote. Partici-
pating in committee debates, or any other public account of lobbying increases the
chance the committee will discuss and vote on a proposed change. An invitation to
a committee debate is an opportunity to have your proposal on record. Once it is
on record, the proposal will be considered and voted on by committee members.
17Interview with Christian Walhi, Executive President of ANFAB. October 15, 2018.
18Private agreements can be binding because the payment (votes/positive endorsement) a legis-
lator receives from interest groups for the commitments they make are delayed and fixed with the
electoral cycle. The shadow of the future hangs over private commitments since politicians cannot
reap the reward ex-ante. Moreover, even if politicians can plausibly deny having made private
commitments, it does not mean interest groups cannot mobilize voters against them. It can be
costly for a legislator to renege. Yet, it is more costly to renege once agreements are formalized
into the legislative records and decreases uncertainty.
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2.4 A different information model of legislative activity and lobbying
Researchers have argued that structure–in particular the committee system–is
key to understanding the behavior of legislators, but only as it serves the ends of the
party (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). As previously described, parties are understood
as legislative cartels, usurping the rule-making power of Congress in order to endow
their party members with differential powers (i.e. gatekeeping authority). The
informational rationale for congressional institutions, in contrast, is less interested
in the party, and more focused on how the institutional arrangements acquire and
disseminate information (Krehbiel, 1991). Committees are powerful legislative tools
that monopolize information and expertise, to then supply that information to the
rest of Congress accurately and truthfully. I share the emphasis on both party and
information and propose a different “information” model of legislative activity, one
where legislators answer to and benefit from the strengths of the party precisely by
strategically disseminating information (i.e. raising the salience of an issue). Parties
take advantage of the prerogatives granted to them by the sequential organization
of the legislature. Yet, rather than solely thinking about the effect bills will have
on the way party members vote, gatekeepers rely on interest group participation to
increase the visibility (make public) bill initiatives of issues they own, and gain from
the increases salience.
The strategy is in itself a signal to the party and a signal to the voters. To
the voters, a reminder or a prompt of who (i.e. what party) is handling what
important/salient issue (in this case, the issue the party owns). To the party, that
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a successful outcome of a bill addressing the owned issue is a(n) (electoral) win for
the party. Rather than relying in specialized committees to inform the plenary (á
la Krehbiel, 1991), gatekeepers rely on interest groups to raise the salience of an
issue, thus informing the party that they can now bank on the political investment
of supporting a bill (or, in game theoretical terms, of moving the status quo).
The proposed theory farther departs from informational theories since legisla-
tors are not (only) looking for information (from interest groups) nor is this informa-
tion the main driver of their behavior, but they instead invite interest groups to raise
the salience of issues, making voters the main audience. Krehbiel notes that ”two
informed opinions are better than one, especially when the informants are natural
adversaries” (1991, p.84), but it might be that the heterogeneity or homogeneity of
the information is less important than the multitude of bodies that bring it.
The alternative information model presented here addresses the public ac-
counts of lobbying, something often absent from interest group theories. Exchange
theory (Austen-Smith, 1996), for example, cannot explain public participation of
interest groups. Interest groups needn’t be on committees for them to help bring
out voters in support of legislators that promote their values. The transmission of
information models (Grossman and Helpman, 2001) can explain the strategic choice
of lawmakers to invite interest group to participate and reveal information about the
state of the world to other legislators. But these models assume that the audience
is other legislators. While this might be the case, committee politics are not em-
blematic of genuine debate. After all, debates and speeches on committees are less
about policy and more about politics, ranging from the electoral advantages through
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advertising and position taking (Mayhew, 1974; Pearson and Dancey, 2011), to the
expertise shown to other members of the legislature (Pearson and Dancey, 2011),
and the assertion in leadership positions. Rather than a dialogue, politicians “speak
past one another” (Ceaser and Busch, 2001), a description that can be extended to
the interaction between interest group representatives and legislators. This would
suggest that the true audience is, primarily, the party and the party constituents.
2.5 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to present a theory of public lobbying in the
legislature, highlighting the importance of issue ownership, issue salience, and the
effect interest group participation in committees has over the latter. I argue that
legislators with gatekeeping authority will invite open the committee gates in the
issue they own and close them for the issues they do not. Inviting interest groups to
committee debate raises the salience of the issues discussed, granting political and
electoral benefits to the party owning the issue. Interest groups do not engage in
this behavior selflessly. They gain, among other things, access to micro-manage the
policy being debated.
The model departs from the current theories of legislative activity and lobby-
ing. It is a different “information” model that stresses the importance of gatekeepers
and the effect opening and closing the gates to interest group has on the party. Sub-
sequent chapters give descriptive and empirical accounts of the theory by examining
interest group participation in the Ecuadorian Congress.
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Chapter 3: The Legislative Organization of the Ecuadorian Congress





In the previous chapter, I proposed a theoretical framework to analyze interest
group participation in the legislative process. The theory suggests that committee
chairs, legislators with gatekeeping authority, will strategically invite interest groups
to participate in committees in order to raise the salience of the issues the party
owns. This chapter describes in detail the legislative organization of the Ecuadorian
Congress, the role of parties and party leaders, and the participation of interest
groups at the committee level.
The sequential organization of the Ecuadorian Congress endows committee
chairs with agenda-setting power. Committee chairs use this power to control the
flow of legislation as well as the participation of interest groups in the debates. While
the rules governing this legislative body have changed over the years–from proce-
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dural reforms to constitutional reforms–the organizational distribution of power has
remained constant. Even though party leaders have a limited toolbox to whip com-
mittee chairs, it has been sufficient to yield some control over the decisions coming
from these pockets of decentralized power.
The debates within the committees are characterized by their performative
nature rather than their deliberative qualities. Media outlets are often present and
legislators are more interested in speaking to the cameras than to each other. One
common complaint among interest group representatives and some legislators was
the lack of substantive debate within committees. Yet, as suggested in the previous
chapter, the politics of debates are paramount for controlling the level of exposure a
bill gets (i.e. salience) and taking advantage of this exposure will affect how parties
are perceived by voters.
The rest of the chapter describes parties and their presence in the Ecuadorian
Congress across time. I also explain the process required to turn a bill into law,
emphasizing the procedure and politics of discharging bills from committees to the
floor. I close the chapter by detailing how interest groups try to micro-manage
policy, at what stage, and how the actual interaction with legislators looks like.
While interest groups hold general stances vis-á-vis policy, managing the “fine print”
of legislation is a common strategy used to obtain marginal gains from a process
(i.e. the approval of a bill) that is conditional on actors, contexts, and politics they
cannot control.
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3.2 Understanding the Committee System in Latin America
The organizational characteristics of legislatures are similar across Latin Amer-
ica. Most legislatures in Latin America have permanent committees with specific
policy jurisdictions (Saiegh, 2010). There is variation in the number of committees,
from 7 in Colombia to 48 in Honduras, as well as in the size of the legislative bodies,
from close to 600 in Brazil to 57 in Costa Rica. According to Saiegh (2005), all
countries in Latin America, except for Brazil and Colombia, have too many com-
mittees relative to their size.1 This means that legislators often need to serve in
more than one committee at the same time. In Argentina, for example, the median
number of assignments of a member of Congress per committee in 2007 was five,
even though some participated in up to ten committees in a single congressional
period (Calvo, 2014). For the most part, the sequential organization of legislatures
in Latin America is similar, decentralizing power to committees chairs and grant-
ing them agenda-setting prerogatives. At the same time, party leaders will have
different mechanisms to keep member loyal to the party line.
Legislative rules in the continent give party leaders, to a varying degree, some
type of power over committee appointments, along with prerogatives to manage the
legislative agenda. The amount of power a party leader will yield is dependent on
the number of seats the party gets. The allocation of committee assignments is, for
the most part, determined on a partisan basis (Saiegh, 2010). Party leaders often
use committee chairmanships and membership as rewards for party loyalty (Heath
1As a benchmark, Saiegh (2005) uses the average ratio of the number of committees to the size
of the legislature for a cross-section of non-Latin American countries.
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et al., 2005), something particularly useful in countries where electoral rules allow
or encourage legislator independence (e.g. Ecuador between 1979 and 1996).
The staff and resources available to assist with committee work in Latin Amer-
ica are deficient. In Brazil, one of the better-staffed legislatures in the continent, a
research office that has about 35 professionals assists the budget committee of the
lower House (Saiegh, 2010). In contrast, other legislatures, like the Argentinian,
have staff members assigned to the committees, but these only perform adminis-
trative functions (Rundquist and Wellborn, 1994). In Ecuador, while there is a
technical unit providing legal assistance to all legislators, the staff working in each
committee is limited to three members appointed by the chair.2 These members are
in charge of scheduling and submitting the reports to the Congressional archive, but
given the political nature of their appointment, they often lack formal training.
In general, legislatures in Latin America are characterized by low levels of
citizens trust (Latinobarometer, 2018) and low effectiveness in representing societal
interests (IDB, 2005). Saiegh (2010) constructs a two-dimensional representation of
Latin American legislatures measuring their capability and proactiveness. Brazil,
Chile, and to a lesser degree Uruguay, are characterized as constructive legisla-
tures, with the potential to become proactive. Argentina, Peru, and Panama are
described as somewhat obstructionist, but mostly passive. In this analysis, Ecuador
is located in the center of both dimensions, more likely a reflection of the orga-
nizational changes across time than of the structural characteristics picked up by
the model, but still a good starting point to describe the Ecuadorian Congress in
2Interview with Congressional Staff 1, April 5, 2019
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terms of the actors participating, the rules conditioning their behavior, and the
institutional characteristics determining their power.
3.3 Parties, legislators, and presidents in Congress
Ecuador is a unitary state with 25 electoral districts3, holding competitive
elections to select a president, national legislators, provincial legislators, governors,
majors, and a varying number of municipal council members. Despite the many
dictatorial stints, both civilian and military, during the first half of the twentieth
century, since 1979 Ecuador has been a relatively stable democratic regime. Com-
petitive general and sectional elections are regularly held with alternation in all levels
of government, and while the constitutional order has been disrupted as a result of
political and economic instability, the democratic order has been quickly reestab-
lished. More importantly, a majority of citizens in Ecuador support democracy, a
number that has steadily risen since 1996 (Latinobarómetro, 2017).
The party system in Ecuador is one of the most fragmented in Latin America
(Freidenberg, 2006). Since 1979, there have always been at least 10 parties and
movements with legislative representation, with a high of 19 in 2002. Figure 3.1
shows the share of seats by party per legislative period and their survival rate. Many
of the parties that won seats in the first decade after the return to democracy in
1979 had disappeared by 2006. The emergence of new parties, with outsider leaders,
is not uncommon. The most notorious case is Alianza Páıs in 2008 (24th legislative
3Each province (24) is an electoral district. One district is added for representatives of Ecuado-
rians living outside the country.
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period) who won close to 50% of the seats in Congress as a first-time participant.
Smaller parties (labeled as “Other”), parties that have not controlled more than 5%
of the legislature at any point in time, made up a considerable portion of Congress,
especially until 2006. The fragmentation of the system is in part a consequence of
the institutional design: laws restricting coalitions (until 1996), laws loosening the
restrictions for participation (i.e. movements were allowed to participate in 1995),
and the different methods to allocate seats (i.e. from D’Hondt to proportional
representation, and back). Parties have also catered mostly to regional constituents,
accentuated by the ethnic cleavages that became politically relevant in the early
1990s (Van Cott, 2007). As many scholars have argued, the governability problems
of Ecuador have been aggravated by this fragmentation, a reflection of broader
regional fractures (Pachano, 2004; Freidenberg, 2003).
The characteristics of the party system in Ecuador have an effect on the behav-
ior of parties and legislators in Congress. Between 1979 and 2008, there have been no
congressional majorities or stable coalitions (Mej́ıa Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich,
2011). Before 1996, the short-term limits for legislators–legislators were banned
from seeking immediate reelection–weakened the influence party leaders had on the
political careers of the rank and file (Morgenstern, 2002). With no leverage over leg-
islators’ electoral prospects, party leaders had few tools to retaliate against dissent
or camisetazos (party switches). The dynamic changed with the 1996 reforms that
allowed immediate reelection. This reform, combined with other mechanisms in the
leaders’ toolkit (e.g. promote or block legislative initiatives of party members, the

































Figure 3.1: Description of seat share by party from 1979 to 2019. Empty spaces mark the emer-
gence of new parties. Note, for example, the victory of PAIS in 2008 (period 24),
that won almost 50% of the seats in their first participation.
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resources), eventually gave party leaders enough power to control and coordinate
their members (Acosta Mej́ıa, 2009).
The key leadership positions within the Ecuadorian Congress are the presi-
dency, the CAL (Comisión Administrativa Legislativa)4, and the committee chairs.
All of these positions are endowed with agenda-setting prerogatives that will be later
explained in detail. The presidency is usually given to the party with the greatest
amount of seats, with the second largest political bloc holding the vice-presidency.
The CAL is comprised of the president, the vice-president, and four legislators, who
are chosen from the four largest political blocs. Committee chairmanships are allo-
cated by the CAL and are a result of previous negotiations. It is important to note
that these negotiations have become more streamlined with each passing period.
During the early 1980s, Congress took up to 4 months to agree on the confirmation
of committees and the distribution of chairs. By the early 1990s, the negotiations
were finalized within the first week of each legislative period.
Despite any prerogative party leaders could have over the members of the
party, they always have to be in constant political negotiations with a historically
strong executive. Ecuadorian presidents are endowed with significant agenda-setting
power, and political and material resources to influence the legislative process. In
addition to the president’s decree and veto authority,5 they can also allocate cabi-
4The Comisión Administrativa Legislativa is an administrative-like unit that is in charge of
classifying bill initiatives and assigning them to committees. I provide greater detail of the CAL
throughout the chapter.
5Though the rules have been modified in various occasions since 1979, in general, presidents
have had either exclusive rights to initiate bill related to fiscal reform and government spending, or
the capacity to send urgent economic bills to Congress, which have shorter time frames for debate,
and are automatically approved if Congress fails to vote on them. A presidential veto can only be
overturned by an absolute majority.
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net positions and offer valuable government posting,6 and, before 2008, (often legal
though seldom moral) informally use a discretionary spending fund (gastos reser-
vados) to finance legislators’ individual development projects (Mej́ıa Acosta and
Polga-Hecimovich, 2011).
The political history of Ecuador can be roughly divided into three periods,
all of which saw different (dominant) parties in Congress, and different inner work-
ings. The first period, between 1979 and 1996, was characterized by a process of
professionalization of the traditional parties, while constantly negotiating coalitions
with marginal movements. No party was able to get (close) to a legislative majority,
and the profound ideological divides between parties limited the capacity to form
lasting coalitions (Freidenberg and Alcántara, 2001). In 1997, the PSC (Partido
Social Cristiano)7 and the DP-UDC (Democracia Popular)8 secured a governing
short-lived coalition known as the aplanadora (“steamroller”), that supported the
market-based economic reforms of then president Jamil Mahuad. The breakdown
6Given the high turnover rates and short term-limits of Ecuadorian legislators, cabinet appoint-
ments and diplomatic posts usually trump legislative ones. Politicians often have more resources
in executive posts, some of which can be used to advance the goals of the party itself.
7The PSC is one of the most influential parties of the last four decades of Ecuadorian political
history. It is a conservative party that emerged in 1951 as a representative of the traditional elite
of the highlands (sierra). Six years later, the founder and historical leader of the PSC, Camilo
Ponce Enŕıquez, won the presidency through a conservative coalition that broke the liberal rule
of 61 years. By the early 1980s, the PSC had extended its reach to the coast, where, under
the leadership of León Febres Cordero, it revamped and strengthened its organizational structure
(Freidenberg and Alcántara, 2001). Even though it lost some legislative presence after 2008, it
has maintained in Guayaquil, the largest city, its political stronghold, having occupied the mayor’s
chair uninterruptedly since 1992.
8The Democracia Popular emerged after a dispute between the founder of the PSC, Camilo
Ponce Enŕıquez, and the younger members of the party. It presented itself as a modern alternative
to other conservative parties in the 1960s. Despite its unsuccessful beginnings, it entered the polit-
ical arena early after the return to democracy in 1979, through a coalition with the Concertación
de Fuerzas Populares (CFP), an alliance that allowed them to win the vice-presidency and, af-
ter the early death of CFP’s president Jaime Roldós, the presidency. Since then, the party won
the presidency again in 1998 and has elected various mayors, most importantly, the mayor of the
capital, Quito. The political prominence of the party waned towards 2008 and, while many of its
former members are still politically active, the party was dissolved in 2013.
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of the coalition was triggered, among other things, by the collapse of the Ecuado-
rian banking system in 1999. The polarized policy preferences for addressing the
crisis created friction between the PSC and the DP-UDC. The president’s deci-
sion to impose a freeze on accounts and later dollarize the economy alienated the
government’s PSC allies, who had already secured important posts in courts and
influential government agencies (Mej́ıa Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich, 2011). The
political, social, and economic crisis of that period extended until 2006. In that 10-
year period, two presidents were ousted from office (including Jamil Mahuad) amid
corruption scandals and deep social mistrust. By 2005, massive mobilizations of
people disenchanted by the political system took the streets with the chant: que se
vayan todos (everyone leaves). This led to the third period, which was consecrated
in 2008 with the drafting of a new Constitution. Alianza Páıs (AP), led by the
movement leader Rafael Correa,9 was able to secure, for the first time since 1979,
a majority in Congress. At the same time, most traditional parties had virtually
disappeared after 2006, and new parties emerged (see Figure 3.1). The political
landscape changed, not only by the levels of electoral support and economic re-
sources that AP had to govern but also by the dynamics within Congress, where a
clear government/opposition confrontation was always at the forefront.
3.4 The approval of a bill initiative
The Ecuadorian Congress has a fixed schedule for the approval of bills, a
feature that has been relatively constant despite the various institutional reforms.
9Carlos de la Torre (2013) describes Correa as a “populist technocrat”.
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The legislative process begins with a bill initiative10 being deposited with the CAL
(Comisión Administrativa Legislativa). Bills are introduced by a lead sponsor, who
can be a member of Congress, a member of the executive, a member of the national
judiciary, or, under special conditions, a citizen group.11 Legislators need the sup-
port of their bloc (party or coalition) or the support of 5% of legislators (LOFL
Art. 54). Bill may also be endorsed by other members of Congress, as long as
the main sponsor is also a member of Congress. Until 2008, each bill was assigned
a file number (i.e. II-98-001 or 20-001)12 by the staff of the Secretaŕıa Técnica,
a congressional agency in charge of providing legal and administrative support to
legislators. The Secretaŕıa Técnica sends a non-binding report to the CAL suggest-
ing the continuation (or not) of the bill on technical grounds and the committee to
which it should go based on the policy jurisdiction implied by the wording of the
bill. The Secretaŕıa Técnica can also suggest combining the discussion of various
bills addressing a similar topic. Even though for many cases the CAL will accept
the suggestions from the Secretaŕıa Técnica, interviews with congressional staff and
legislators suggest that there are political considerations when deciding to which
committee a bill is assigned and, most importantly, what bills are allowed to reach
committee, and which are killed in this first stage.13 Note that there are limits to
10Bills have different scopes. They range from public declarations on regional landmarks to
complete overhauls of the civil code.
11Before 1998, a committee could also introduce a bill.
12The file number is composed of three elements: the legislative year within a period (I, II, III, or
IV), the last two digits of the year, and the order of submission of a the bill in the legislative year.
The code changed after 1998, and the legislative year and the last two digits of the year were given
a code, starting at 20. Interviews with staff from the Secretaŕıa Técnica and the Congressional
Archive said that there are no formal rules on coding and archiving bills, so the format tends to
change with the staff.
13Interview with Congressional Archive Staff Member 1 of the Archivo-Biblioteca de la Asamblea
Nacional. April 3, 2019.
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the leeway the CAL might have on the decision to which committee a bill is referred
to: the topic of the bills must be related to the policy jurisdiction of the committee.
Once a bill reaches a committee, the committee has 45 days to review the bill
and to elaborate a report for its first debate on the plenary floor. The commit-
tee cannot review the bill in less than 15 days (LOFL Art. 58). The discussion
of the bills occurs over time in separate and not necessarily continuous sessions.
Each committee has a secretariat from where all the discussions are coordinated
and scheduled, and all the reports distributed and filed. The secretariat is not a
non-partisan technical unit as it is appointed by each committee chair (and changes
with each new chair).14 Before 2008, there were no deadlines for the consideration
or reporting of legislation to the plenary floor. When the Executive sends a proyecto
económico urgente (urgent economic bill), the committee has only 15 days to elab-
orate a report and Congress only 30 days to vote on the bill, otherwise, the bill is
automatically approved.15
Committees do not formally vote on a bill but instead report to the floor for
a first debate.16 The committee will agree on a majority report that includes the
recommendations and observations expressed by interest and citizen groups, as well
as the recommendations and observations made by committee members. Members
14One of the major limitations of the official documents archived in the Congressional Archive is
the absence of rules for the elaboration of committee reports. While the Secretaŕıa Técnica follows
a strict format for all the documents they produce, the reports produced by the committees follow a
rough outline but will depend on the secretary in charge. This reveals, in a way, one of the broader
consequences of a legislature marked by ever-changing rules, limited and politicized (technical)
resources, and inadequate capacity.
15The deadline for a proyecto económico urgente to be voted has varied since 1979. Initially, the
Executive could send “urgent” bills on any topic and Congress only had 15 days to vote on them.
16The Secretaŕıa Técnica assists legislators in screening bills for potential defects of form and
substance.
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who disagree with the report can also attach a minority report to the bill, explaining
their position. This first report, as well as the bill, are not necessarily voted the
first time they reach the plenary floor. Instead, legislators can make additional
observations to the bill before it returns to the committee for a second report. Only
with an absolute majority can the plenary reject the bill during its first debate. This
usually occurs if the majority report is negative.
Once the bill returns from the floor, the committee has an additional 45 days
to review the bill and elaborate a report for the second debate. Again, a second
majority and, if needed, a second minority report is attached to the bill. In addition
to the report, the bill dossier will include the committee version of the proposed
bill, and all ancillary material, which are made available to all legislators. The
president of Congress–also the chair of the CAL–will schedule, at her discretion, a
second debate on the plenary floor. On the plenary floor, the bill will be debated a
second time, during which new changes can be included. The plenary can reject the
majority report and acknowledge the minority report, but only with the support of
two-thirds of plenary attendees. Bills can be voted on as a whole, by section, or by
article. Bills can also be voted down as a whole, by section, or by article. At this
stage, a simple majority is sufficient for any decision.
If the bill is approved by the plenary floor, it will be sent to the executive,
who can sign it into law (sancionar), partially veto the bill (objeción parcial), or
veto the bill (objeción total). A partial veto will return the bill to the plenary with
modifications from the executive to be approved (by simple majority) or rejected (by
a two-thirds majority), in which case the original text is published. If the president
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vetoes the bills, it will be archived and can only be treated again after a year. After a
year, the original project can be ratified by the legislature with an absolute majority.
In each stage, a smaller sample of bills successfully advances. Close to 68% of
all bills presented will never be discharged from committee.17 A third of those will
not reach the plenary floor for a second debate. In the end, only 16% of all bills
presented will be sanctioned into law. In a later chapter, I will analyze the effect
of interest groups on success in committees and success on the plenary floor. For
now, it is important to note that the process by which a bill becomes a law leads to
most bills failing to make it to the next stage. As we will see in the next section,
the institutional rules have been thoroughly reformed, yet the legislative sequence
of a bill has remained constant.
3.5 Committees, debates, and their organization
The Ecuadorian Congress has gone through several institutional changes in the
midst of economic and political crises. As Freidenberg (2006) describes it, “rather
than the absence of rule of the game, Ecuador has gone through a constant change of
the rule.” (p. 250) Since 1979, reforms have changed the electoral rules, party rules,
legislative rules, and the Constitution (twice). All of these institutional changes
were a consequence of and had a consequence in politics, but the general consensus is
that they did not improve the conditions for adequate representation or governability
(Conaghan, 1995; Mej́ıa Acosta, 2002; Pachano, 2004; Freidenberg, 2006). A recount
17This includes bills that were cajoneadas, kept “in the drawer”, by the CAL (most common),
by the respective committee, or bills that were reject based on technical aspects.
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of the most relevant changes of the last 40 years can be found in Table 3.1.
Year Reform
1983 Legislative and executive periods reduced from five to four years.
Midterm elections for provincial legislators (every two years).
1994/1995 Immediate reelection approved for all elected positions, except for the pres-
ident.
Movements allowed to participate in elections.
1998 New Constitution1
Committees increased from 4 to 16.
Committee assignments extended from one to two years.
Seats in Congress increased from 82 to 121.2
2000 D’Hondt method for allocation of seats adopted.
2002 D’Hondt method ruled unconstitutional. Imperiali method (proportional
representation) adopted.
2008 New Constitution1
Committees decreased from 16 to 12. All the names and topics of commit-
tees revamped.
2012 D’Hondt method for allocation of seats adopted, again.
Two-year term limit imposed to all elected positions.
1 The two major constitutional reforms in Ecuador catered to different interests, elites, and
political processes (for contrasting accounts, see Becker, 2011; de la Torre, 2013; Conaghan,
2008; Radcliffe, 2012). Even though some of the gatekeeping prerogatives of legislators
were stripped from the 1998 and 2008 constitutions, and both supported extensive exec-
utive powers, the general sequential organization of the legislature was maintained.
2 In 1979 the Ecuadorian Congress had 70 seats, but a provision in the electoral law
required that the number of seats would increase with population. This provision has
been maintained.
Table 3.1: Important Institutional Reforms in Ecuador, 1979-2018
Despite the many institutional and constitutional changes in Ecuador and the
Ecuadorian Congress, the general sequential organization of the legislature has been
maintained, as well as the main pillar on which political power rests: legislative
blocs (bloques legislativos), and committees. Legislative blocs are formed by at least
10% of the seats in Congress and comprise one or multiple parties (art. 128, CPE
1998; art. 124, CPE 2008). Blocs determine the distribution of political power in
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the legislature: memberships to the CAL are divided among blocs, the position in
a political trial had to be presented by a bloc (until 2008), bills need the support
of a bloc (or at least 10 legislators), and the size of blocs determine who is elected
as president and vice-president of Congress. The CAL (Comisión Administrativa
Legislativa)18, an administrative-like committee, plays a central role in the organi-
zation of Congress. The president of Congress also holds the chairmanship of the
CAL. The CAL will determine the agenda for the legislative period (2 years). It
can change the order of the day and determines the order in which legislators will
speak during plenary debates. Before 2008, a member of a bloc would propose a
list of legislators for each committee, and this list would be voted by the plenary.
As of 2008, the CAL is also in charge of assigning legislators to committees and
electing the corresponding chairs.19 One of the most important roles of the CAL
is assigning bill initiatives to the appropriate committees. Unlike similar bodies in
other legislatures, the CAL is not a technical committee, but it is informed by a
technical unit that writes a report on every bill and makes a non-binding suggestion
to the CAL on whether a bill must be approved or not, and to what committee it
should be assigned. Yet, it is as a gatekeeper that the chair of the CAL exercises
most of her agenda-setting power. The chair of the CAL can deny the advancement
of any bill on technical (legal or formal) grounds and, more often, can “cajonear” a
bill initiative before it even reaches the committee.
Once legislators chair a committee, their prerogatives are ample. The commit-
18Before 1998, the CAL was known as the Comisión de Mesa
19Each legislator sends a list of preferred committees and the CAL will evaluate to which com-
mittee each legislator is assigned based on these preferences. Yet, the preferences are only that,
preferences. It is the CAL who decides who is going where.
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tee has 45 days to review the bill and elaborate a report for the first plenary floor
debate, and it can extend the period by 10 days.20 These timelines are, in practice,
a fiction. Chairs control the schedule of committee meetings and the time during
the meetings. It is often the case that during a legislative period there are more
bills entering the committees than time to debate them. Legislators and legislative
staff confirmed that chairs (strategically) change the order the bills are debated, and
can effectively block bills from being debated at all.21 These accounts are corrob-
orated by the data. There are more bills approved by the CAL than bills exiting
from committees to the floor.22 In general, the legislative organization and rules are
particularly favorable to parties with gatekeeping authority at the committee level.
Since there are no explicit rules on how committee chairmanships are allocated, large
parties enjoy a significant premium in committee chairs even when seat differences
are small, as shown in Figure 3.2. This condition is particularly relevant in the
Ecuadorian political context, where only one party after 2008 has won a majority
of seats in Congress. The gatekeeping authority is decentralized to party members,
usually party leaders, who control important committee posts, endowing large par-
ties with institutional resources to screen unwanted legislation in their respective
jurisdictions, e.g., the tributary, social security, constitutional affairs committees,
etc.23
20No specific timetable for standing committees is found in the legislative rules before 2008.
21Interview with Gabriela Larreátegui, Congresswoman of the Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador.
October 19, 2018; interview with Congressional Staff Member 2. October 20, 2018.
22Procedural rules require that all bills approved by the CAL are reviewed in committees and
sent to the plenary floor. We should see the same number of bills approved by the CAL than bills
exiting from commissions to the floor.
23Note, however, that decentralized gatekeeping authority at the committee level may result
in divisive legislation that is not unanimously supported by all senior partners of the party being
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Figure 3.2: Majoritarian bias in the allocation of committee chairmanships. Estimated using a
general linear (binomial, N) with logistic link. Dependent variable is the share of
chairs controlled by each party bloc. Independent variables include the log trans-
formed share of party seats (King, 1990) and the effective number of legislative blocs
(Calvo, 2009).
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As previously described, the number of standing committees has varied across
time, and so have the number of legislators assigned to each committee (see Figure
3.3). With only four committees between 1979 and 1998 and limited seats in each
committee, there were legislators that never served in one. This means that commit-
tee membership and key positions in these committees were valuable, often assigned
to high ranking members within the party–who were, at the same time, less likely to
dissent–. For example, the average tenure of a committee member was longer than
the tenure of a non-committee member in 60% of the periods24; national legislators
were almost twice as likely to be committee chairs than state legislators.25 Once the
number of standing committees was expanded, all members were able to participate
in a committee, but the importance of the four original committees (i.e. Civil and
Penal, Tributary, Economic, and Labor) and the CAL remained. Members of the
plurality party were 2.5 times more likely to be assigned chairmanship of these
committees than members of the rest of parties.
Parties will strategically stack committees, favoring committees addressing the
issues they own.26 Historically, traditional parties on the left have been linked to
pay attention to issues on which no senior party member has previously expressed a preference
(Sheingate, 2006). Yet, as previously mentioned, the CAL has ample agenda-setting prerogatives,
creating a first filtering mechanism. And even when the committee chair abides by the mandatory
times, the president of the legislature can always postpone the debate of the bill on the plenary
floor.
24This is a particularly high number if we keep in mind that between 1979 and 1996 there was
no immediate reelection for legislators. Note that the tenure is from non-consecutive terms.
25National candidates were often on top of the list and were chosen from the party leadership.
National candidates were competing for a four-year term vis-á-vis a two-year term from state
candidates, but only 15% of seats were assigned to national candidates. In a legislature with high
turnover rates, like the Ecuadorian, a guaranteed longer tenure in Congress was desirable.
26Measuring issue ownership is not straightforward as there is no established way of determining
which issues are owned by which party. In the United Kingdom and the United States, there are
detailed surveys that ask respondents which party is most competent at dealing with each of a
series of issues (Green 2011; Sides 2006). Instead, for this descriptive section, I link issue ownership
to party families, as historical cleavages are often closely related to issue ownership (De Ridder
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Figure 3.3: Box plot describing the number of committee assignments per representative, 1989 -
2019. Box describes the 25th to 75th quantiles, with median observation described
by a solid line. For many legislative periods, the number of committee assignments
was constant and homogeneous.
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topics of labor and parties on the right to issues of commerce (Mej́ıa Acosta, 2003).
Movements and parties founded during the 1990s and 2000s as part of the institu-
tionalization of the indigenous social movements were easily linked to indigenous
issues. This characterization matches how parties stack their members in com-
mittees. From Figure 3.4, the trend is suggestive, though it varies across periods.
Between 1979 and 2008 (panel A), leftist parties place most of their members in
the Labor committee (e.g. MPD), while parties on the right stacked the Economic
committee (e.g. PSC). Indigenous political parties, like the MUPP-NP, concen-
trated their members in committees dealing with indigenous and regional affairs.
Given the expansion of the number of standing committees after the Constitutional
reforms of 1998, there was a slight spreading out of members across committees.
For parties with a larger share of seats, the allocation of committee chairs, usually
negotiated among the larger party blocs, is also telling: the ID (left) focused on the
Labor committee, while the PSC (right) preferred allocating chairs in the Economic
committee. After 2009 (panel B), the majoritarian party AP had a motivation to
spread their members across all committees, obtaining simple majorities in all of
them and controlling the flow of most legislation. The rest of the parties had to be
content with whatever was left over.
Chairs also control who participates in committee debates. In Ecuador, any
legislator can invite an interest group to participate in committee debates. Consti-
tutionally, every citizen has the right to participate in committee debates, and each
committee must hold socialización forums where bill initiatives are discussed with


























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.4: Number of committee assignments and committee chairmanship by selected parties,
from 1979-2007 (Panel A) and from 2008-2019 (Panel B). Committees changed in
name after the Constitution of 2008. *Note that the indigenous and territorial affairs
committees were added only after 1998.
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interested parties. But within their scheduling control, committee chairs have an
implicit power to decide who can participate in committee debates. So, while chairs
have a legal obligation to grant interest groups time in committees, in practice this
is not always the case. By changing the order of the day, committee chairs can
postpone participation of interests groups until time runs out. Interviews with leg-
islative staff confirm that this is common practice, though how common a practice
it is hard to know. It is also hard to know how much can a chair get away with. If
there are time slots to fill, other committee members will push to have an interest
group they support receive or occupy that time. Despite these instances, there are
enough circumstances where the discretionary power of the chair is capable of limit-
ing access to debates. Even the socialización forums are controlled spaces managed
by the office of the committee chair. While the lists of possible forums are compiled
by a technical team from the Ecuadorian Congress, committee chairs have to give
their final approval. Ultimately, the only valid invitation is the one the committee
chair accepts.27
3.6 Guests in and outside committees
In Ecuador, the interactions between interest groups and policymakers are
most commonly carried out in informal venues. Lobbying is mostly unregulated in
Latin America,28 and there is no law addressing it in Ecuador. Yet, there are conver-
27Interview with Congressional Staff Member 1 of the Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador. March
25, 2019.
28México, Perú, and Chile are the only countries in Latin America where lobbying is explicitly
regulated. The first country to regulate lobbying activity was Perú in 2003, although the actual
law has come in conflict with the barriers imposed by the Peruvian legislation. Mexico approved
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sations and negotiations between interest groups and policymakers that, while legal,
are not registered or observable. As previously described, the Cámara de Comer-
cio de Quito (Chamber of Commerce of Quito) routinely holds informative meetings
with public officials at different levels and branches of government; a former Ecuado-
rian minister of Coordinación de la producción, empleo y competitividad, a secretary
in charge of coordinating topics of production, employment, and competitiveness,
held regular meetings with representatives of different sectors and organizations,
both to clarify the position of the government and to receive input about new legis-
lation being proposed or needed. The examples are context-specific, but they help
illustrate some of the consequences of unregulated lobbying. First, there are is no
legal definition of what constitutes lobbying, or who is a lobbyist. Are the meeting
and workshops held by the Cámara de Comercio de Quito lobbying? Is asking for a
meeting with a secretary of state to discuss policy lobbying? Second, the legal lines
between policymakers and lobbyists are blurred, even for them.29
In their interviews, legislators and interest groups representatives were open
about informal meetings to discuss bill initiatives. All of the legislators interviewed
agreed that the lack of regulation regarding lobbying made interactions with interest
groups complicated. They justified their meetings with interest groups normatively:
a necessary approach to their constituents. They also acknowledged the possible
negative reaction a meeting between policymakers and interest groups could gener-
ate. Yet, most legislators also agreed that the public perception of these meetings,
regulations for lobbying activity in 2010, while Chile did so in 2014.
29The lack of regulation and/or records is one of the main reasons why it is hard to systematically
study interest groups.
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associated with corruption or cronyism, was only a problem if there was, indeed,
some morally questionable exchange.
It is not surprising that the informal interaction between interest groups and
legislators was necessary for the ongoing discussions and negotiations of a bill. As
suggested by the executive president of the main association for producers of food
and beverages in Ecuador, “we move simultaneously in a formal and informal setting
[...]. Informal meetings get you access and a ballpark agreement, formal [venues]
allow us to validate what we propose.” Many of the interviewees agreed that most of
the “action” took place outside the formal setting of the Ecuadorian Congress, while
admitting that invitations to the committee were, to them, a form of legitimization
of the agreements discussed in private.30
To gain access to a committee, it is more common for interest groups to be
actively pressuring legislators than it is for committee members to seek groups to
participate in committees. In the next chapter, I will detail the evolution of interest
groups as organizations, but for now, it is important to note that there has been
a professionalization of interest groups in Ecuador, especially of traditional groups
representing commerce and finance. This professionalization has also changed the
interaction between interest groups and legislators, and the mechanisms used to gain
access. Beyond the informal agreements described above, interest groups maintain
constant communication with legislators (and the office of the legislators).31 Interest
30This was a common theme across all interest group representatives.
31Interview with Pabel Muñoz, Congressman (Committee Chair) of the Asamblea Nacional del
Ecuador, October 23, 2018; Gabriela Larreátegui, Congresswoman of the Asamblea Nacional del
Ecuador. October 19, 2018; Julio José Prado, Executive Director of the Asociación de Bancos
Privados del Ecuador (AsoBanca). October 23, 2018; Ramiro Viteri, Executive Director of the
Asociacin de Administradoras de Fondos y Fideicomisos del Ecuador (AAFFE). October 23, 2018;
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groups, especially those with more resources, have teams collecting and organizing
information that they are constantly feeding the (relevant) legislators, as part of
the mechanisms that build and cement networks, which are important when “invi-
tations” for the discussion of a bill are sent out. This was not always the case. One
interviewee who worked through the professionalization period of interest groups
described how the current formalities were not so in the early 2000s. She suggested
that access was often times conditional on informal ties (i.e. family ties, social ties,
or business ties) and while there is still much of this behavior present, there has been
a change towards formalizing the channels to gain access to legislators. “My part-
ner and I would sit outside conference rooms where committee debates were being
heard, waiting for legislators to exit [...] and follow them with some documents we
had put together trying to get their attention about possible reforms to the [topic
we represented]”, she explained, then adding, “nowadays we would have tried the
more formal channels, probably badgering the legislator’s office, rather than the
legislators himself.”32. On their part, legislators will also request the participation
of interest groups, experts or government agencies. This can be done either individ-
ually or as an invitation from the committee as a group. According to legislative
staff, it is only in rare occasions that an invitation would be turned down, regardless
of whether the guest was from a government agency or the private sector.33 In both
Patricio Aspiazu, President of the Cámara de Comercio de Quito (Chamber of Commerce of
Quito). October 19, 2018.
32Mónica Villagómez, President of the Board of Directors of the Bolsa de Valores de Quito
(BVQ). October 18, 2018.
33According to staff at the Ecuadorian Congress, more common than turning down an invita-
tion from a commission was sending a lower ranking member from the invited organization. For
example, members would react negatively if the director of the IRS was invited, yet she sent an
assistant on her behalf. Interview with Congressional Staff Member 1 of the Asamblea Nacional
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cases, when groups are looking to gain access and when legislators invite groups to
participate, the final decision is made by the committee chair.
Once inside the committee, the debates resemble a spectacle. As described in
chapter 2, interest groups are fully aware of the performative nature of committee
debates. Committee debates are usually held in large conference rooms, with space
for non-participating guests and the media. According to congressional staff, media
presence is constant, even though the number of outlets present would vary from
topic to topic. In their interviews, interest group representatives suggested using
media as a strategy to pressure legislators,34 so the presence of the press had many
sources: the exogenous salience of the topic, the salience created by interest groups,
and the salience created by legislators. In addition to interest groups, common
committee guests are legal specialists, citizen groups, and representatives of state
agencies. Once the speeches start35, one member from each legislator’s team is
usually ready to take pictures when it is the legislator’s turn to speak.36 Legislators
who are not members of the committee can also request to participate in the debates.
The committee chair will conduct the meeting, with the committee secretary (a staff
member appointed by the committee chair) reading the order of the day, the guest
del Ecuador. April 1, 2019
34Interview with Christian Walhi, Executive President of the Asociación Nacional de Fabricantes
de Alimentos y Bebidas (ANFAB). October 15, 2018; Patricio Aspiazu, President of the Cámara
de Comercio de Quito (Chamber of Commerce of Quito). October 19, 2018. Julio José Prado,
Executive Director of the Asociación de Bancos Privados del Ecuador (AsoBanca). October 23,
2018.
35I refer to the intervention of legislators as “speeches” though, technically, they are spaces for
legislators to comment on the bill initiatives and ask questions to participants, including guests.
36Legislators can have a team of four staff members (committee chairs have an additional team
that helps them with the organization of the committee). Staff members are usually tasked with
political coordination, media relations, and scheduling. There are few resources dedicated to policy
research, and that information usually comes from the party leadership, government agencies or
party allies (e.g. policy research institutes or interest groups).
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list, and the scheduled participation of interest groups. Committee members will
request time to speak, and the speeches will resemble the speeches in the plenary
floor in form and substance: expository rather than interactive. Contrary, guests
will bring prepared material to present in the committee. Many interest groups
representatives complained about the limited attention committee members gave
to their presentations. Anecdotal observation of committee debates confirms this
behavior, as many legislators were often in their phones, working in their computers,
talking to their staff, or talking among each other. Committee members will then
have a chance to ask questions to guests and request additional information. Those
who request time to ask questions will usually use the opportunity to deliver another
speech, rarely addressing the guest directly, though using their question as a segue.
After all, the questions and information required can always be obtained in private.
There are legislators that take this time to engage with guests, and chairs seem to
abide more closely to the spirit of the committee debates than the rest of members.
Yet, the most common behavior is to gain additional floor time rather than to engage
with the guests. Once the allotted time to discuss a bill has passed, the chair will
end the meeting. Chairs have the discretionary power to stop short or extend the
time a discussion lasts (within a reasonable time frame), as well as the capacity to
have invited guests not participating.
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3.7 From committees to the floor
As described above, legislators do not vote on bills at committees. Rather,
the committee is in charge of the elaboration of a report on the bill, detailing
the input from different participants (e.g. other legislators, government agencies,
interest groups, experts, etc.), the motivation for the proposed changes to the bill,
and a draft of the modified bill. A majority of members have to agree on this
report (known as the majority report) before it can be discharged to be voted on
the plenary floor. Additionally, any member can attach a dissenting report, known
as the minority report. The committee can also send a report suggesting a bill be
voted down, even though this is less common. Of the bills that reached committee,
only 9% of the time did the report suggest the bill should be voted down, compared
to 17% of the time bills were cajoneados by the committee chair. Once a report has
been discharged from a committee, the president of Congress will schedule a vote
on the plenary floor. This first vote will only stop a bill from going forward with an
absolute 2/3 majority. Otherwise, the bill will return to the original committee,37
where a second report will be agreed upon and sent to the plenary floor for a second
time where it needs a simple majority to be approved (and sent to the executive).
The activity of committees will vary across topics and periods. Table 3.2 in-
cludes descriptive information that ranks committees in the Ecuadorian Congress by
the number of bills that were assigned to each committee by the CAL, detailing the
percentage of bills successfully discharged to first and second debate in the plenary
37Again, if the chair wants to stall the advancement of the bill at this point, she has the ability
to do so.
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floor. Committees dealing with civil and penal law are, overall, the busiest. Note,
however, that bills entering these committees are usually reforms or interpretations
to specific articles. Beyond that, committees discussing topics of labor and social
security have historically been the most active, followed closely by committees ad-
dressing economic and tributary matters. The level of activity does not necessarily
equate to importance. For example, committees addressing constitutional reforms
are highly regarded but, by construction, less active.
Committees will also vary on the time it takes them to discharge legislation to
the floor. Between 1979 and 1998, the median time it took a bill initiative from its
presentation to being discharged to the plenary floor for first debate was 113 days,
compared to 21 days that took for a bill to get from the first debate to the second
debate. Between 1998 and 2008, the time from presentation to first debate increased
to 195 days, and from the first debate to the second debate to 105 days. Since 2009,
it takes 153 days from presentation to the first debate and 101 days from first to
second. In general, bills sent by the executive move faster across the legislature,
especially bills going to the Tributary committee and the Commerce committee.
Once a bill is discharged to the floor, the president of Congress will schedule
a debate and a vote. Before the start of a plenary meeting, the president will check
if there is the necessary 2/3 quorum. The committee chair will first summarize
the committee report, and then the president will open the floor for comments and
requests for modifications to the bill. It is within the powers of the president to
extend or limit the debate, and call for a roll call vote at any point. Before 2008,
there was no electronic device to record the votes and there is no official log of the
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Committee Ranking, 1979-1997
Ranking Committee Bills (%) Bills First (%) Second (%)
1 De lo Laboral y Social 0.42 539 0.39 0.37
2 De lo Civil y Penal 0.28 361 0.25 0.24
3 Econmico, Agrario, Industrial y Comercial 0.17 224 0.16 0.15
4 Tributario, Fiscal, Bancario y de Presupuesto 0.13 175 0.12 0.12
Total 1.00 1299 0.92 0.88
Committee Ranking, 1997-2008
Ranking Committee Bills (%) Bills First (%) Second (%)
1 De lo Civil y Penal 0.25 186 0.24 0.19
2 Gestin Pblica y Seguridad Social 0.12 88 0.12 0.05
3 De lo Laboral y Social 0.11 83 0.11 0.08
4 Econmico, Agrario, Industrial y Comercial 0.10 78 0.10 0.08
5 Educacin, Cultura y Deporte 0.10 73 0.10 0.07
6 Tributario, Fiscal, Bancario y de Presupuesto 0.09 70 0.09 0.08
7 Salud, Medio Ambiente y Ecologa 0.06 45 0.06 0.05
8 Descentralizacin y Desconcentracin 0.06 43 0.06 0.05
9 Asuntos Constitucionales 0.03 19 0.03 0.01
10 Asuntos Amaznicos 0.02 17 0.02 0.01
11 Defensa del Consumidor y Contribuyente 0.02 14 0.02 0.01
12 Desarollo Urbano y Vivienda de Inters Social 0.02 13 0.02 0.01
13 De la Mujer, el Nio, la Juventud y la Familia 0.01 11 0.01 0.01
14 Asuntos Indgenas y Otras Etnias 0.01 5 0.01 0.01
15 Asuntos Internacionales y de Defensa Nacional 0.00 3 0.00 0.00
Total 1.00 748 0.99 0.71
Committee Ranking, 2009-2018
Ranking Committee Bills (%) Bills First (%) Second (%)
1 Justicia y Estructura del Estado 0.29 267 0.24 0.10
2 Derechos de los Trabajadores y la Seguridad Social 0.13 114 0.10 0.04
3 Educacin, Cultura, Ciencia y Tecnologa 0.10 94 0.09 0.04
4 Desarrollo Econmico, Productivo y la Microempresa 0.09 87 0.08 0.03
5 Rgimen Econmico y Tributario y su Regulacin y Control 0.09 81 0.08 0.04
6 Gobiernos Autónomos y Descentralización 0.08 69 0.07 0.04
7 Derechos a la Salud 0.05 46 0.04 0.02
8 Soberana, Relaciones Internacionales y Seguridad Integral 0.04 36 0.03 0.01
9 Participacin Ciudadana y Control Social 0.04 36 0.04 0.02
10 Derecho Colectivos 0.04 36 0.03 0.01
11 Biodiversidad y Recursos Naturales 0.03 26 0.02 0.01
12 Soberana Alimentara y Desarrollo Agropecuario 0.03 26 0.02 0.01
Total 1.00 919 0.86 0.37
Note: The variable “Ranking by Bill” is measured by estimating the aggregate number of referrals by committee for the entire
period. The activity of some standing committees changed significantly over the years. For the change of ranking across time,
see Appendix A.
Table 3.2: Committee Ranking in the Ecuadorian Congress, 1979-2018
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votes. This worked in favor of legislators who would publicly take a position on an
issue, but vote differently (Acosta Mej́ıa et al., 2006).
3.8 The “fine print” in action
When interest groups are invited to committees, they are particularly cog-
nizant of the importance of addressing the “fine print” of policy, as well as the
broader picture. The former president of the board of directors of the Bolsa de Val-
ores de Quito (Quito Stock Exchange) said that “as an organization, [in the Quito
Stock Exchange] we have always been vocal in our position on financial regulations
[...], and when the Código Orgánico Monetario y Financiero38 was being debated
we expressed our concerns about its technical flaws [...] and the effect it would
have on [the Quito Stock Exchange]. We made our opposition clear.” Regardless,
when asked about the effect of their participation in the debate of the same bill, she
pointed out that “we pushed for the modification of certain articles of the law [...]. In
the end, I would say we got around 80% of the changes we proposed.” The chair of
the Tributary committee confirmed this behavior from interest groups, annoyed, in
part, by the lack of a “general to particular” view of policy. “Most [interest groups]
are only concerned with whether the tax exemption for new businesses should be
for 3 years or 5 year or 7 years [...]. There are no [groups] that make claims about
the spirit of the bill or their preference for certain policy in the context of a broader
view of the state.” A contrasting view was expressed by the president of Asobanca
38The Código Orgánico Monetario y Financiero is a law regulating the activities of financial and
fiduciary institutions in Ecuador. It was initially proposed by president Rafael Correa in 2014 and
was signed into law the same year.
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(Bank Association), who confirmed their interest in specific articles, but as a result
of “no openings [in the policy-creation process] to do otherwise.”39
As an example of how interest groups and other participants approach bills in
committee, we can look at the report on the Proyecto de Ley del Código Orgánico
para el Equilibrio de las Finanzas Públicas, an urgent bill sent by the executive
to expand tax collection and create economic incentives to the use of electronic
currency. There were around 40 interest groups that were invited to participate, in
addition to 25 legislators and representatives of government agencies that presented
observations. Most legislators made observations on the conceptual and general
aspects of the bill: the motivation of the bill, the justification for the changes in
legislation, and the previous policy decisions made by the government that leads to
the need of a bill of these characteristics. There were extensive explanations on the
possible consequences of the bill on the local industry and on alternative policies
to the one presented. Legislators supporting the bill argued it was a proper policy
instrument within a broader economic plan. At one point, a legislator stated: “[...]
It is worth considering whether or not Ecuador has an excessive tributary burden
and cannot further advance in redistributive justice”.
Interest groups, on the other hand, focused on micromanaging policy. For
example, the Cámara de Industriales y Empresarios de Cotopaxi, the Chamber of
Commerce of Cotopaxi (a province), wanted to have the tax exemptions given to
39The former president of the board of directors of the Bolsa de Valores de Quito had a more
critical opinion about the approach taken by interest groups to address policy. She argued that
“interest groups do not have a national project or a long-term plan. [Interest groups] are reactive
and short-sighted, and often prefer to negotiate individual benefits.” She concluded by stating
that “[interest groups] often take the role of victims.”
80
artisanal beer extended to the artisanal spirits produced in Cotopaxi. Or the rep-
resentative of the Cámara de la Construcción, Chamber of Construction, who re-
quested for the bill to specify that government contracts will be paid in January
and not October. Each group presented their position differently: some came with
statistics from the industry they represented, some with microeconomic analyses
of the effect of the bill on employment, and others repeating a position that had
been made public in the media. Most interest groups representing capital openly
opposed the bill as a whole, something they made clear in their interventions, but
at the same time addressed specifics of the bill. For this debate, the only group
that presented a general position vis-á-vis the spirit of the bill, accompanied by an
alternative solution, was the Instituto de Economı́a de la Universidad San Francisco
de Quito, an economic policy center from a (private) university.
As is to be expected, not all the proposals were accepted by the committee,
but all of them were eventually discussed. Committee members will discuss the bill
article by article, and will usually bring up any changes suggested by interest groups.
The dynamics of committee debates lend themselves for a “fine print” approach by
interest groups. Once committee chairs start a discussion on a bill, more often than
not the bill will be eventually discharged to the floor. While there are groups that
participate to solely show their support for a bill or to solely show their opposition
to a bill, there are no marginal gains for the group from a bill that will be approved
or voted down based on a series of political determinants that they cannot affect.
Interest groups are not disingenuous about their capacity to influence policy. Thus,
they will also cater to specific elements affecting their group, and while as a class
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or a sector they might have shared preferences, obtaining benefits for their own
industry is a priority.40
3.9 Conclusion
The sequential organization of the Ecuadorian Congress endows committee
chairs with ample agenda-setting prerogatives. The gatekeeping authority of chairs
allows them to control the passage of bills and the participation of interest groups.
Parties will strategically fill committees, prioritizing the ones addressing issues they
own. Despite the fragmentation of the Ecuadorian party system, and the institu-
tional reforms to the legislature, the gatekeeping positions, and their importance
have remained relatively stable across time. Gatekeepers use their power strategi-
cally, blocking legislation from reaching the floor and controlling the participation
of interest groups in committee debates.
Committee debates are performative in nature, a place where legislators play
for the audience (e.g. media). The politics of these performances are important, for
members of Congress can benefit from the increased salience. The rise in importance
of a topic can lead to increased exposure and the electoral gains of owning a salient
issue. The latter, particularly important to determine when will gatekeepers open
the doors of committees to interest groups, an effect tested in Chapter 5. In this
process, interest groups participate in committees, presenting their general position
40There was a strategic division of labor among interest groups sharing preferences. “Umbrella
groups” like the Comité Empresarial Ecuatoriano (CEE) represent productive, commercial, and
construction associations, and coordinates among these sectors to provide a general position of
capital vis-á-vis policy. But each association will also cater separately to the interests of their own
sector, often addressing specific laws that go beyond the competence of the CEE.
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vis-á-vis the policy being modified by the bill initiative, but often looking to change
the “fine print”. Interest groups are cognizant of the intricacies of policy creation
and will hedge their efforts by aiming to micromanage policy, focusing on specific
articles or provisions.
The description of the Ecuadorian Congress sets up the context where we
can analyze, empirically and in further detail, the strategic choices legislators with
gatekeeping authority make when they decide whether to invite interest groups or
not. The performative characteristics of committee debates lend credence the use of
interest group participation as a mechanism to raise the salience of certain issues.
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Chapter 4: Interest groups in the Ecuadorian Congress
4.1 Introduction
Our theory suggests that committee chairs will invite interest groups to raise
the salience of issues they own. In the previous Chapter, we described the sequential
organization of the Ecuadorian Congress, the inner workings of committee meetings,
and the participation of interest groups in those meetings. Although gatekeepers ul-
timately decide when to open the gates, interest groups have their own motivations
and preferences. We made the initial assumption that interest groups have a con-
stant incentive to attend committee meetings. None of the particular motivations is
a necessary condition for our theory, but there must be a motivation to attend. In
the following sections, I briefly recount the history of interest groups in Ecuadorian
politics and their relation to the policy-making process. Drawing from interviews
with interest group representatives, I explore how interest groups motivate their
participation in committee debates. Finally, I describe the participation of interest
groups in the Ecuadorian Congress across time and committees.
Interest groups have close historical ties with parties and politicians and have
influenced election and policy outcomes. The presence of certain groups, particu-
larly economic groups, in the legislature is closely linked to these historical ties. Yet,
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the networks established between interest groups and politicians have been mostly
informal, relating back to family or business connections. The importance of the
informal networks has been relatively consistent across time, but the status of in-
terest groups changed after the 2008 constitutional reforms rescinded mandatory
membership. The consequence was a push towards the professionalization of inter-
est groups–including their relationship with politicians–and the appearance of new
ones.
The professionalization of interest groups also pushed towards more technically-
oriented groups. Representatives of interest groups often suggested that one reason
to attend committees was to present information to legislators. They also perceive
the invitation to committee meetings as mechanisms of legitimization and account-
ability; a public manifestation of a legislator’s commitment to what was agreed in
private. For interest groups, bringing media outlets was part of the strategy to keep
politicians honest.
Beyond the motivation to attend committee debates, who gets invited to the
committee and how often they get invited varies in time and by interest group
category. Representatives of academic institutions, for example, are the groups
more often invited to committees. The economic clout of an interest group also has
an effect on who gets invited. The media salience of economic groups is contingent
on their economic clout (Calvo and Ponce, 2013), and committee chairs will look
to bank on this. The effect is more clearly seen in the change of interest group
participation before and after dollarization in Ecuador (and empirically analyzed in
the next chapter).
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4.2 A brief history of interest group participation in Ecuadorian pol-
itics
The history of interest groups in Ecuador is closely linked to the heteroge-
neous and fragmented class structure of the country. In the early twentieth century,
at the top of the social pyramid were two sets of regional elites differentiated by
economic interest. The agro-financial bourgeoisie of the port of Guayaquil clashed
with the traditional landowning class of the sierra over policy preferences, but in
the absence of a strong state, there was no overt attempt of either to dismantle the
economic base of the rival. The predominance of both elite groups rapidly created
links with political parties, establishing an oligarchical electoral system that, while
competitive, was restricted in regard to the franchise. The national producers’ as-
sociations, like the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture, pushed for
the representation of corporate interests, eventually holding seats on policy-making
boards inside the government and blocking the political incorporation of subordinate
classes.1 (Conaghan and Espinal, 1990)
The industrialization process of the 1960s brought socio-economic transforma-
tions to the country. The dominant class of the sierra moved into industrial invest-
ments, and the coastal elites flourished thanks to a boom in banana exports. The
economic expansion also brought an expansion of urban middle and working classes.
1The common collective action problems of labor were aggravated by the different economic
models dominating the two regions. The coastal export agriculture of Guayaquil was dominated
by capitalist relations of production, while pre-capitalist relations persisted in the hacienda system
characteristic of the sierra. The heterogeneity of the latter was further aggravated by ethnic,
linguistic, and cultural cleavages.
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The political instability that marked the period eventually ended in a military-based
authoritarian regime (1972-1979). The dictatorship was led by economic modern-
izers, that expanded the size of the state, promoted diversification, and developed
infrastructure. The social and class power relations, though, remained unaltered.
The lower classes remained unorganized, and the economic power of the elite was not
undermined. Essentially, the participation of citizen and interest groups remained
“frozen” for the period (Conaghan and Espinal, 1990, p.561). This meant that the
channel for the representation of the civil society remained underdeveloped and lim-
ited. The only interest groups with effective participation were those representing
industrial elites (e.g. Chambers of Commerce), and even their representation was
curtailed by then dictator, Rodŕıguez Lara, who suspended Congress, banned party
activity, and barred corporate groups from their positions inside policy-making bod-
ies.
The suspension of business participation from policy decisions was regarded
by the business elite as a usurpation of their right to be heard on those matters.
The Chambers of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce mounted a media campaign
against the regime, not only accusing it from a lack of favorable policy but also
criticizing the exclusion of interested parties, like the Chambers, from the decision
making process. Indeed, it was the elites who pushed for a return to democracy as
early as 1975. Once the democratic regime was reestablished in 1979, the economic
elite embraced the transition as an opportunity to reassert their power within the
structures of the state, particularly those overlooking economic policy. Their aspi-
rations were short-lived, when Jaime Roldós, of the leftist Concertación de Fuerza
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Populares (CFP), won the presidential election. Economic interest groups waged
an aggressive campaign against the government, going as far a calling for a coup
(Conaghan and Espinal, 1990, p.565). The campaign withered away with the rising
prospects of León Febres Cordero becoming president in 1984 backed by the Cámara
de la Producción de Guayaquil (Freindenberg and Alcántara, 2001).
During this period, labor interest groups gained political prominence, even
though their presence in the policy creation process was limited. In 1975 major
trade union confederations started coordinating strikes, and during the early demo-
cratic regime, unions like the Frente Unitario de Trabajadores sponsored various
general strikes. Yet, the diversity of the working class in Ecuador, each with its
own reality and demands, constrained the political relevance of these groups. The
difference between the political clout of labor and capital groups was evident even
in cabinet post assignments. While no leader from labor groups was in charge of a
ministry during the 1980s and early 1990s, in the government of Febres Cordero a
former president of the Chamber of Commerce was tapped as minister of industry,
commerce, and integration, while the vice-president of the Banco del Paćıfico, a
private bank, was appointed president of the Central Bank (Martz, 1985).
A new pressure group emerged in the early 1990s as a consequence of the po-
litical rise of the indigenous movement. The indigenous peoples of the Amazon and
the sierra began the process of organization in the 1970s, with the arrival of oil com-
panies (in the Amazon) and the demand of comprehensive agrarian reform (sierra).
In 1986 both groups came together under CONAIE, the Confederation of Indigenous
Nationalities, an umbrella federation. Policy-wise, the CONAIE has pushed for and
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obtained important social gains, from bilingual education, land reform (albeit lim-
ited), to the eventual recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational state. The CONAIE,
as well as other indigenous organizations, have a multi-strategy approach to politi-
cal participation. They have combined mass mobilization with pressure through the
institutional channels of the legislature and formal representation.2
Overall, these three categories (i.e. capital, labor, and indigenous) of interest
groups have been the most prominent actors in Ecuadorian politics. Within the
legislature, their invitation to committee debates is constant, especially capital and
labor groups (see Figure 4.1). The most prominent groups in each category had
close ties to political parties, and that is reflected in who is invited more often.
Table 4.1 lists the interests groups that have participated most often in committee
debates. For capital, besides the Comité Empresarial Ecuatoriano (CEE),3 the in-
terest groups named have been actively participating in politics since before 1979.
As suggested above, the Chamber of Industry and Production (Cámara de la Indus-
tria y la Producción) and the Chamber of Commerce (Cámara de Comercio) pushed
for democratization, help elect a president and, starting in 1998, were instrumental
in the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy (Acosta Mej́ıa, 2009). The same can
be said about the CONAIE, an organization that in 1996 founded its political arm,
Pachakutik, a party with presence in Congress, in ministerial cabinet positions, and
the Ecuadorian Supreme Court.
2Pachakutik, a political party with presence in Congress is the political arm of the CONAIE.
3The CEE is a relatively new “umbrella” organization founded in 2004 to coordinate among
the different productive, commercial, and construction associations.
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Rank Capital Interest Groups Labor Interest Groups Indigenous Interest Groups
1 Cámara de la Producción Frente Unitario de Trabajadores CONAIE
2 Asociación de Bancos Privados FENACOPE1 CODENPE4
3 Cámara de Comercio Federación de Choferes Profesionales CODEPMOC5
4 Cámara de Agricultura CONASEP2 CODAE6
5 Comité Empresarial Ecuatoriano CEDOC3 FEINE7
1 Federación Nacional de Empleados de Consejos Provinciales.
2 Confederación Nacional de Servidores Públicos.
3 Central Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Clasistas.
4 Consejo de Desarrollo de Pueblos y Nacionalidades.
5 Consejo de Desarrollo del Pueblo Montubio.
6 Corporación de Desarrollo Afroecuatoriano.
7 Consejo de Pueblos y Organizaciones Ind́ıgenas Evangélicas.
Table 4.1: Most Invited Capital, Labor and Indigenous Interest Groups, 1979-2018
4.2.1 The professionalization of interest groups.
Despite the political importance of interest groups in Ecuador, the overtly
clientelistic party system and the lack of institutionalization led interest groups to
pressure (solely) through informal channels or (solely) through informal networks
created by family and/or business ties. Interest group representatives from bank
associations, exporter associations, and manufacturing associations all coincided on
this depiction of the interaction between interest groups and politicians. Yet, three
elements pushed interest groups towards professionalization: the Constitutional re-
form of 2008, a generational change, and the presidency of Rafael Correa.
Interest groups, particularly interest groups representing economic groups, ini-
tially answered to a small group of elites. In a small economy, like the Ecuadorian,
informal family and business networks are common among the politicians and busi-
ness leaders. The revolving-doors of cabinet positions are full of former interest
group members.4 This type of informal networks is not exclusive to Ecuador and
4Guillermo Lasso, the former president of the Asobanca, the largest bank association, was
appointed Minister of Economy in Jamil Mahuad’s presidency. Mauricio Pozo, former director of
the Chamber of Commerce of Quito, was Minister of Finance for Lucio Gutiérrez. The former
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still exists in Ecuador. Yet, the generational change of industry leaders–though
not necessarily a change of the dominant industries–eventually brought on board
younger faces and experiences, that, while relying on already established networks,
also came with new ideas about the role of interest groups. When Rafael Correa first
became president in 2006, traditional parties had lost much of their legitimization
vis-á-vis voters and, more importantly, they lost most of the seats in the legis-
latures. The legislative majority won by AP, a first-time-contender party, forced
interest groups to rethink their strategy, for relying on informal networks was, at
least at the beginning, not feasible. Many politicians in the legislature, as well
as cabinet members and the president himself, were new faces to politics, which
meant networks had to be reestablished. This allowed the new faces of interest
groups to internally push for their professionalization. Thus, some interest groups
started producing information unavailable to legislators and executive staff; they
organized events to explain the state of the sector and their policy positions; and
informal meetings with political actors became more transparent. The last push for
professionalization came when president Correa, in late 2008, repealed a law that
required professionals and business to be members of a collegiate body.5 Previously,
collegiate bodies were de facto interest groups, with no real motivation to engage
in politics. After all, they had guaranteed membership. After 2008, interest groups
had to provide actual services to their members–if they were to have any–, pushing
them to more actively engage with politicians. I am not suggesting that all, or even
president of the Comité Empresarial Ecuatoriano, Richard Mart́ınez, was appointed Minister of
Economy in 2018.
5The law was declared unconstitutional under the new Constitutional text.
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a majority, of interest groups have professionalized. There was, though, a movement
towards professionalization, one that was more easily achieved by those sectors with
resources, and a change that was welcomed by policymakers.
This transition partially explains the abrupt increase of interest group invita-
tions after 2008 (see Figure 4.1). In addition to more concrete rules on participation
within legislative committees, there was a wider pool of interest groups to invite to
committees. The new faces in the legislature encouraged some sectors to create inter-
est groups given the possibility to establish networks that were previously reserved to
elites. The Constitutional reforms of 2008 that made mandatory membership illegal
increased the demand for organizations that could effectively represent groups.
4.3 Interest groups as lobbying firms
In Chapter 3 we described the organizational characteristics of the Ecuadorian
Congress, stressing the gatekeeping prerogatives of committee chairs, particularly
when it comes to inviting groups to participate in committees. But interest groups
have their own perspective about committee debate and what they bring to the
table. Drawing from semi-structured interviews with interest group representatives,
I describe how interest groups see themselves within the policy creation process,
their interactions with legislators and their motivations and interests to participate
in public lobbying (i.e. committee meetings). Even though the possible motivations
to participate in committee debates are not a necessary condition for our theory,














































































































Figure 4.1: Capital, Labor and Indigenous Group Participation in Committees, 1979-2018.
Count of interest group invitations by year. In 2008, a National Assembly to rewrite
the Constitution replaced Congress, so that year is not included. While there was
interest group participation during the drafting of the Constitution, their participa-
tion was under different conditions, both from the organizational characteristics of
the National Assembly and the rules for participation.
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It is important to note that interest groups (in Ecuador) are not lobbying firms
or are not solely dedicated to lobbying politicians. Yet, part of the service they
provide is pressuring for policies that advance the preferences of their members.6
Interest groups arrange networking and coordination spaces for their members, as
well as training, support, and information. The extent of the services members
receive will depend on the size of the sector or industry being represented. This is
also true for the information interest groups can produce, an important presentation
card when trying to gain access to politicians. There are coordination strategies
between interest groups, commonly under “umbrella” organizations, like the Comité
Empresarial Ecuatoriano or the CAPEIPI, the Chamber of Small Businesses. They
usually present a general position on topics, but interest groups will more often than
not lobby for their own particular interests, despite the positions taken.7
When interest groups engage with politicians, they do so with policymakers
from the executive and from the legislative. Interest groups create links with the
executive, especially with middle-ranking staff members, from where all policy is
executed and policy is also produced. One common theme across the interviews
was the importance of gaining access to the technical staff at the ministerial level.
This serves three purposes: clarifying policy being executed, providing information
6Paid membership is the norm for interest groups in Ecuador. Interest groups have the common
collective action problems of free riding, so they try to raise the cost of not participating. The
president of Asobanca (Bank Association) said they were constantly looking for ways to keep
members engaged and coordinated, not only by offering services but also showing results in policy
outcomes. He said this is hard even in small groups, like the financial sector, with ample resources.
7The director of the Ecuadorian Association of Textile Industries (AITE) and the former presi-
dent of the Stock Exchange coincided in describing interest groups as a highly fragmented environ-
ment. Both cited the regional divide as one of the main drives of this fragmentation. The director
of AITE added that “there are too many business associations, and this is a weakness.”
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to guide the application of policy, and creating a connection with the minister. As
the president of the ANFAB8 suggested: “most decision-making is carried out at
the administrative level, not at the level of the minister; [...] having the attention
of the minister is less important than the attention of the staff member that has
the ear of the minister.” The problem interviewees agreed on about interaction
with the executive was the high turnover of ministers, often accompanied by new
technical staff. It requires interest groups to invest in creating new networks to
obtain renewed access.
Interactions with legislators carry their own shortcomings. Legislators have a
team of four members and lack the resources to carry out policy research. Interest
groups fill this gap. The director of the AITE9 describes the role of interest groups
as “free advisors” to legislators. This role is not extended to all interest groups. For
example, the comparative advantage of labor unions and indigenous groups is their
power in numbers. They will use the mobilization capacity as a tool to get access.
Yet, like the director of the AAFFE10 stated, “there is a limit of space [...], space
in the law and space in the legislator’s time.” There is a limit to what an interest
group can gain from meeting a legislator. Furthermore, not all legislators carry the
same weight in Congress, and getting access to gatekeepers is not an easy task. The
politics of the legislature give individual legislators little decision power, and their
actions are usually conditioned by the positions of the party. Interviewees mentioned
8Asociación Nacional de Fabricantes de Alimentos y Bebidas. The National Association of Food
and Beverage Producers.
9Asociación de Industriales Textiles del Ecuador. The Ecuadorian Association of Textile In-
dustries.
10Asociacin de Administradoras de Fondos y Fideicomisos del Ecuador. The Ecuadorian Asso-
ciation of Fund and Trust Fund Managers.
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“friendly” legislators, but friendly legislators will not always be the “important”
legislators.
The interactions described so far are informal or private. All interest group
representatives interviewed agreed that informal networks and interactions were
paramount to gain some form of policy benefit. The president of the ANFAB com-
plained that his lack of informal connections with policymakers was a disadvantage,
something that he could observe when comparing the interaction of legislators and
executive representatives with other interest groups. Interest group representatives
also agreed that the most effective strategy was to approach the executive, rather
than the legislature. The Executive President of Expoflores11 explained that “pol-
icy gets approved and there is not much we can do [...], but we can still influence
how that policy is reflected in regulations.” Since 2008, with the executive’s party
holding a majority of seats in Congress, bills sent by the President were relatively
more likely to get approved, and the discussions about those bills were held with
the executive, who would then coordinate with legislators. Interest groups had to
divide their time between both political spaces.
Yet, despite the relevance of private or informal meetings, interest groups
often participate in the public manifestation of these interactions: committee de-
bates. The most common explanation given by the interviewees for participating
in committee debates was a mixture of accountability and legitimization. The for-
mer president of the Bolsa de Valores argued that “[she] went to committees to be
11Asociación Nacional de Productores y Exportadores de Flores. The Ecuadorian Association of
Producers and Exporters of Flowers.
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sure that what was discussed in private was honored during the committee meet-
ings.” This applied for private meetings with the executive or a legislator about
bills currently debated in Congress. Coordinating their participation with a media
campaign was a common strategy among interest groups, something that was more
easily achieved by groups who had ties to media outlets, or enough resources to af-
ford a team specialized in public relations. Some interest groups representative, like
the president from the Chamber of Commerce of Quito, highlighted the importance
of presenting information in the committee to legislators they had not previously
met. Others, like the president of the ANFAB, wanted to “remove legislators from
politics”, presenting technical information about the effects of reform. Participa-
tion also allows interest groups to expand their policy network and is a tangible
representation of their work, something they are always eager to report back to the
fee-paying members.
Despite the myriad motivations to participate in committees, none are nec-
essary conditions for interest group participation. Interest groups might attend
committee meetings for the networking opportunities, to present information, to
pressure legislators by bringing media outlets, or to show members what the in-
terest group is doing. Nevertheless, it is still a prerogative of the committee chair
to invite groups, whatever their intention. But describing the motivations suggests
that, in fact, there are always benefits, in the eyes of interest groups, to participate
in committees when invited.
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4.4 Interest group participation in committee debates
Our theory suggests that chairs will invite interest groups to participate in
committees to raise the salience of issues the party owns. Before empirically analyz-
ing the validity of the theory, I describe the participation of interest groups across
time and committee. We have established the conditions that lead to interest group
participation, mainly an invitation from the committee chair, but there are contex-
tual priors (i.e. the general salience of a topic, the importance, and prevalence of a
sector within the economy) that affect the importance of certain interest groups.
To better study interest groups, I categorize them based on economic activity
and group representation. The classification, while not exhaustive, tries to be as fine-
grained as possible. There are important limitations to this categorization. Each
interest group can identify or coordinate with a different sector or class depending
on the circumstance. For example, an interest group representing flower exporters
might identify as an “exporter” or as part of “agriculture”; a union representing
workers in the auto industry might identify as “labor” or with “industry”; or an
interest group representing evangelical indigenous people might identify as “indige-
nous” or as “religious”. It becomes more complex with “umbrella” organizations,
such as Chambers of Commerce, that represent various sectors. Furthermore, many
firms or groups will be members of more than one interest group.12 Even though
it is beyond the scope of this research, it is worth noting that the heterogeneity of
interest groups membership can affect their mobilization capacity and their political
12Some groups are easily identifiable: groups representing cultural movements or groups repre-
senting financial organizations are more homogeneous in their membership.
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Figure 4.2: Interest Group Participation in Committees, 1979-2018. Participation of interest
groups in committee meeting by category, from 1979 to 2018.
Figure 4.2 shows the participation of interest groups in committee debates by
category. I further divide them by class (e.g. labor and capital), social groups,
and academia. Most invited groups are from the academic space, which is not
surprising. Often, committees will invite university professors to clarify or expand
on the possible legal effects of reform. Less frequent, but not uncommon, is for
specialized research centers to argue, on technical ground, the impact a reform can
have on the economy, on collective rights, or on the market. This is not to say
that the participation of academic representatives is void of ideology or political
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preferences. There are universities that, historically, have been closer to economic
groups and others that have been closer to labor. For example, public universities,
where labor groups and student unions are in constant dialogue, more often coincide
with worker unions than with capital groups (see Figure 4.4). The opposite is also
true, private universities, founded by and for the economic elite, participate more
often with Chambers than with unions. This to further suggest that participation















































Type Private U. Public U.
Figure 4.4: Academic, Labor, and Capital Participation in Committees, 1979-2018. Panel A:
Predicted count of labor interest group participation when public universities and
private universities participate in committee debate. Estimated using a negative
binomial model to account for over-dispersion of the dependent variable. Dependent
variable is the number of labor groups participating in the committee debate of
an individual bill. Independent variables include the number of private universities
participating in a committee debate of an individual bill (p ≤ 0.05), the public
universities (p ≤ 0.05), and the total number of interest groups participating in the
committee debate. Panel B: Predicted count of capital interest group participation
when public universities and private universities participate in committee debate.
Estimated using a negative binomial model to account for over-dispersion of the
dependent variable. Dependent variable is the number of capital groups participating
in the committee debate of an individual bill. Independent variables include the
number of private universities participating in a committee debate of an individual
bill (p ≥ 0.05), the public universities (p ≤ 0.05), and the total number of interest
groups participating in the committee debate.
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The invitation of interest groups to committees is uneven. We expect that
interest groups representing labor participate more in committees that debate bills
addressing labor issues (e.g. De lo Laboral y Social) and capital interest groups to
participate more in committees that debate bills addressing economic issues (e.g.
Económico, Agrario, Industrial y Comercial), something that indeed happens. The
rate at which each group is invited across committees varies with time [although it is
fairly constant] (see Figure 4.6). This is also expected. After all, interest groups are
invited to raise issue salience, and regardless of the narrative of the party owning the
issue, we can assume committee chairs try to attract attention to the issues at hand
by directly engaging the constituents interested in that topic (i.e. interest groups).



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.6: Interest group participation in committees by category, from 1979 to 2018.
The capacity of an interest group to raise the salience of an issue is dependent
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on the salience of the interest group among the public. The media salience of
economic groups will be, in part, contingent on their economic clout (Calvo and
Ponce, 2013). With greater economic resources come not only enhanced market
power but also greater capacity to lobby policymakers, greater capacity to finance
the political aspirations of political allies, or to weaken political foes (Grossman
and Helpman 2002, 2004). As the participation of sectors in the total output of
an economy increases, so does their capacity to advertise policy preferences to the
media and the public. Committee chairs can take advantage of the resources and
capabilities of each group to raise the public salience of an issue. In the next Chapter,
I explore more in detail the effect of economic clout in committee participation,
but for now, I use the currency shock of dollarization to evaluate the changes in
interest group invitations to committees. In 2000, Ecuador went from a controlled
floating system to dollarization, effectively pegging the exchange rate. The effects
this measure were dramatic: export-oriented firm lost their competitive advantage in
the regional and world markets, as the costs of labor and the fragility of the domestic
market punished national producers. As an economy reliant in the primary sector,
the consequences of dollarization were particularly harsh on the agro-industry.
We expect for interest groups representing the winning (losing) sectors of dol-
larization to be invited more (less) often after dollarization. For example, interest
groups representing importers should participate more in committees after dollariza-
tion, and export-oriented groups, as well as the agro-industry, to participate less.13
13Figure 4.7 uses an eight-year window before and after dollarization since we are only interested
in the effect of the shock in the immediate aftermath.
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In Figure 4.7, the non-linear splines describing the share of interest group partici-
pation in committees is suggestive. The two dashed lines represent the start of the
exchange-rate crisis (1998) and the dollarization of the economy (2000). Increases
in the share of the total import-oriented interest group (e.g. retailers, importers)
invited to committees can be observed in the period after dollarization, starting
with the beginning of the exchange-rate crisis in 1998. A similar, although more
moderate pattern is observed in the export-oriented groups (e.g. agro-industry, local










































Figure 4.7: Export and import-oriented interest group participation in Committees, 1979-2018.
Interest group participation in Committee, 19792019. Note: Plots describe proba-
bilities (k-splines = 5) that different interest groups will be invited to Committee
debates. Dashed lines for 1998, year the exchange rate crisis started, and 2000, year
the economy was dollarized.
4.5 Conclusion
Interest groups participate for a number of reasons in committee debates. In-
terest groups see committee debates as a mechanism to publicly legitimized agree-
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ment reached in private. They serve as an accountability space, a place where
interest groups can verify that legislators are not changing the terms previously
discussed. Interest groups coordinate their participation with media campaigns,
something that feeds into the two-way logic of issue salience: a mechanism for legis-
lators to gain from the issues they own, and a pressuring tool in the eyes of interest
groups to get legislators to act on specific topics. As member-funded institutions,
the presence of interest groups in the policy-creation space is a tangible representa-
tion of access, something interest groups offer to their (fee-paying) members. It also
reveals their technical capacity and the policy position to all committee members
and creates possible links for the future.
There are a number of motivations for interest groups to attend committees.
Even though they are not a necessary condition for interest group participation,14
they do illustrate the importance of an invitation to committees. From previous
chapters, we know that invitations are a strategic decision made by committee chairs
looking to raise the salience of issues the party owns. A descriptive view of interest
group participation suggests that this participation is, mostly, a political choice.
Previous accounts of interest group interaction with legislators stress the importance
of information dissemination or some type of quid-pro-quo exchange, but the public
manifestation of lobbying seems, at first glance, guided by the benefit a politician
can gain from the rise of issue salience thanks to interest groups participation.
In the next chapter I empirically show evidence for this theory, taking into
14There could be other motivations to attend committees (e.g. prestige) or only one motivation
to attend committees. There just needs to be a motivation to attend committees.
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account that once a gatekeeper opens the doors to committee debates, she can dis-
criminate who gets to enter and who does not. As shown above, there is evidence of
the relationship between economic clout–linked to media salience– and participation,
as well as the strategic choice of inviting groups with similar policy positions.
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Chapter 5: Determinants of Interest Groups Participation in the Ecuado-
rian Congress
When will committee chairs invite interest group to committees? What type of
interest group will committee chairs invite? In Chapter 2 I argued that legislators
use the public participation of interest groups in the legislative process to raise
issue salience. Committee chairs, legislators endowed with gatekeeping and agenda-
setting prerogatives, will open the gates to committees when a bill addresses issues
the party owns and will limit participation in the committees when the bill addresses
an issue the party does not. Since parties gain electorally from the increased salience
of owned issues, they have an incentive to coordinate, through members in key
positions, strategies that maximize the returns from interest group participation.
From our theoretical framework, we expect committee chairs to 1) be strategic
about invitations; 2) invite more interest groups to participate in debates of issue
the party owns; 3) invite more interest groups to participate when the party can
gain more (electorally) from raising issue salience; and 4) invite group that can raise
the more the salience of an issues.
From the proposed theoretical framework, the scope conditions that must be
met are as follow. First, committee chairs must be endowed with gatekeeping author-
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ity. Second, there must be institutional mechanisms that favor party coordination,
rather than individualistic behavior. Third, interest group must be able to raise
issue salience or, at the very least, raise media attention to an issue.
In Chapter 3 we established the reach of the gatekeeping authority of com-
mittee chairs in the Ecuadorian Congress. Committee chairs1 are not only able to
regulate the flow of legislation, but they decide who is invited to participate in the
discussions of a bill. Even after 2008, when Constitutional norms granted the right
to any and every citizen to participate in committee debates (i.e. under the figure
of socialización forums), it is the prerogative of the chair to decide if the forums are
held, where they are held, and, more importantly, who is invited. The committee
chair can go as far as to change the order of the day to limit the participation of
an interest group. Second, the allocation of committee posts and chairmanship is
a politically negotiated process led by the larger legislative blocs.2 Chairs are usu-
ally reserved to senior party members, who are less likely to dissent and favor the
party line. Parties in the Ecuadorian Congress were no oblivious to the strategical
importance of these posts, which explains the characteristics of the average chair: a
four-year national legislator (as opposed to a two-year state legislator) from the ma-
jority/plurality party with a longer tenure in a legislature (that for many year had
non-consecutive terms). Finally, the behavior of legislators during committee meet-
1The gatekeeping authority extends to the first hurdle in the flow of legislation: the CAL. As
explained in Chapter 3, the CAL is in charge of assigning bills to committees, but also in charge
of letting them reach committee in the first place. Often a technical committee (e.g. Argentina),
in Ecuador the president of Congress also chairs the CAL.
2The chair of the CAL is not negotiated, but is also one of the roles of the president of the
legislature. Note that the president of the legislature, by law, is a member of the majority/plurality
party.
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ings, as well as the mechanisms employed by interest groups to pressure legislators,
suggests that media salience is central to interest group participation. Legislators
are interested in taking advantage of media presence during meetings, and interest
groups believe that media presence “gets legislators into action”. Committee meet-
ings, much like plenary floor exchanges, are more about politics than policy: the
politics of performance.
Having established how the sequential organization of the Ecuadorian Congress
and the constraints for participation meet the main conditions of our theoretical
framework, we can now specify a set of testable hypotheses regarding the gate-
keeper’s strategic considerations to open or not the gates and to discriminate who is
allowed in. There are four conditions that we can test. First, we expect invitations
to committees to be determined by issue ownership. Second, we expect for chairs
to invite more interest groups to bills sponsored by legislators ideologically close.
Chairs cater to their own coalition, first and foremost, and avoid dividing the party
in the floor vote –by passing legislation that will be favored by the party’s median
voter–. Inviting interest groups to bills that are preferred by the party is a sign of
party coordination. Third, and most importantly, we expect that in situations when
issue salience is more impactful, chairs will be more like to open the gates. Finally,
we expect more invitations to groups that can raise more the salience of an issue
(than those that lack the resources to do so). The first hypothesis is straightforward:
Hypothesis 1: Chairs will invite more interest groups to participate in committees
when the party owns the issue of the bill.
Chairs have an incentive not only to advance legislation that is closer to their
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own coalition (Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Calvo, 2014),3 but also to invite more
interest groups to raise the salience of the issues discussed in those bills. Even though
committee chairs can have nuanced considerations regarding the ideological position
of the bill with regards to the median voter in the plenary floor (e.g. whether to
favor proposals deep in the coalition or not), ultimately, they should always favor
those ideological positions that will be preferred by their own party.
Hypothesis 2: Chairs will invite more interest groups to participate in committee
meetings of bills sponsored by legislators ideologically closer to them.
Here, we are not differentiating the position of the interest group relative to the
position of the chair’s party. Even though our theory makes no assumptions about
the congruence between interest group and legislator ideology,4 we can still explore
if there are additional determinants for gatekeeper behavior based on ideology. Does
Hypothesis 2 hold even for interest groups on the opposite side of the issue? For
example, if the chair’s party owns public education, would they be equally likely
to invite groups representing public school teachers (shared preferences) as they
are to invite groups pushing for school privatization (the same issue, but opposing
policy preference)? In order to increase the salience of an issue while maintaining
discursive coherence, strategic committee chairs might avoid inviting interest groups
holding opposing views of an “owned” issue. Alternatively, they might allow the
participation of all interest group in a show of fairness, and even encourage opposing
interest groups in an attempt to publicly reprimand them.
3Cox and McCubbins (2005) argue that committee chairs avoid dividing the party in the floor
vote.
4It is worth noting that, above all, issue ownership and salience, rather than congruence, is
what matters.
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Assuming that competition for access to committees is constant and that time
to debate a bill is limited, gatekeepers can and, depending on the salience of the
topic, will have to discriminate which groups are able to participate. There is no
guarantee that the proposed change made by an interest group will be included
on the bill itself. It will ultimately depend on the preferences of the relevant me-
dian voter within the committee or the plenary floor. However, and in concordance
with Hypothesis 2, committee chairs should favor interest groups with shared pref-
erences. This also falls in line with the informal networks discussed in previous
chapters, where the interaction between interest group and legislators is first carried
out outside the formal channels with groups that are have already created ties with
the legislators. Often, these ties are electoral and ideological. Thus, we can derive
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Chairs will invite more interest groups closer to their ideological
position when they want to raise the salience of an issue.
Hypothesis 3 relies on relatively high competition among interest groups to
gain access to committees, enough for the time slots for interest group participation
in committee debates to be in high demand. In other words, enough for access
to be a seller’s market (the chair being the seller). There are topics, on the other
hand, which are only relevant to a reduced constituency, with a limited capacity to
organize. For example, in the early 1980s, the “indigenous” question in Ecuador
was only raised by a small group of legislators from highland provinces, and was
pushed by only a few organized groups that had enough resources to mobilize.
Until the foundation of the CONAIE in 1986, there was no unified strategy or an
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overarching list of demands among indigenous groups. Bills addressing indigenous
rights or lands or welfare were few and far apart. Participation in these debates
was reduced to a limited number of organizations. It was a buyers market, and
chairs interested in raising the salience of that issue could not really choose who
was invited. Note that the salience of certain topics will change over time, and
attract different participants with more diverse interests. By 1998, the “indigenous”
question was not only a salient topic but a contentious one too. The demands for a
plurinational state from the CONAIE also allowed for autonomous administration
of natural resources (e.g. oil and later precious metals) found in the Amazon, and
a dual justice system. The issues raised attracted the attention from a diverse
type of groups: academics supporting and opposing the dual justice system, groups
concerned with “plurinationality” as a legal concept, and investors worried about
the fate of the contracts to exploit natural resources. Therefore, the exogenous
salience of a topic will affect the capacity chairs have to choose which interest group
participates in committees if they want to raise the salience of an issue.
Hypothesis 3a: In a seller’s market, chairs will invite more interest groups closer
to their ideological position, when they want to raise the salience of an owned issue.
While raising the salience of an issue the party owns is always important, elec-
tion cycles should have an effect on the behavior of committee chairs. After all,
parties maximize their gains from raising the salience of an owned issue during cam-
paigns. Before elections, we would expect policymakers to be particularly generous
with the access they grant to interest groups. It is during political campaigns that
politicians are more interested in raising the salience of issue they own (Bélanger and
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Meguid, 2008). Since reelection trumps legislative success (Jacobson, 1996; Brady
et al. 2000; Cox and McCubbins, 2005), we should also expect committee chairs to
care less about the position of the interest group, and more about the amount of
participation (that raises salience). Campaigns bring the pluralist out of legislators.
This can be linked to what was previously said about the motivations for committee
chairs to invite opposing interest groups. Before elections, chairs have a dual interest
to invite contrasting positions: to publicly antagonize opposition groups and gain
support from their own constituency or to approach opposition groups in order to
win over undecided voters.
Hypothesis 4a: Before elections, chairs will invite more interest groups to partic-
ipate in committees where their party owns the issue than after elections.
Hypothesis 4b: Before elections, the ideological position of committee chairs will
be less important than in non-election periods.
Finally, the capacity of an interest group to raise the salience of an issue is
dependent on the salience of the interest group among the public. The media salience
of economic groups is determined by their economic clout (Calvo and Ponce, 2013).
With greater economic resources come not only enhanced market power but also
greater capacity to lobby policymakers, greater capacity to finance the political
aspirations of political allies, or to weaken political foes (Grossman and Helpman
2002, 2004). As the participation of sectors in the total output of an economy
increases, so does their capacity to advertise policy preferences to the media and
the public.
Hypothesis 5: Committee chairs are more likely to invite interest groups with a
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larger economic clout.
5.1 Data and Empirical Strategy
I examine the determinants for invitations to committees by looking at inter-
est group participation in committee meetings in all the legislative periods in the
Ecuadorian Congress from 1979 to 2018. The datasets are a combination of three
distinct data sources that I will explain separately and in detail.
5.1.1 Committee allocation and chairmanship
Committee allocation and chairmanship data are divided by legislative periods–
one or two-year spans in which committee assignments last–. From 1979 to 1996,
committee assignments and chairmanships rotated yearly. After 1996, these were ex-
tended to two years. The number, as well as the name of standing committees, varied
across the 40-year period covered by the data (see Table 5.1). There are instances
of special committees being created, but these are not included in the dataset. No
official record for committee assignments is available from the Congress. Rather, I
look at the plenary meeting transcripts when committee assignments were voted,
and take the information from there. The main limitation to this process is that I
am not able to identify instances when legislators leave Congress, either to join a
post in the executive branch, to campaign for a different office, by destitution, or by
death. For those cases, I look at journalistic records, when available.5 Committee
5There are unknown instances of legislators leaving their legislative post that are not captured
in the data, but those cannot be identified either. There is one instance where there are records
known to be incomplete. In January 2007, a conflict between then president Rafael Correa and
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chairmanship information is not available from the plenary transcripts. I turn to
the committee reports to identify the chairs and committee members, who signed
all official documents discharged from the committees.
Since there are no official records of committee assignment and no official
records of members of Congress before 2009, I collect the data from various sources6
to match the names with their parties. Unfortunately, not all the sources format the
names in the same way, and neither do the plenary transcripts. This is problematic,
especially when I try to combine this information with the data on bill sponsorship.
I employ a string-based name matching algorithm, allowing for a fuzzy similarity
between the two different text variables (Raffo, 2015). The algorithm is able to
correctly match 60% of the names between legislative periods without supervision.
An additional 35% of the names are matched with supervision. There are in total,
1094 unique legislators identified for the time period examined. The main problem
with the dataset comes from homonyms or similar names. Manual inspection of the
dataset suggests that most names were correctly matched, but there is a possibility
for error.
the largest legislative coalition (PSC, PSP, PRIAN, and DP-UDC) over a referendum ensued. The
referendum was eventually approved, but the legislative coalition did not recognize its legality. A
judge ordered the 57 members of the coalition to be removed from office. There are no records on
who the members replacing the legislators were, and how they were assigned to the committees.
Yet, by November of the same year, Congress was completely dismissed and replaced with a
Constituent Assembly. The period between January 2007 and December 2008 is not included in
the dataset.
6For the period between 1979 and 1998: Marchán (1996), Salgado (1984), Diario Hoy (1990,




De lo Laboral y Social (Labor)
De lo Civil y Penal (Civil and Criminal Law)
Econmico, Agrario, Industrial y Comercial (Economic, Agrarian, Industrial and Commercial)
Tributario, Fiscal, Bancario y de Presupuesto (Tributary, Fiscal, Financial and Budget)
Standing Committee, 1997-2008
De lo Laboral y Social (Labor)
De lo Civil y Penal (Civil and Criminal Law)
Econmico, Agrario, Industrial y Comercial (Economic, Agrarian, Industrial and Commercial)
Tributario, Fiscal, Bancario y de Presupuesto (Tributary, Fiscal, Financial and Budget)
Educacin, Cultura y Deporte (Education, Culture, and Sports)
Gestin Pblica y Seguridad Social (Public Management and Social Security)
Salud, Medio Ambiente y Ecologa (Health, Environment, and Ecology)
Descentralizacin y Desconcentracin (Descentralization)
Asuntos Constitucionales (Constitutional Matters)
Asuntos Amaznicos (Amazonian Matters)
Defensa del Consumidor y Contribuyente (Consumer and Taxpayer Defense)
Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda de Inters Social (Urban Development and Social Housing)
De la Mujer, el Nio, la Juventud y la Familia (Women, Children, Youth, and Family)
Asuntos Indgenas y Otras Etnias (Indigenous and Ethnic Matters)
Asuntos Internacionales y de Defensa Nacional (National Defense)
Standing Committees, 2009-2018
Justicia y Estructura del Estado (Justice and Structure of the State)
Derechos de los Trabajadores y la Seguridad Social (Worker’s Rights and Social Security)
Educacin, Cultura, Ciencia y Tecnologa (Education, Culture, Science, and Technology)
Desarrollo Econmico, Productivo y de la Microempresa (Economic, Productive, and Small Business Development)
Rgimen Econmico y Tributario (Economic and Tributary Regime)
Gobiernos Autónomos y Descentralización (Autonomous Governments)
Derechos a la Salud (Health)
Soberana, RRII y Seguridad Integral (Defense and National Security)
Participacin Ciudadana y Control Social (Citizen’s Participation and Social Control)
Derecho Colectivos (Collective Rights)
Biodiversidad y Recursos Naturales (Biodiversity and Natural Resources)
Soberana Alimentara y Desarrollo Agropecuario (Agricultural and Livestock Development)
Note: There are three standing committees not mentioned, as no bills are debated within those committees: CAL (Consejo Administrativo
Legislativo), De Mesa (former CAL), and Fiscalización–a committee that serves as special council–.
Table 5.1: Committees in the Ecuadorian Congress, 1979-2018
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5.1.2 Bill Initiatives Data
Data on bill initiatives provide information on sponsors and cosponsor, party
affiliation, the sequential process the bill followed, and where it died (or did not).
The dataset was constructed from data provided by the Archivo-Biblioteca of the
Ecuadorian Congress and includes the 9,089 bills introduced by legislators from 1979
to 2017. As previously mentioned, there is no official list of legislators and no tag to
identify each legislator and match them to the committee allocation dataset. The
same string-based name matching algorithm was used to both, match the names
within the bill initiative data, and with the committee allocation data set. More
than 90% of the names were matched across datasets. Bills initiated by non-party
affiliated sponsors (i.e. citizen groups, public defender, attorney general), which
make up 3.2% of the total (N=295), are dropped from the data. Another 243 bill
initiatives were introduced by committees7. I count as a sponsor of those bills every
committee member that signed the initiative.8
5.1.3 Interest Group Data
Each committee produces a report detailing all the changes to the bill initia-
tives, as well as the interest groups participating in the meetings held. The reports
were generously provided by staff from the Archivo-Biblioteca of the Ecuadorian
Congress. Before 2008, not all reports are available. Between 1979 and 2007, there
7Until the 2008 Constitution, special and standing committees were able to introduce bills to
the floor.
8In all but 13 cases all members in the committee signed as cosponsors of the bills introduced
by committees.
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was no systematization for the format of the reports or for the actual delivery of the
reports to the Archive. The committee secretary, the person in charge of writing
the reports and delivering them to the Archive, is assigned by each committee chair.
It is not a career post, and it changes with each new committee chair, thus there
is no formal training nor an office to hold them accountable. While there is a legal
requirement for chairs to distribute the reports written up in the committees to the
plenary floor before a debate, there is no legal requirement to have those reports
delivered to the Archive. Many committee secretaries ended their tenure without
entering the reports into the Archive. Interviews with the Archive staff suggest
that reports are missing at random, even though the lack of norms could also lead
committee chairs to purposefully withhold reports if there was information they did
not want to be made public.
From 1979 to 2007, 17.7% of the committee reports are missing (N=379).
There are no reports missing between 1979 and 1985. Comparing the expected
number of missing and non-missing committee reports by year,9 only after 2002
there are more missing reports than expected. For 2007 and 2008, the aggravated
institutional and political crisis might explain the absence of reports. It was during
that time when half of the legislators were removed from office after opposing a
referendum, and Congress was eventually dissolved. Focusing on the period between
1985 and 2006, the average missing report is less likely to reach second debate and to
eventually turn into law (p ≤ 0.05; see Table 5.2). Apart from the Civil and Penal
committee, the other three main committees (i.e. Tributary, Economic, Labor)
9The null hypothesis is no association between the year and the number of missing reports.
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have less-than-expected missing reports. The Civil and Penal committee has more
missing reports than expected, but not considerably (see Table 5.3). Proportionally,
most of the reports are missing from smaller committees. Similarly, bills introduced
by larger parties are less likely to have missing reports. Referring to the plenary
floor debates, some of the missing reports might be due to similarity with other
bills being debated. Overall, while it is important to take into account how missing
observations will affect the outcome of our estimation, especially concerning interest
group participation, unavailable reports appear to be mostly on those bills expected
to be voted down anyway.
(1) (2)
Voted into Law (Diff.) -0.566
(-21.47)
Discharged to Second Debate (Diff.) -0.505
(-26.14)
Observations 1824 1824
t statistics in parentheses
Table 5.2: T-test comparing missing and non-missing reports
From the total available reports (N = 2,784; 86%), I extract information on
interest group participation. Interest group participation is defined as any instance
where an interest group is mentioned in a report. When interest groups participate
in committee meetings, reports mention them by name. Interest groups can be in-
vited more than once to a meeting, but to avoid Type I errors from interest groups
being mentioned more than once for other reasons other than multiple participa-
tion, I only count one invitation per interest group per bill debate. This can lead
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Reports
Committee Missing Not-Missing Expected
% % %
Asuntos Amaznicos, Desarrollo F 1.9 2.5 2.3
Asuntos Constitucionales 4.1 0.8 2.1
Asuntos Indgenas y Otras Etnias 0.7 0.8 0.8
Asuntos Internacionales y de Def 0.4 0.3 0.3
De la Mujer, el Nio, la Juventu 1.5 1.3 1.4
De lo Civil y Penal 28.7 22.7 25.2
De lo Laboral y Social 13.1 11.6 12.2
Defensa del Consumidor 2.2 2.0 2.1
Desarollo Urbano y Vivienda de I 1.1 2.0 1.7
Descentralizacin, Desconcentrac 3.7 6.6 5.4
Econmico, Agrario, Industrial y 6.3 11.9 9.6
Educacin, Cultura y Deporte 8.6 11.1 10.1
Especial 1.1 0.5 0.8
Gestin Pblica Y Universalizaci 19.4 6.3 11.6
Legislativa y Fiscalizacin 0.0 0.3 0.2
Salud, Medio Ambiente y Ecologa 3.4 7.8 6.0
Tributario, Fiscal, Bancario y d 3.7 11.6 8.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 268 396 664
Pearson chi2(16) = 62.9439 Pr = 0.000
Note: only looking at committees between 1998 and 2006.
Table 5.3: Missing and non-missing reports by committee
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to underreporting (Type II error), but I am comfortable with taking the more con-
servative approach. To identify interest groups, I use Natural Language Processing
(NLP) to predict linguistic annotations–for example, whether a word is a verb or a
noun or a company–in my text. Once the algorithm recognizes the different entities,
I extract the names of interest groups. I manually examine the documents with
the highest density of recognized entities and add the names of new interest groups
identified. I repeat the process feeding the new names to the algorithm. There
are occurrences where different interest groups have similar names yet different ge-
ographical locations (e.g. Cámara de Comercio de Quito and Cámara de Comercio
de Guayaquil). These are also picked up separately by the algorithm. In total, the
dataset contains 838 unique interest groups and 6,989 instances of interest group
participation in committee meetings.
There are three main limitations to this method. First, there might be interest
groups that have not been picked by the algorithm (Type II error). Interest groups
fluctuate across time and identifying older groups that have disappeared can be
difficult. Manually coding each interest group from the reports is complicated, as
each document can contain more than a hundred pages. Second, there are no unique
identification codes for interest groups participating in committee debates, so I have
to identify interest groups by name. This means that any change to the spelling of a
name (e.g. Asociación de Bancos del Ecuador and Asociación de Bancos Privados
del Ecuador) or the use of the abbreviated form of a name(e.g. CONAIE and
Confederación de Nacionalidades Ind́ıgenas del Ecuador) will fail to identify the
presence of an interest group (Type II error). I try to provide as many alternative
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names to each group as possible, but some forms might not have been captured.
Third, the poor quality of some of the earlier documents, and different marks (e.g.
official stamps, signatures, etc.) in all the documents, can corrupt the text. This
will change how the text is processed and read by the algorithm. This too can
reduce the number of interest groups identified (Type II error).
5.1.4 Interest group invitations
The unit of analysis for all models is at the bill initiative level. The main
outcome of interest is a measure of the number of interest groups participating in
the committee debate of a bill initiative. Even if an interest group participates more
than once in the same bill initiative, its presence is only counted once. All bill ini-
tiatives that reached committees are included, whether interest groups participated
or not. We can still have sources of selection bias. For example, bill initiatives that
reach committees are, on average, more closely linked to the issues a party owns and
are more likely to have interest group invitations than those that do not (if those
that did not advance were to hypothetically reach committee). To assess the degree
of selection affecting the models, I test for bias using a modified two-step Heck-
man selection model for count responses fitted by penalized maximum likelihood
estimation (Wyszynkski and Marra, 2018), where the selection equation is a probit
estimating the likelihood a bill reaches committee, and the outcomes equation is
a negative binomial of the number of interest groups participating in a committee
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debate. The model suggests that there is no selection effect (see Appendix A)10, but
this might be a product of the estimation method or the specification of the model,
rather than an accurate reflection of reality. Still, theoretically, it is important to
keep in mind that if there was selection bias, it might be affecting our estimates
upwards. Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the number of interest groups partic-
ipating in committee debates. Note that before 2008, nearly half of the bills had no
interest groups participation, something that changes after the 2008 Constitution
came into effect.
5.1.5 Estimating issue ownership
Measuring issue ownership in Ecuador is not straightforward as there is no
established way of determining which issues are owned by which party. In Europe
and the U.S., there are detailed surveys that ask respondents which party is most
competent at dealing with each of a series of issues (Green 2011; Sides 2006; Wagner
and Meyer, 2014). Such surveys are not publicly available for Ecuador. I use an
alternative approach to estimate issue ownership.
The literature has shown that political parties strategically focus on issues they
own (Petrocik, 1996; Sides, 2006; Green and Hobolt, 2008; Busemeyer et al., 2013;
Guinaudeau and Persico, 2013; Wagner and Meyer, 2014). Budge and Farlie (1983),
10There are a number of limitations to using two-step Heckman selection models. The estimates
are affected by the correlation of the errors of the selection and outcome equations, by the level of
censoring, and by the availability of an adequate exclusion restriction. Given the size of the sample,
the bias stemming from the first two should be mitigated. Exclusion restrictions, instrument-like
variables that only affect our outcome of interest through independent variables, are difficult to
come across. Conversely, we can estimate the model without an exclusion restriction, relying solely
on the difference in the distributional assumptions of the errors, which can lead to high levels of
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Figure 5.1: Interest Group Participation in Committees, 1979-2018. Participation of interest
groups in committee meetings, from 1979 to 2018. Panel on the left shows at least
one participant in committee debates. Panel on the right shows the distribution of
the number of interest groups participating in committee debates.
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Guinaudeau and Persico (2013), and Walgrave and De Swert (2004) argue that
parties devote most attention to issues they have ownership over and are perceived
as such by the voters at large. These assumptions are not unproblematic. Tapping
solely into a party’s “history of attention” does not capture their competence to
deal with issues–an important component of issue ownership theory–. Yet, since
we are interested in party behavior and their reaction to voter perceptions of them,
focusing on their attention to issues can serve as a proxy to ownership. Note that
using survey data to explain issue ownership is problematic on its own: voters often
conflate issue ownership with voting preference and ideological position, especially
in multiparty systems (for a review see Walgrave et al., 2014).
Issue ownership depends on the social basis of a party, as well as a partys
historical reputation for handling certain issues (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Petrocik,
1996; Petrocik, Benoit, & Hensen, 2003). Assuming parties will focus most of
their legislative efforts in issues they already own, I construct an issue ownership
ranking based on the likelihood of presenting a bill initiative on specific topics. One
logical approach would be to use the committee assignments to show the importance
given to different topics. Committees have jurisdictions over fairly specific issues
(depending on the number of committees). In previous chapters, I have shown that
there is some evidence of parties stacking committees and negotiating chairmanships
to favor the issues they are historically known to own. Yet, there are various political
biases that will affect who gets allocated to which committee. Limited spaces in a
small number of committees will favor larger political coalitions, and the possibility
to control all committees and, with them, the flow of legislation, is an important
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incentive for party leaders to evenly distribute member across committees.
Instead, to estimate issue ownership I focus on the topics of bill initiatives.
Ideally, I would get information from the committee each bill is assigned to. Leg-
islative committees usually have jurisdiction over specific policy areas, revealing
information on the topic of each bill reaching a committee. Yet, only a fraction of
bills reaches committees. Furthermore, there are political benefits to killing a bill
before it reaches a committee (Calvo, 2014), so we only get a partial view of the
type of bills being introduced by parties. Rather, I look at the name of all bill initia-
tives introduced in Congress. The advantage of looking at all bill initiatives is that
they are not affected by the political determinants that stop or allow bills to reach
committees. There are political and electoral incentives for legislators to introduce
bills to Congress, even when most are destined to be defeated (Crisp et al. 2004).11
I assume that, as part of a broader party strategy, policymakers will focus their leg-
islative activity in the issue they own. This strategy is not without its limitations:
Crisp et al. (2004), for example, show that in the U.S. legislators also introduce
bills to favor the specific needs of their geographical constituencies, rather than the
broader strategy of the party. This same process might be attenuated in Ecuador,
where candidates are more dependent on the party during elections, especially be-
cause seat allocation methods in Congress depend on the vote the party gets, rather
than the individual (i.e. D’Hondt method). I conduct a series of robustness checks
to show the validity of my measure (see Appendix B).
11The incentives are part of a more ample party and individual strategy. Legislators will intro-
duce bills and use that record to go back to their districts or constituencies and maintain a high
profile within the community that will eventually for them.
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To extract the theme covered by a bill, I run a structural topic model (STM)
(Roberts et al., 2013) and estimate the likelihood of each bill being within a given
topic. STM relies on the information each word in each text reveals. The names
of the bills in the Ecuadorian Congress reveal most of the information we need to
identify the topic they address: they are concrete and descriptive summaries of the
issue treated by a bill.12 STM, rather than relying on an assumed topic defined ex-
ante, infer the content of the topics under study. In statistical topic models, topics
are defined as distributions over a vocabulary of words that represent interpretable
themes (Roberts et al., 2013). STM is a type of multi-membership model,13 where
each document is represented as a mixture of topics, so all words within it are
generated from the same distribution. A multi-membership model will estimate the
likelihood a bill initiative fits within each topic, allowing us to categorize out bills by
theme. Furthermore, STM allows all estimations to include document-level meta-
data that explain topical prevalence, such as party affiliation, fitting the results
closer to our priors (i.e. that the sponsor’s party is correlated with the topic of the
bill).
We are interested in addressing how parties prioritize issues. The hierarchical
structure of our data has three levels (from top to bottom): partyi, legislatorjfrompartyi ,
billkfromlegislatorj . As Grimmer (2010) suggests, this structure is employed “anytime
12The 1998 and 2008 Constitutions of Ecuador explicitly state that bill can only be confined to
one topic and reform only one legal body. There are no omnibus bills, but even if the names hint
at more than one topic, STM can estimate more than one topic per bill name.
13Alternatively, there are single-membership topic models. In single-membership models a doc-
ument is restricted to only one topic, with each word within a given document belonging to exactly
one topic; thus, each document can be represented as a vector of proportions that denote what
fraction of the words belong to each topic. (Roberts et al., 2013)
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the quantities of interest are the priorities a set of actors allocate to issue”. Once
the distribution of topics by party is estimated, I rank the topics by frequency by
party. I estimate the model for each legislative period as well as for the whole pe-
riod analyzed, to get at both the dynamic and static nature of issue ownership. The
ranking of topics by party is then matched to each committee chair.
To prepare and evaluate my data, I follow Roberts et al. (2014) process
on STM. I start by pre-processing my text data by stemming (reducing words to
their root form), dropping punctuation and removing stop words (e.g., de, el, y).
Additionally, I drop words that are common to most bill names and that provide
little information to the model.14 I also eliminate any word that appears less than
five times across all documents. I estimate the model using K = 15 topics.15 The
main words estimated by topics, and their proportions across the texts, are presented
in Figure 5.2. From these topics, I assign themes to each and match the most
prevalent topic of each bill to that theme. The assigned themes and examples of
bills fitting that description are shown in Figure 5.3. The topics assigned to bills
are closely related to the issue we would expect parties in Ecuador would own
and sponsor.16 For example, the most prevalent topics presented by the MUPP-
NP, the political arm of the indigenous movement, are those related to ethnics
14The words eliminated are: proyecto, ley, orgnica, reformatoria, cdigo, art́ıculo, derogatoria,
ecuador.
15As robustness check, I estimate the model using K = 10, K = 20, and K = 25 topics. At
K = 15, topics have the highest levels of semantic coherence and exclusivity of words to topics,
a desirable quality in topic models (Roberts et al., 2014). While at K = 20 and K = 25 topics
become increasingly hard to assign specific themes to each topic, the conclusions from our main
models, for the most part, remain unchanged (see Appendix B).
16Issue ownership can be linked to party families, as historical cleavages are often closely related
to issue ownership (De Ridder and Kleinnijenhuis, 1998; Wagner and Meyer, 2014). The left is
historically own issues of labor, the right of capital, and the green party of the environment.
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rights (topic 11) and the environment (topic 6). The MPD, the electoral wing of
the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador, and a party associated with
worker unions presented most bill initiatives on social security, labor (topic 8), and
education (topic 7). Likewise, of the bill initiatives on social security and labor that
eventually reached a committee, 72% were assigned to the De lo Laboral y Social
committee. For civil and penal (topic 14), 60% were assigned to the De lo Civil y
Penal committee.
Top Topics
Topic 15: nacion, especi, policia
Topic 10: empresa, agua, sistema
Topic 3: servicio, sector, ecuatoriano
Topic 12: año, ecuatoriana, delito
Topic 1: desarrollo, elector, precio
Topic 13: control, trabajo, económico
Topic 11: artículo, banco, derecho
Topic 2: impuesto, régimen, consejo
Topic 9: registro, industri, agrario
Topic 6: provincia, fondo, transport
Topic 5: creacion, canton, universidad
Topic 7: educación, cultura, favor
Topic 4: articulo, tributario, fiscal
Topic 14: penal, civil, justicia
Topic 8: social, labor, seguridad
Figure 5.2: Graphical display of estimated topic proportions
One final note on this measure. To keep in line with how surveys usually
report issue ownership, I rank the attention on each topic by party. Ranking the
topics assumes that there is the same difference between the attention placed on the
first topic and the attention placed on the second topic, and the difference between
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T1: Agro/Labor
FIJACION DE SUELDOS Y SALARIOS
MINIMOS VITALES Y ELEVACION DE
SUELDOS Y SALARIOS.
REFORMATORIA A LA CODIFICACIÓN
DE LA LEY DEL FONDO PARA
EL ECODESARROLLO REGIONAL
AMAZÓNICO Y DE FORTALECIMIENTO
DE SUS ORGANISMOS SECCIONALES.
T2: Regional Funds
ASIGNASE LA CANTIDAD DE CINCO
SUCRES POR CADA BARRIL DE
PETROLEO QUE SE EXPORTE EN
BENEFICIO DE LOS MUNICIPIOS
DEL PAIS EN CUYA JURISDICCION
SE ENCUENTREN LOS POZOS
PRODUCTORES QUE GENEREN DICHAS
EXPORTACIONES.
ESTABLECESE EN FAVOR DE LA
MUNICIPALIDAD DE GUAYAQUIL
EL GRAVAMEN DE 30 CENTAVOS
DE DOLAR POR CADA BARRIL DE
PETROLEO EMBARCADO EN PUERTO
BALAO Y 20 CENTAVOS POR CADA
BARRIL QUE SE TRANSPORTA POR
EL OLEDUCTO LAGO AGRIO−BALAO.
T3: Public Service
SUSTITUTIVA A LA LEY DE
SERVICIO CIVIL Y CARRERA
ADMINISTRATIVA Y DE
UNIFICACION Y HOMOLOGACION DE
LAS REMUNERACIONES DEL SECTOR
PUBLICO.
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY DE
SERVICIO CIVIL Y CARRERA
ADMINISTRATIVA Y UNIFICACIÓN
SALARIAL Y HOMOLOGACIÓN DE
LAS REMUNERACIONES DEL SECTOR
PÚBLICO. (No podrá ejercer su
profesión en forma libre)
T4: Taxes
REFORMATORIA DE LOS
ARTICULOS 29, 30 Y 31 DE LA
LEY DE REGIMEN MUNICIPAL;
Y, ARTICULOS 9, 15 Y
DISPOSICIONES TRANSITORIAS DE
LA LEY DE REGIMEN PROVINCIAL.
INTERPRETATIVA DEL NUMERAL 19
DEL ARTICULO 55 DE LA LEY DE
REGIMEN TRIBUTARIO INTERNO.
T5: Public Works
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY DE
CREACION DE LA CORPORACION
EJECUTIVA PARA LA
RECONSTRUCCION DE LAS ZONAS
AFECTADAS POR EL FENOMENO EL
NIÑO −CORPECUADOR−
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY DE
CREACION DE LA CORPORACION
EJECUTIVA PARA LA
RECONSTRUCCION DE LAS ZONAS
AFECTADAS POR EL FENOMENO DEL
NIÑO, CORPECUADOR.
T6: Environment
FORESTACION Y REFORESTACION DE
LA PROVINCIA DE EL ORO.
REFORMA A LA LEY QUE CREA EL
FONDO DE SANEAMIENTO AMBIENTAL




DE SALUD PUBLICA LA VENTA
DE SOLARES UBICADOS EN LOS
BARRIOS NUEVA ESPERANZA
SUR, DE LA PARROQUIA CINCO
DE AGOSTO EN FAVOR DE LOS
ACTUALES POSESIONARIOS.
EXPROPIASE CON FINES DE
UTILIDAD PUBLICA EL PREDIO
DENOMINADO ALEGRIA UBICADO
EN LA PARROQUIA PASCUALES
DE LA CIUDAD DE GUAYAQUIL, A
FAVOR DE LOS MIEMBROS DE LA
COOPERATIVA PANCHO JACOME.
T8: Social Security/Labor
ESCALAFON Y SUELDOS DE
PERIODISTAS PROFESIONALES.
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY DE
SEGURIDAD SOCIAL
T9: Commerce
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY DE
CENTROS AGRICOLAS Y CAMARAS DE
AGRICULTURA.
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY PARA




CONGELASE LAS TARIFAS DE
CONSUMO DE ENERGIA ELECTRICA,
AGUA POTABLE Y TELEFONO.
REBAJA EL 75% DEL PAGO DE
LAS PLANILLAS POR CONSUMO
DE ENERGIA ELECTRICA QUE LAS
JUNTAS ADMINISTRADORAS DE AGUA
POTABLE ADEUDEN A LA EMPRESA
ELECTRICA, PARA FUNCIONAMIENTO
DE SISTEMAS DE AGUA POTABLE A
BOMBEO.
T11: Ethnic
Proyecto de Ley Orgánica
de Derechos Lingüísticos de
los Pueblos y Nacionalidades
Indígenas
Proyecto de Ley Orgánica




Ley Orgánica Reformatoria a la
Ley Contra la Violencia a la
Mujer y la Familia (Ley 103)
Denominada Ley Orgánica Contra
la Violencia de Género Hacia
las Mujeres
REFORMATORIA AL CÓDIGO DE LA
NIÑEZ Y ADOLESCENCIA. (Que
determina que el domicilio
para demandar la tenencia,
alimentos y demás casos
contemplados en la ley, sea el
domicilio de los menores)
T13: Descentralization





Proyecto de Ley Reformatoria
al Código Orgánico de
Organización Territorial,
Autonomía y Descentralización
T14: Civil and Penal
Proyecto de Ley Reformatoria
al Código de Procedimiento
Penal y Normas Penales
ORGÁNICA REFORMATORIA A LA
LEY ORGÁNICA DE LA FUNCIÓN
JUDICIAL Y AL CÓDIGO DE
PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL.
T15: Security
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY ESPECIAL
DE TELECOMUNICACIONES.
ARTICULO 38.
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY ORGÁNICA
DE LA POLICIA NACIONAL.
(Supervigilar, evaluar y
controlar a la Policia)
Figure 5.3: Example Documents Highly Associated with Topics
the attention placed on the second topic and the third topic. This is not necessarily
the case. For example, the MPD focused 24% of their attention on social security
and labor, 12% of their attention on education, 8% of their attention on taxes, and
so on. Indeed, this aligns with what we would expect from issue ownership theory.
I estimate the models using the proportions, rather than the ranking, and all the
conclusions from the models are maintained. In fact, many effects are amplified.
Yet, in the main models, I report the more conservative measure.
5.1.6 Ideological position of legislators
I use co-sponsorship data for all available bills–including those bills that did
not reach a committee or that reached a committee but had no interest group
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participation–to retrieve ideal point estimates describing the spatial preferences of
Congress members (Alemán et al. 2009). Since co-sponsorship takes place before
a bill is considered in committee, the revealed preferences about the legislators’
preferences in co-sponsorship data are not affected by committee or interest group
behavior and will not be endogenously related to our variables of interest group
participation.17 The ideological location of legislators was retrieved using principal
component analysis on the agreement matrix of cosponsored legislation (see Ap-
pendix E). In the Ecuadorian Congress, a lead sponsor requests fellow legislators
to co-sponsor a bill before it is formally proposed. Consequently, the estimation
drawn from co-sponsorship data is independent of observations of committee as-
signment and interest group participation. The independent variables used as ide-
ological determinants are the squared ideological distance between the sponsor and
the committee chair, and the median party member of the plenary floor.
To simplify the analysis, I divide the interest groups into four broad categories:
capital (e.g. industry, finance, etc.), labor (e.g. workers unions), academia (e.g.
universities, research institutes), and social groups (e.g. CONAIE). I assume that
capital is aligned to the right, and labor to the left. From Chapter 4 we know that
public and private universities are linked to labor and capital, respectively, thus I
aligned them accordingly. It is important to keep in mind that these alignments are
arbitrary and, while based on the political history of Ecuador and political economy
theory, there might be individual interest groups within these broad categories that
17An additional and important benefit is that there is no roll-call data readily available for
Ecuador.
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lack class consciousness, or that align by different cleavages.
5.1.7 Additional Variables and Controls
We are interested in the conditional effect of elections on interest group par-
ticipation. Elections should increase the importance of raising the salience of issues
owned. I use a dummy variable coded 1 for any committee meeting held six months
prior to an election, and 0 otherwise.18 As previously suggested, we also expect
groups with larger economic clout to participate in legislative committees. The ar-
gument focuses on the resources/ability of the group to raise the public salience of
an issue. There is no firm-level data for the economic performance or clout of each
interest group. Alternatively, I use sector-level economic indicators as proxies to
measure the clout of the sector being represented by an interest group. For labor,
I use the percentage of wage and salaried workers. A low proportion of wage and
salaried workers in a country can be an indication of a large agriculture sector and
low growth in the formal economy. They are the least likely to have formal work
arrangements, are the least likely to have social protection and safety nets to guard
against economic shocks, and are not able to collectively bargain or unionize. For
the economic clout of the financial sector, I use a measure of the domestic credit
provided by the financial sector (as a percentage of GDP).19 It provides a snapshot
18As a robustness check, I see the effect on interest group participation from one to six months
before an election.
19The measure captures credit provided by monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as
well as other financial corporations, including corporations that do not accept transferable deposits
but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits. Examples of other financial corporations
are finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and
foreign exchange companies. The category of financial interest groups include a similar variety of
corporations.
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of the dominance of private financial institutions within a financial system. For
the export and import sector, their economic clout is operationalized by the export
and import value index, respectively. The indexes are the normalized values for
exports and imports (expressed as a percentage of the average of the year 2000).
All macro-economic variables are taken from the World Bank.
There are a number of variables that are of substantive interest and should
be introduced to control for other confounding factors. At the bill level, I con-
trol for the overall attention given to the topic of a bill over the period. I also
control for whether a bill was sent by the executive. Committee-specific controls
include the total number of interest groups invited to a committee over a period;
whether a bill was sent by the executive; whether the committee chair is a mem-
ber of majority/plurality party; and whether a committee chair is a member of the
legislative president’s party. Notice that many of the controls, as well as the vari-
ables of interest, are estimated at the committee, period, and party level. Some
effectively control for period-specific effects (e.g. total number of interest groups
invited to a committee over a period), others are highly correlated with party and
committee-specific effects (e.g. topic ranking). Overall topic ranking, for example,
is fairly stable across time, and bills from the same topics will usually end up in the
same committee. Thus, adding committee-specific, party-specific, or period-specific
effects can be problematic for model convergence.20 Full summary statistics are
presented in Table 5.4.
20I show the results of alternative modeling strategies in Appendix C.
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Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Interest Groups Participation (per Bill) 2406 2.599 7.536 0.000 96.000
Labor Groups Participation (per Bill) 2406 0.388 1.355 0.000 14.000
Capital Groups Participation (per Bill) 2406 0.485 2.270 0.000 38.000
Finance Groups Participation (per Bill) 2406 0.097 0.725 0.000 18.000
Export Groups Participation (per Bill) 2406 0.291 1.570 0.000 33.000
Import Groups Participation (per Bill) 2406 0.157 0.805 0.000 15.000
Academia Participation (per Bill) 2406 0.884 3.899 0.000 49.000
Private University Participation (per Bill) 2406 0.318 1.529 0.000 19.000
Public University Participation (per Bill) 2406 0.406 2.219 0.000 28.000
Interest Group Participation (per Committee) 2409 37.912 99.440 0 983
Executive Bill 2406 0.146 0.353 0.000 1.000
Chair Party of the President 2406 0.431 0.495 0.000 1.000
Chair Party of the Maj/Plur Party 2406 0.512 0.500 0.000 1.000
Elections (6 Months) 2406 0.166 0.372 0.000 1.000
Wage and Salaried Workers (% of Workers) 1945 53.131 1.229 50.707 57.106
Domestic Credit (% GDP) 2338 22.093 6.981 10.529 37.675
Export Value Index 2306 164.824 139.993 39.131 522.151
Import Value Index 2306 223.723 205.940 39.972 745.106
Table 5.4: Summary Statistics
5.1.8 Empirical strategy
Studying the determinants of interest group participation in committee de-
bates requires an empirical approach that takes into account the overdispersion of
our main count variables of interest. Poisson models for count data assume that
the variance of the dependent variable equals its mean. Imposing this condition
on overdispersed data produces inefficient estimators. Different from Poisson mod-
els, negative binomial models employ an extra parameter, θ, that directly addresses
overdispersion. Tests for overdispersion on all models (Cameron and Trivedi, 1990)
strongly suggest that the true dispersion is greater than 0 (p ≤ 0.05).
Zero-inflation might also be an issue. I compare the performance of the neg-
ative binomial and a zero-inflated negative binomial model using Vuong’s closeness
test and find that both models are indistinguishable. Under some specifications, the
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zero-inflated model has trouble converging, thus I use the negative binomial model
as my main estimation strategy across all models.
5.2 Results
IG Part. (Bill) Labor Part. (Bill) Capital Part. (Bill) Academia Part. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.081∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗ −0.015 −0.057∗
(0.023) (0.042) (0.040) (0.034)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.087∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.028 0.079∗∗
(0.023) (0.041) (0.040) (0.034)
IG Participation by Committee 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005)
Executive Bill 1.038∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 1.972∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.179) (0.165) (0.150)
Chair Party of President 0.510∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.162) (0.137) (0.115)
Constant −0.241∗∗∗ −1.809∗∗∗ −1.793∗∗∗ −1.691∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.153) (0.144) (0.122)
N 2406 2406 2406 2406
θ 0.352∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.139∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.143∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.207∗∗∗ (0.015)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Negative binomial
model that accounts and corrects for over-dispersion. The unit of analysis is all bills that reached committees (whether they were lobbied or not).
Table 5.5: Explaining Interest Group Participation in the Ecuadorian Congress, 1979-2018
I start by empirically testing whether chairs will invite more interest groups to
participate in committees when the party owns the issue of the bill. Various models
addressing this hypothesis are presented in Table 5.5. The dependent variable for
Model 1, the main model, is participation by any interest groups in a committee
debate. The other three models (Model 2 - Model 4) only count labor, capital, and
academic interest group participation. The main variable of interest is the rank of
the topic of the bill by the party of the chair. Note that the ranking goes from 1
(highest) to 15 (lowest), thus we expect a negative coefficient. Across all models, the
rank variable is, as predicted, negative (p≤ 0.05). The higher the rank of an issue for
a party, the higher the number of interest groups that will be invited to participate
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in committee debates. Substantively, this means going from the fifth highest ranked
issue to the highest ranked issue of a party increases the predicted number of interest
groups participating by 30% (see Figure 5.4). According to our theory, the general
rank of an issue has no predicted effect on the number of invitations to interest
groups. After all, we assume that chairs are strategic players, worried about raising
the salience of their issue owned by their party, not necessarily the issue that has the
most attention. The negative effect, while not expected, is not entirely surprising
either. There is an incentive to limit the exposure of all other issues that are not
owned by the party. The effect of issue ranking is stronger when we estimate the
model by only looking at interest groups representing labor, but not significant for
capital interest groups. Worth noting that bills sent by the executive will see more
interest group participation than those sent by a legislator. Committee chairs that
are of the same party as the legislative president, usually the majority or plurality
party, will invite more interest groups to participate. Both results are likely related
to the expectations of bill success and will be further explored below.
Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 5.6 present estimates of interest group partici-
pation in committee debates. Meanwhile, Models 3 through 6 describe the estimates
of labor and capital group participation. Each of these models provides evidence
that conforms to Hypothesis 2.
First, notice the evolution of the estimates of ideological proximity of the
sponsor of the bill to the committee chair across all unconditional models (Models
1, 3, and 5). As suggested by Hypothesis 2, ideological proximity is important to the
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Figure 5.4: Invitations to Committee by the level of issue ranking (ownership) by party of com-
mittee chair. Note that the ranking goes from 1 (highest) to 15 (lowest), thus we
expect a descending line.
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similar relationship with labor and capital interest groups. As previously mentioned,
the chair of the CAL–the president of the legislature–acts as the first gatekeeper.
Since there is coordination within parties among all stages of the policy-creation
process, we see an increased importance of the ideological proximity when the chair
of a committee is from the same party as the president of the legislature.
IG Part. (Bill) Labor Part. (Bill) Capital Part. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Distance of Sponsor to Chair −0.256∗∗∗ −0.092 −0.198 −0.224 −0.229 −0.047
(0.079) (0.106) (0.140) (0.197) (0.141) (0.187)
Distance of Sponsor to Floor Median 0.139 0.162 0.200 0.150 −0.282 −0.228
(0.107) (0.144) (0.187) (0.259) (0.205) (0.280)
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.064∗∗ −0.062∗∗ −0.092∗∗ −0.092∗∗ −0.004 −0.003
(0.025) (0.025) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.071∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.083∗ 0.083∗ 0.009 0.008
(0.025) (0.025) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
IG Participation by Committee 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Executive Bill 1.011∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 1.888∗∗∗ 1.862∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.107) (0.184) (0.185) (0.170) (0.171)
Chair Party of President 0.580∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗ 0.252 0.572∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.103) (0.150) (0.182) (0.145) (0.176)
Sponsor to Chair * Chair Party of President −0.391∗∗ 0.053 −0.408
(0.158) (0.281) (0.286)
Sponsor to Floor * Chair Party of President −0.016 0.109 −0.115
(0.211) (0.368) (0.404)
Constant −0.219∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗ −1.831∗∗∗ −1.809∗∗∗ −1.684∗∗∗ −1.752∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.098) (0.168) (0.174) (0.167) (0.173)
N 2093 2093 2093 2093 2093 2093
θ 0.360∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.362∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.144∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.144∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.149∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.150∗∗∗ (0.013)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Negative binomial model that accounts and
corrects for over-dispersion. The unit of analysis is bills that reached committees and were lobbied by all (Model 1 and Model 2), labor (Model 3 and Model 4) or capital
(Model 5 and Model 6) interest groups. For bills introduced by the executive, the assigned ideal position was the median position of the party for that cohort.
Table 5.6: Effect of Ideological Distance of Bill Sponsor on Interest Groups Participation
The effect of ideological proximity to the committee chairs is more easily in-
terpretable as presented in Figure 5.5. The horizontal axis in Figure 5.5 describes
the ideological position of sponsors as estimated from the cosponsorship data. The
vertical axis describes the number of invitations to a committee. The median floor
voter is represented with the letter F and the position of the committee chair with
the letter C. The median floor voter is pegged at the center and the committee chair
right-of-center.21 As shown in the left plot of Figure 5.5 and consistent with Hypoth-
21The model yields the same conclusions regardless of the position of the median floor voter and
committee chair.
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esis 2, more interest groups are invited to proposals sponsored by representatives
who are deep in the chair’s coalition. We can also see different preferences when it
comes to inviting labor interest groups and capital interest groups. In the right plot
of Figure 5.5, chairs invite labor more to committees when the bill is sponsored by
a legislator deep in the coalition, yet chairs will invite capital more to committees
when the bill is sponsored by a legislator closer to the median floor voter.
In Figure 5.6, we can see the conditional effect of the committee chairs and
the president of the legislature being from the same party. First, it is noteworthy
the dramatic increase in participation when the chair and the president are from the
same party. For the complete sample, the participation of interest groups increases
almost six-fold when committee chair and the legislative president share party affil-
iation. While lower in magnitude, for labor and capital participation stills increases
considerably. The effects across groups remain, yet we see that for interest groups
in general, the bills that get more invitations are those of sponsors deeper in the
coalition when the chair and president share party than when they do not.
The effect of the chair’s ideological position on interest group participation is
shown in Table 5.7. For groups broadly on the left, we expect a negative coefficient
for the ideological position, and the opposite for those groups broadly on the right.
The results are mixed. Labor interest groups, as predicted, are invited more often
when the committee chair’s ideological position is closer to the left. Roughly, moving
from the right to the left would increase labor participation by a standard deviation.
For capital interest groups the effect is not statistically significant, even though










































Figure 5.5: Invitations to Committee by Interest Groups Type; Ecuadorian Congress, 1979-2019.
Note: Estimated from models reported in Table D.1 in Appendix D. Median Floor
voter (f) set to 0.0. Committee Chair (c) set to 0.4.
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Figure 5.6: Invitations to Committee by Interest Groups Type Conditional on Party of Chair
and Legislative President; Ecuadorian Congress, 1979-2019. Note: Estimated from
models reported in Table D.1 in Appendix D. Median Floor voter (f) set to 0.0.
Committee Chair (c) set to 0.4.
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political, even “technical” participation, like that from members of universities.
Public universities are often closer to labor groups, while private universities have
connections with Chambers. One the one hand, private universities participate
more as the position of committee chairs moves to the right (p ≤ 0.1). The opposite
effect is observed with public universities, even though in this case the effect is not
statistically significant. The conditional effect of the chair being from the same
party as the president of the legislature is presented in Model 2 and Model 4. The
marginal effect is in the expected direction for labor groups (p ≤ 0.05), but not so
for capital interest groups. While the estimates show some support for Hypothesis
3, the results are not conclusive and merit further exploration in future work. For
example, left-leaning chairs are more likely to invite interest groups, in general,
to participate in committee debates. Given the overall right-leaning nature of the
Ecuadorian Congress (see Figure E.1), chairs from the other side of the aisle might
use more often, and more strategically, interest group invitations in an effort to gain
from their owned issues while at the same time be effective lawmakers.22
I also hypothesized that in a seller’s market (the chair being the seller), chairs
will invite more interest groups closer to their own ideological position when they
want to raise the salience of an issue owned. When topics are salient, there will be a
higher demand to participate in committee debates, allowing chairs to discriminate
whom they invite to debates. The opposite should also be true: in a buyer’s market
(the interest group being the buyer), chairs should not able to discriminate from
what side of the aisle the interest group fairs. To explore this effect, I interact the
22The same can be extended to legislatures with opposite biases.
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Labor Part. (Bill) Capital Part. (Bill) Public Uni. (Bill) Private Uni. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Ideological Pos. of Chair −0.277∗∗ 0.003 0.154 0.269 −0.105 0.332∗
(0.133) (0.193) (0.135) (0.183) (0.163) (0.181)
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.013 −0.026 0.004 −0.0005 −0.028 −0.094∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.051) (0.057)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.047 0.048 0.010 0.012 0.096∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.050) (0.053)
IG Participation by Committee 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Executive Bill 1.054∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗ 1.973∗∗∗ 1.941∗∗∗ 0.448∗ 0.196
(0.183) (0.183) (0.179) (0.178) (0.238) (0.262)
Chair Party of President 0.889∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.152) (0.147) (0.154) (0.181) (0.195)
Ideological Pos. of Chair * Chair Party of President −0.560∗∗ −0.276
(0.270) (0.275)
Constant −2.437∗∗∗ −2.437∗∗∗ −1.871∗∗∗ −1.881∗∗∗ −2.842∗∗∗ −3.414∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.161) (0.154) (0.154) (0.192) (0.217)
N 2131 2131 2131 2131 2131 2131
θ 0.183∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.185∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.144∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.144∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.119∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.139∗∗∗ (0.021)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Negative binomial model that accounts and corrects for
over-dispersion. The unit of analysis is bills that reached committees and were lobbied by labor (Model 1 and Model 2), capital (Model 3 and Model 4), public or private universities (Model
5 and Model 6) and interest groups.
Table 5.7: Effect of Chair’s Ideology on Interest Groups Participation
committee chair’s ideological position and the total participation of interest groups
by committee in a given period. Thus, the higher the number of overall participation,
the more a chair should be able to discriminate. In Figure 5.7 I present the predicted
count of labor and capital interest group participation across the range of ideological
distance at different levels of issue salience (in a given period). Once again, the
evidence is mixed. For labor groups, the conditional effect is as predicted: when few
interest groups participate, the effect of ideology on labor group invitations is flat.
As more groups participate in committees, left-leaning chairs are able to choose the
type of group that gets invited, favoring those closer to their ideology (i.e. labor
groups). The effect for capital groups is flat across most levels of general attendance,
and at high levels of attendance, when the relationship becomes significant, it does
so in the opposite direction as predicted.
One of the most compelling empirical evidence of the model is the behavior
of chairs before elections, a time when issue salience matters most. Conditional






















−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0




















































Figure 5.7: Predicted count of labor interest group participation across ideological distance at
different levels of interest group participation. Predicted values estimated using a
restricted model where the dependent variables are labor and capital interest group
participation, and interacting the ideological position of the chair with the total
number of interest group participation by committee in a given period.
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election. Table 5.8 shows the interactive effect of elections (6 months prior) and our
main variable of interest. For off-election months, the effect of issue ownership is
maintained. In election season, the effect for each unit change is increased two-fold.
This effect intensifies progressively as we get closer to an election, too. In Figure
5.8, we can more clearly see this progression. Starting on the top left panel, the
effect of issue ownership becomes more pronounced on interest group participation
as we get closer to elections. The more substantive effects appear five months before
an election when the participation of interest groups in an owned issue will increase
by 50% when compared to non-election periods. By the time we get to the month
prior to an election, chairs will invite three times as much interest groups as they
would in any other period.
Furthermore, as hypothesized, elections eliminate the effect of ideological prox-
imity on interest group participation, even though the evidence is not conclusive.
Model 1 from Table 5.9 shows the expected effect of the ideological position of the
chair on labor group participation, an effect that disappears during election sea-
son. This is not true for capital interest groups, though, as there is no effect of the
ideological position of the chair on their participation (as previously shown), but
elections actually trigger more numerous invitations to capital groups from right-
leaning chairs. While the direction is as expected, the conditional effect of elections
is opposite to what was initially predicted. To more clearly observe the interactive
effect, Figure 5.9 shows the predicted count for labor (top) and capital (bottom)
interest groups. This further suggests that there might be an additional strategical
component to interest group invitations, mainly, one exploited by parties farther
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away from the median.
IG Part. (Bill)




Rank of Topic by Party of Chair X Election −0.084∗
(0.043)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.088∗∗∗
(0.023)










Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence
levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Negative
binomial model that accounts and corrects for over-dispersion. The
unit of analysis is all bills that reached committees (whether they were
lobbied or not). The Election dummy is coded 1 for any bill debated 6
months prior to an election, and 0 otherwise.
Table 5.8: The Effect of Election Cycle on Interest Group Participation
Of course, these results could also be a result of opportunistic legislators aiming
to obtain benefits from direct and personalistic exchanges with interest groups.
Towards the end of their tenure, when there is no possibility of reelection and no
fear of punishment by the party, legislators might be inclined to invite more interest
group to gain some outside benefit. For example, interest groups, keen in gaining
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Figure 5.9: Predicted count of labor and capital interest group participation across different
levels of the committee chair’s ideological position, conditional on elections.
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Labor Part. (Bill) Capital Part. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Ideological Pos. of Chair −0.523∗∗∗ −0.529∗∗∗ −0.206 −0.280
(0.172) (0.175) (0.186) (0.189)
Elections (Dummy) 0.175 0.144 1.033∗∗ −0.248
(0.456) (0.533) (0.449) (0.670)
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair 0.074 0.076 −0.049 −0.024
(0.066) (0.066) (0.073) (0.072)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.060 0.059 0.086 0.067
(0.061) (0.062) (0.067) (0.067)
IG Participation by Committee 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001)
Executive Bill 1.261∗∗∗ 1.266∗∗∗ 2.486∗∗∗ 2.523∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.216) (0.232) (0.230)
Ideological Pos. of Chair * Election 0.133 2.662∗∗
(0.969) (1.066)
Constant −1.908∗∗∗ −1.909∗∗∗ −1.511∗∗∗ −1.535∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.173) (0.186) (0.186)
N 1036 1036 1036 1036
θ 0.218∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.218∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.161∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.164∗∗∗ (0.018)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p
< .1. Negative binomial model that accounts and corrects for over-dispersion. The unit of analysis is bills that reached
committees and were lobbied by labor (Model 1 and Model 2) or capital (Model 3 and Model 4) interest groups. Election
dummy takes 1 for any bill discussed 3 months before an election and 0 otherwise. The model is estimated for bills that
reached a committee whose chair was the same party as the legislative president.
Table 5.9: Effect of Ideology and Elections on Interest Groups Participation
door). If this was the case, just like our theory predicts, we would expect to see more
invitations to issues owned by the party before elections. After all, people leaving
want to show their capacity to their future employer, and they can better achieve
that by inviting interest groups to issues they own (i.e. are better are handling). To
discard this possibility, I divide my sample into cohorts that could run for reelection
and cohorts that could not.23 The results are presented in Table 5.10. Model 1 shows
the estimates for cohorts that could be reelected and Model 2 shows the estimates
for cohorts that could not. As expected, the effect found in the full sample (Table
23Between 1979 and 1994, there was no immediate reelection in Ecuador. Between 1994 and
2008, a legal reform eliminated term-limits. The 2008 Constitution limited reelection to one term.
Thus, between 1994 and 2013, all legislators could run for reelection. Note that cohort terms are
not staggered, so all legislators within a cohort have the same options regarding reelection (at least
until 2013).
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5.8) only holds for those legislators that could run for reelection (Model 1 in Table
5.10), providing additional evidence to the theory of party coordination to raise
issue salience.
IG Part. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.080∗∗ −0.070∗
(0.031) (0.040)
Election (dummy) 0.351 0.043
(0.220) (0.283)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.123∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.030) (0.036)
IG Participation by Committee 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.001)
Executive Bill 1.148∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.148)
Chair Party of President 0.370∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.128)




Reelection Allowed? Yes No
N 1510 884
θ 0.327∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.425∗∗∗ (0.033)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels
reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Negative binomial model
that accounts and corrects for over-dispersion. The unit of analysis is all bills
that reached committees (whether they were lobbied or not). The Election
dummy is coded 1 for any bill debated 6 months prior to an election, and 0
otherwise. Model 1 only includes cohort that could run for reelection. Model
2 only includes cohorts that could not.
Table 5.10: The Effect of Election Cycle on Interest Group Participation
Finally, several other factors previously identified in the literature as affecting
media salience, and thus the capacity to affect issue salience, appears to also have an
effect on interest groups participation. In particular, the economic clout of a group
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seems to be linked to the frequency with which chairs invite them to committees.
As the level of prominence of an economic group raises in the market, so does their
participation in committees (see Table 5.11). For example, raising the domestic
credit provided by the financial sector by half a standard deviation will raise the
participation of finance interest group by a whole standard deviation.
Labor Part. (Bill) Finance Part. (Bill) Export Part. (Bill) Import Part. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.138∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.084∗ 0.087
(0.048) (0.081) (0.050) (0.053)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.159∗∗∗ −0.108 0.151∗∗∗ −0.041
(0.046) (0.085) (0.049) (0.055)
IG Participation by Committee 0.008∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.0003 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Executive Bill 0.914∗∗∗ 2.152∗∗∗ 1.810∗∗∗ 1.656∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.290) (0.198) (0.214)
Chair Party of President 0.257 0.370 0.366∗ 0.166
(0.157) (0.269) (0.188) (0.208)
Waged Workers (%) 0.150∗∗
(0.060)






Constant −9.806∗∗∗ −4.691∗∗∗ −3.077∗∗∗ −2.963∗∗∗
(3.219) (0.503) (0.204) (0.216)
N 1943 2335 2304 2304
θ 0.141∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.114∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.105∗∗∗ (0.014)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Negative binomial
model that accounts and corrects for over-dispersion. The unit of analysis is all bills that reached committees (whether they were lobbied or not).
Table 5.11: The Effect of Economic Clout on Interest Group Participation
5.3 Conclusion
This chapter finds that committee chairs are more likely to invite interest
groups to participate in committees when they own the issue discussed. Most con-
clusively, when salience is more important for the party–before an election–the effect
of issue ownership becomes more marked. Furthermore, committee chairs are also
sensitive to other sources that can increase issue salience, such as economic clout.
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I show that gatekeepers are strategic in the way they open and close the gates,
and how this behavior is shaped by different strategical party elements politician
consider when legislating (e.g. ideological position of bill sponsor, gatekeepers, etc.).
Interestingly, all these effects are more prominent for labor interest groups.
When we break down participation by groups, it is invitations to labor groups that
will increase if the party of the chair owns the issue, an effect that was not found
for capital interest groups, for example. This might speak to the mechanisms that
parties use to raise issue salience, particularly those farther away from the plenary
median voter.24 Since the benefits from strategically allowing groups to participate
are mostly electoral, chairs could be investing more in the numbers (votes) provided
by labor than the resources (campaign contributions) provided by capital. Yet, the
effect of the ideological position of the committee chair is stronger for capital interest
groups.
All the results presented speak to the same strategic considerations of com-
mittee chairs when it comes to inviting interest groups to committee debates. That
is, chairs invite more interest groups when bills addressing topics their party owns
are discussed. They are more likely to do this when parties benefit from increased
issue salience of an owned issue. Mainly, before an election, an effect that increases
as we get closer to election day. Finally, the results show that as the economic clout
of groups increase, so does their presence in committee debates. We know that
economic clout is related to media presence, thus it is not surprising that chairs are
more inclined to invite groups with larger clout.
24As mentioned above, the Congress of Ecuador has been, historically, right-leaning biased.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
6.1 Summary of Findings
The outside influence of interest groups, their interaction with policymakers,
and the outcome of lobbying has received much attention by scholars. Its more
visible counterpart, public lobbying, has not. Public lobbying, as presented in this
dissertation, is a double-sided window into the strategic behavior of interest groups,
on the one side, and the legislative game, on the other.
In democracies like the Latin American ones, where the institutionalization
and regulation of lobbying is an improbable possibility–always a scapegoat, but
rarely a priority–, the opportunity to look into this process is particularly attrac-
tive. After all, interest groups participation in the policy creation process is ubiq-
uitous across political systems and structures. It is the omitted variable of many
legislative processes, one whose existence we acknowledge, but are rarely able to
observe. Earlier research in Latin American interest groups theorized about the
channels of influence (Schneider, 2004), the conditions on how the channels operate,
and the structural determinants for the policy outcomes stemming from these chan-
nels (Fairfield 2010, 2015a, 2015b).1 Rarely have we been able to systematically
1Fairfield (2010, 2015a, 2015b) has done research on private wealth and public revenue, focusing
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observe and quantify the interactions of groups and politicians where the policy is
ultimately decided: the legislature.
This dissertation, a push to fill that gap, benefited theoretically from the lit-
erature on legislative politics and the intuitions from research on interest groups.
It is an attempt to detail a process that has been elusive to the comparative field,
yet often alters the outcome of policy. Without a doubt, research on lobbying and
Congress in the United States (and, to a lesser extent, in the European Union) is
more extensive and developed,2 yet often falls short in its institutional, organiza-
tional and partisan variation. The rules of the game are clear, and while “dark
money” is still pervasive, the exchanges between interest groups and policymak-
ers are better recorded and publicly available (though not necessarily publicized).
By looking at lobbying, both from its public manifestation and in its alternative
institutional environment, this research offers a new perspective on interest group
participation in the policy-creation process in Latin America, one that can hopefully
inform different political contexts.
In summary, this dissertation proposes an alternative information model to
explain the interaction between interest groups and legislators. My theory sug-
gests that committee chairs–endowed with gatekeeping authority–will strategically
invite interest groups to raise the salience of issues owned by the party. I find that
interest groups are willing to participate in this process given the prospects of micro-
on the relevance of structural and instrumental power. Schneider (2004) provides a comparative
and historical analysis on the participation of business in Latin American politics.
2Beyond the literature cited throughout this paper, see Figueiredo and Ritcher (2014) for a
review on the advances on the field and the limitations of studying lobbying in developing countries.
Also see Hojnacki et al. (2012) for a review on the theoretical frameworks of lobbying (focused on
the U.S., Europe, and Japan).
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managing policy. Fully aware of the political hurdles required to overcome before
passing legislation, interest groups try to gain access to bill initiatives already in
motion, and aim for the marginal gains obtained from changing specific articles–the
“fine print”–that could benefit them.
Committee chairs appear to be highly strategic about invitations to debates
on bill initiatives. Chairs will invite more interest groups to participate in debates
of issues the party owns, a relation that is increased when raising the salience of is-
sues becomes more appealing. Particularly, as elections approach, committee chairs
become more generous with their invitations to debates, a sign that indeed salience
is one of the main drivers of interest group participation. As the ideology of the
sponsor of the bill gets closer to the ideology of the chairs, the latter is more likely
to invite interest groups to participate. Invitations increase at a faster rate when
the chair also share party with the first gatekeeper, the president of the legislature.
Given that interest groups have different levels of resources, and these resources
change across time, it is not surprising that as the economic clout of certain groups
increases, so does their participation in committees.
To execute this research, I utilized an original dataset on interest groups par-
ticipation in committee debates in the Ecuadorian Congress from 1979 to 2018. By
identifying 838 unique interest groups, and 6,989 instances of interest group partic-
ipation in committee meetings, I was able to paint a new picture of how legislators
and interest groups interact in the midst of the policy creation process. Additionally,
the analysis sourced data on the entire universe of bill initiatives from the Ecuado-
rian Congress, to complement interest group participation data with legislative-level
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and party-level information that reflect the internal strategies the come into play
when deciding who gets to invite interest groups, and when. Finally, I draw upon
over 30 semi-structured interviews with a range of actors participating in the policy-
creation process in Ecuador, from interest group representatives to committee chairs,
to elucidate why interest groups seek to participate in committee debates, and what
they gain from this.
This analysis of public lobbying through the participation of interest groups
in committee debates helps draw attention to several gaps in our understanding
of both the role and reach of external influences in policy and the handling of
these influences by legislators. On the one hand, this research extends the role
of legislative gatekeepers from one of controlling the flow of legislation to one of
controlling the flow of influence. Common wisdom assumes that interest groups
purchase the access they want from politicians (Austen-Smith, 1995) or provide
information strategically to shape policy outcomes (Grossman and Helpman, 2001).
This dissertation complements those approaches in arguing that the quid pro quo
transactions between politicians and interest groups, when made public, change the
dynamic between the parts, granting much of the leverage to the legislator instead
of the interest group. This, by no means, suggests that interest groups have no
agency. Rather, it looks to expand the reach of transactions that are kept private
and out of public sight, and analyze how they change the motivations and incentives
of both parts. When we place lobbying in the center of the policy-creation process,
their participation is also part of the broader political considerations of policymakers
answering to many audiences.
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Secondly, my dissertation sheds light on interest group participation in a region
and a context often absent in the literature addressing this topic. While there have
been attempts to explore how groups interact with policymakers, and how they
are able to affect policy, their participation in the policy-creation process itself–in
the political game that ultimately decide the fate of legislation–, appear to have
been sidelined from the analysis. This dissertation is an attempt to fill this gap
by exploring the behavior of legislators vis á vis interest group in a context, like
legislative committees, that is important for both the political interests of the party
and for the outcome of bill initiatives. In doing so, I present some of the first
empirical evidence of lobbying, public or otherwise, in Latin America, and a novel
theoretical framework for the politics of committees and interest groups.
6.2 A Further Agenda
This research explores two main questions: why do politicians invite interest
groups to committees and when are they being invited? But this dissertations
also hints at another two lines of research that come as natural extensions of these
main questions: who are they inviting, and how are invitations affecting legislative
success? We have presented a broad look at when different types of interest groups,
representing different industries and alignments, participate in committees. Yet, the
categorizations, while based on theory, are ad-hoc and static.
The participation of interest groups in the policy-creation process requires the
creation of networks, not only with politicians but among other interest groups.
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These connections will change, as interest groups create different networks that are
more efficient at representing and delivering their interests. With our data, and
within our framework, we can study the networks created by interest groups and
legislators, the structure of those networks, and how are those networks changing
and reacting to different political and economic contexts. For example, modeling the
participation to committee debates as a bipartite network where interest groups are
connected only through a committee chair (i.e. all edges–invitations to committees–
go through a chair) can provide a detail view on how these connections change across
time and to exogenous factors.
At first glance, we might expect for economic and political crises, for instance,
to affect the strength of the ties between groups. Committee chairs might run a
tighter ship, being more conservative on who gets access to policy, creating tightly
knit communities when there is stronger competition for limited resources. When
more resources are available to go around, committee chairs can opt to distribute
access more generously, in an attempt to build new ties with groups in the future.
Future research can uncover in further detail how gatekeepers choose who is allowed
to participate and how that choice is modeled by endogenous and exogenous factors.
The second unanswered question touches more closely to the policy implica-
tions of the participation of interest groups in the committee debates. We want to
know how the outcome of policy changes when groups participate and when they do
not. Inasmuch as interest groups can only be invited to participate in meetings of
bill initiatives that reach committee, the likelihood of success of those bills is already
relatively high. Of the bill initiatives that are discharged from committees in the
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Ecuadorian Congress, 48% are eventually voted into law (compared to 16% of all
bill initiatives). Keeping this in mind, it is still important to know to what degree
does interest group participation affect legislative success. Policymakers are invit-
ing interest groups to participate to raise the salience of owned issues, and in return
they allow interest group to micro-manage policy. Are policymaker offering spaces
in high-value policy, bills that have a high chance of being approved? Are policy-
makers offering high-value bills to some groups and not to others? Is participation
linked to success?
Previous studies have shown that legislative success in Latin America, for leg-
islators, is linked to the party of the sponsor of the bill and the role of the party
within the legislature (i.e. majority/minority party; party of the executive) (Alemán
and Calvo, 2008), and often the executive plays a major role, especially during her
“honeymoon” period and approval is up (Alemán and Navia, 2009; Figueiredo et al.
2009). More recent research on the role of ideology and partisanship in legislative
voting has shown the importance of party strategy when determining legislative vot-
ing (Alemán et al., 2018). With this idea in mind, how do interest groups factor into
legislative success? We can foresee two scenarios: first, one where committee chairs
are using their knowledge of success strategically, and pricing access accordingly;
second, one where committee chairs use the capacity interest groups have to raise
salience in order to alter the probability of success a bill initiative, whether to show
the benefits of an owned issue, or to show the drawbacks of not owned issue of an
opposing party.
The final outstanding question relates to how generalizable the findings of this
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dissertation are to other countries and contexts around the world. The Ecuadorian
Congress, as all legislatures, has its own particularities and the interaction between
interest groups and legislators are unique given the various changes in the rules
of the game across time. That said, we saw in Chapter 3 that the Ecuadorian
Congress is not an outlier in terms of capability and proactiveness when compared
to other legislatures in Latin America (Saiegh, 2010). The norms regulating lobbying
are similarly absent across countries, and those that regulate lobby are seen as an
exception (and even then implementation varies). How much can the proposed
theoretical framework be adapted and generalized to other contexts?
I foresee two types of generalizations: of the model and of public lobbying.
The scope conditions of the proposed theoretical framework are flexible. While
much of the theory stands on the gatekeeping authority of the committee chair,
it is worth noting that relaxing this condition might give us different results using
the same intuition. For example, in legislatures where the decentralized authority
of committee chairs is limited (e.g. Uruguay), chairs might distribute the gains of
raising the salience of an issue across all committee members–by inviting interest
groups to debates in a more ample set of issues–or invitations might be directly
managed by the majority party. Likewise, even though more distanced from the core
actors explored in this dissertation, the framework can be applied to other processes
where gatekeepers have the ability to raise the salience of issue or strategically decide
what issues are discussed and when those issues are discussed.
In other regions where public lobbying is a common feature, such as the Eu-
ropean Union, the relation between the voter and the policy implemented by the
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parliamentarian might be more removed, enough for the benefits of the participation
of interest groups through issue salience are diminished. Thus, the voter as an au-
dience loses its values, but the party or the coalition remain an important strategic
actor that will be interested in the signals chairs are sending through the decision
to invite certain groups and not others. The main aim for any extension of public
lobbying would be how, in different gatekeeping arrangements, legislative organiza-
tions, and party systems, legislators invite interest groups to publicly participate in
the policy creation process.
Likewise with issue salience. Throughout the dissertation, raising the salience
of an issue was always an action carried out by the chair. But the salience of an
issue can be raised exogenously, by political or economic shocks that concentrate
the attention of voters and policymakers (Petrocik, 1996). On the other hand, not
all issues are owned, and competition to own disputed issues can be fierce (Bélanger
and Meguid, 2008). How do committee chairs respond in these cases? Indeed, a
factor that is currently missing from this research are the outside pressures that
shape the behavior of legislators, the competition it can create among parties, the
effect it can have on invitations, and, ultimately, the results on policy outcomes.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
Public lobbying is best understood as a window into a broader world of interest
groups, legislators, and policymaking. It can help us understand how legislators
use their posts within the legislature to benefit the party. It can also show the
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channels of influence interest groups use to change policy, and who controls those
channels–who controls the flow of influence–. In this exchange, we are presented
with further evidence of the mechanisms that govern the policy-creation process,
inter-party preference, and interest group behavior. The richness of the data used
in this research can allow us, in future iterations, to explore more detailed processes
taking place at committee meetings, at plenary floor debates, and even during both
Constitutional Assemblies.
But most importantly, this research is a step towards understanding how ex-
ternal forces ultimately shape the destiny of the laws governing us all. A more nu-
anced look of Schattschneider’s “heavenly chorus”, which can help us better grasp
its accent and how policymakers and their parties benefit from those voices. One
common thread among interviewees for this dissertation was the longing for laws
regulating lobbying. Interest group representatives–especially those representing
smaller groups–wanted to have clear rules to gain access. Legislators, mindful of
the ubiquitous nature of lobbying, wanted to hold meetings with interest groups
without having to worry about looking guilty to the public. Still, both parts knew
that it was a policy unlikely to be implemented: the national collective memory
saw lobbying as back-room deals where policy was sold to the highest bidder; the
“hombre del malet́ın”–the man with the briefcase (full of bribe money)–is still often
invoked.
But the reality is more complicated than lore. Legislative initiatives are diffi-
cult to pass, interests are almost impossible to align, and partisan pressures can be
excruciating. This research has set up the framework to incorporate these realities
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into the policy creation process. Yet this is only the start. We are ultimately in-
terested in policy outcomes, in the “fine print”, in the challenges to the status quo.
We want to know how much of an “upper-class ascent” the chorus has. We want
to know how the pitch changes. We want to know how outside interests affect the
very laws the will rule over the rest. Hopefully, this research is the first step towards
that goal: unraveling the many-times unobservable processes that move policy.
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Appendix A: Sample Selection Bias Robustness Check
We estimating our models of interest group participation, we are encountered
with a censored sample of bill initiates. Close to 68% of all bills presented will never
be discharged from committee. Sample selection bias arises from the non-random
censoring of data. This occurs when the observations select themselves into (or out
of) the sample based on observed and unobserved characteristics. Estimates based
on models that ignore such a non-random selection may be biases and inconsistent.
For our data, non-random selection arises if the sample consisting of bill reaching
committee differ in important characteristics from the sample of bill not reaching
committee. For example, bill initiatives that reach committees are, on average, more
closely linked to the issues a party owns and are more likely to have interest group
invitations than those that do not (if those that did not advance were to hypothet-
ically reach committee). To assess the degree of selection affecting the models, I
test for bias using a modified two-step Heckman selection model for count responses
fitted by penalized maximum likelihood estimation (Wyszynkski and Marra, 2018).
The predictors for the selection and outcome equations, respectively, can be specified
as follows
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selectioni = β10 + β11X1i + ε1i
interestgroupsi = β20 + β21X2i + ε2i
where selectioni is a binary selection variable for bills reaching committees or
not, X1i is a set of covariates determining the selection variable, and include: the
percentage of seats in the legislature of the sponsor’s party, whether the sponsor
is from the same party as the president of the legislature, and if the sponsor of
the bill was the executive. Additionally, interestgroupsi is only observed when
selectioni = 1. The literature has shown that these are all predictors for legislative
success in Latin America (Alemán and Calvo, 2010). I also control for the topic
of the bill. interestgroupsi is the outcome of interest, a count of interest groups
participating the committee debate for a bill, and X2i, a set of covariates determining
the outcome: the rank of issues by party, the overall rank of issues over a period,
and the total number of interest groups participating in a committee over a given
period. Better estimation results are generally obtained when the set of regressors
in the selection equation contains at least one or more regressors (usually known as
exclusion restrictions) that are not included in the outcome equation (e.g., Marra and
Radice 2013). Given that the outcome predictors can only occur once a bill reaches
the committee level, we should not have any problems identifying the parameters.
Table A.1 shows the results from the corrected models. The estimates of all
predictors in the selection equation are in the expected direction and statistical
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significance. Yet, there is no considerable change in the estimate from the main
model in Chapter 5 and the outcome equation from the corrected model. If anything,
the original model is underestimating the effect of our main variable of interest




Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.325∗∗∗
(0.029)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.41∗∗∗
(0.029)
Executive Bill 0.730 ∗∗∗
(0.079)




Bill Topic Effect? Yes
OUTCOME EQ.
IG Part. (Bill)
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.094∗∗∗
(0.029)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.068∗∗
(0.029)








Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence
levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Modified
two-step Heckman selection model for count responses fitted by pe-
nalized maximum likelihood estimation (Wyszynkski and Marra, 2018).
Table A.1: Estimation of Main Model Controlling for Sample Selection Bias
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Appendix B: Alternative Structural Topic Models
Structural topic modeling (STM) is a generative model of word counts, as we
define the data generating process for each document and use the that to estimate
likely values for the parameters in the model. Within this framework, a topic is
defined as a mixture of words, each with a probability of belonging to a topic.
As Roberts et al. (2017) state, in mixed-membership topic models, like the one
used in Chapter 5, the posterior is intractable and non-convex, which creates a
multimodal estimation problem that can be sensitive to initialization. In other
words, the starting values of the parameters used for the estimation can change
the outcomes. To deal with this potential problem, I base the initialization on the
methods of moments, which is deterministic and globally consistent under reasonable
conditions (Arora et al., 2013; Roberts et al., 2016).1 This method is known as a
spectral initialization. This approach allows for similar results, regardless of the
seed set.
The number of topics, K, in STM are specified by the user, and there is
no “right” answer to the number of topics specified (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013).
Roberts et al. (2014) argue that semantically interpretable topics have two qualities:
1Robert et al. (2016) recommend using spectral initialization as it produces the best results
consistently.
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they are cohesive in the sense that high-probability words for the topic tend to co-
occur within documents, and they are exclusive in the sense that the top words for
a topic are unlikely to appear within top words of other topics. Based on these
criterion, I estimate STM to identify the topic of bills by looking at four different
values of K= 7, 10, 15, 20, and 25. STM did not converge at 7 or 10 topics (after
75 iterations). The larger the number of topics, the greater the level of exclusivity
(but this is partly by construction). Yet, the highest levels cohesiveness are found
at K = 15. This is the number of topics I choose for my main models. Note
that K = 20 has similar characteristics as K = 15. To check that the results are
not contingent on the estimation of the model, I replicate some of the results from
Chapter 5, using 20 topics, instead of 15.
When using 20 topics, the main words estimated by topics, and their pro-
portions across the texts, are presented in Figure B.1. From these topics I assign
themes to each, and match the most prevalent topic of each bill to that theme. The
assigned themes and examples of bills fitting that description are shown in Figure
B.2. While the topics assigned are still related to the issue we would expect parties
in Ecuador would own and sponsor, increasing the number can divide one topic
into two and affect both an accurate representation of the theme and an accurate
reflection of the attention given to it by a party.
I report the results of the main models of Chapter 5 in Table B.1. All the
models have the expected direction and are statistically significant. The coefficient
for the ranking of an issue by party in Model 1 is higher than the one reported in
Chapter 5. The ranking of a topic by period, on the other hand, is not statistically
168
Top Topics
Topic 3: año, menor, creas
Topic 20: especi, crea, fondo
Topic 4: politica, general, inciso
Topic 14: transport, terrestr, tránsito
Topic 11: artículo, interpretativa, publicada
Topic 7: procedimiento, función, legislativa
Topic 12: justicia, estructura, integr
Topic 16: articulo, control, constitucion
Topic 8: sistema, ecuatoriana, institucion
Topic 2: desarrollo, seguridad, pública
Topic 13: trabajo, pension, labor
Topic 17: social, labor, industri
Topic 18: creacion, provincia, canton
Topic 15: penal, civil, eleccion
Topic 19: servicio, defensa, profesion
Topic 5: seguridad, derecho, social
Topic 1: educación, cultura, descentralización
Topic 9: tributario, fiscal, presupuesto
Topic 10: nacion, agua, obra
Topic 6: provincia, favor, fondo
Figure B.1: Graphical display of estimated topic proportions
T1: Descentralization





Proyecto de Ley Reformatoria




Proyecto de Ley Reformatoria
de la Ley de Pesca y
Desarrollo Pesquero
Proyecto de Ley Reformatoria








AMPLIA LAS ASISTENCIA MEDICA
A TODOS LOS HIJOS DE LOS
AFILIADOS MENORES DE 12 AÑOS
DE EDAD.
T4: Civil
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY DE LA
JURISDICCION CONTENCIOSO−
ADMINISTRATIVA. (Sustitúyase
Art. 3, suprímanse literales
b) y c) del Art. 10;
agréguese un inciso en el
Art. 11; Después del Art.
innumerado después del Art.
13 sustitúyase una frase;
Elimínese el Art
REFORMATORIA AL INCISO SEGUNDO
DE LA TERCERA DISPOSICIÓN
TRANSITORIA DE LA LEY PARA
REPRIMIR EL LAVADO DE ACTIVOS.
T5: Health
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY
2000−12, LEY DE PRODUCCION,
IMPORTACION, COMERCIALIZACION
Y EXPENDIO DE MEDICAMENTOS
GENERICOS DE USO HUMANO.
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY DE
PRODUCCIÓN, IMPORTACIÓN,
COMERCIALIZACIÓN Y EXPENDIO DE
MEDICAMENTOS GENÉRICOS DE USO
HUMANO. (Verificación de la
calidad, cantidad y eficacia
terapéutica y el principio
activo de los medicamentos de
uso humano)
T6: Local Organization
SE AUTORIZA AL MUNICIPIO
DE DAULE VENDER LOS SOLARES
UBICADOS EN LA ZONA URBANA DEL
CANTON DAULE SIN NECESIDAD DE
PUBLICA SUBASTA A LOS ACTUALES
POSESIONARIOS DE SOLARES EN LA
LOTIZACION LA YOLITA.
AUTORIZA AL MUNICIPIO DE
MACHALA PARA QUE VENDA LOS
SOLARES UBICADOS EN LAS ZONAS
URBANAS DEL CANTON MACHALA SIN
NECESIDAD DE PUBLICA SUBASTA,





Ley Orgánica Reformatoria a la
Ley Contra la Violencia a la
Mujer y la Familia (Ley 103)
Denominada Ley Orgánica Contra




A LOS PREDIOS URBANOS SERAN
RECAUDADOS DIRECTAMENTE POR
LOS CONCEJOS MUNICIPALES Y SU
RECAUDACION BENEFICIARA EN SU
TOTALIDAD A ESTOS ORGANISMOS
SECCIONALES.
LEGALIZACION DE TERRENOS
A FAVOR DE LOS MORADORES Y
POSESIONARIOS DE PREDIOS QUE









INTERESES, COMISIONES Y GASTOS
JUDICIALES A LOS BENEFICIARIOS
DE PRESTAMOS DE LAS SUCURSALES
DE BAEZA, LAGO AGRIO Y
FRANCISCO ORELLANA DEL BANCO
NACIONAL DE FOMENTO.
T10: Public Investment
DECLARASE OBRA URGENTE Y
DE PRIORIDAD NACIONAL LA
TERMINACION DE LOS ESTUDIOS
DEFINITIVOS Y CONSTRUCCION
DE LA CARRETERA OTAVALO−SELVA
ALEGRE−QUININDE.
PROHIBESE POR EL LAPSO DE DOS
AÑOS EL AUMENTO DE LAS TARIFAS
DE ENERGIA ELECTRICA, AGUA




101 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN
POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA
INTERPRETATIVA DEL NUMERAL
OCHO DEL ARTÍCULO 24 DE LA
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA
REPÚBLICA.
T12: Children's Rights
Proyecto de Ley Orgánica
Reformatoria al Código
Orgánico Integral Penal para
la Protección de Niñas, Niños
y Adolescentes
Proyecto de Ley Reformatoria
del Código Orgánico de la
Niñez y Adolescencia; y, de la
Ley Reformatoria al Título V,
Libro II del Código Orgánico
de la Niñez y Adolescencia
T13: Personal Recognition
CONCEDE PENSION VITALICIA
MENSUAL A RAMIRO BOLAÑOS,
EUGENIO ESPINOZA, ANGEL
SANCHEZ Y DANIEL GUANIN.
REFORMATORIO AL DECRETO
LEGISLATIVO 61 PUBLICADO
EN REGISTRO OFICIAL 365 DE
01/29/1990, POR EL CUAL SE
CONCEDIO PENSION VITALICIA
A LA SEÑORA JUDITH PALACIOS
VIUDA DE PALACIOS.
T14: Civil and Penal
REFORMATORIA AL CODIGO
DE EJECUCION DE PENAS Y
REHABILITACION SOCIAL.
REFORMATORIA AL CODIGO
DE EJECUCION DE PENAS Y
REHABILITACION SOCIAL.
T15: Civil and Penal
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY DE
ELECCIONES.
REFORMATORIA AL CÓDIGO PENAL.
(Incluir como delitos el
robo de energía eléctrica, de
cables y lineas telefónicas)
T16: Monetary and Banking
Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de
Optimización y Eficiencia de
Trámites
Proyecto de Ley Reformatoria





CAMARAS DE MINERIA DEL
ECUADOR.
T18: Descentralization
CREACION DEL CANTON TADAY, EN
LA PROVINCIA DEL CAÑAR.
CREACION DEL CANTON PABLO
SEXTO EN LA PROVINCIA DE
MORONA SANTIAGO.
T19: Security
REFORMATORIA A LA LEY DE
SERVICIO CIVIL Y CARRERA
ADMINISTRATIVA Y DE
UNIFICACIÓN Y HOMOLOGACIÓN
SALARIAL DE LAS REMUNERACIONES
DEL SECTOR PÚBLICO.
ORGÁNICA REFORMATORIA A
LA LEY DE PERSONAL DE LAS
FUERZAS ARMADAS. (Grados de




REFORMA EL ARTICULO 3 DEL
DECRETOLEGISLATIVO 136, DE LA
LEY ESPECIAL QUE CREA EL FONDO
DE EMERGENCIA NACIONALES.
Figure B.2: Example Documents Highly Associated with Topics
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significant, even though it has the same direction as the same variable from the
models in Chapter 5. As was mentioned in Chapter 5, there is no expectation for the
direction of magnitude of that variable. The rest of the controls are maintained. It is
important to note that the interaction term of the election and rank variables is not
significant for 6 months prior (compare to Table 5.8), but it does reach significance
when estimating the model looking at one month before an election (see Figure
B.3). On the other hand, using this topic model, the conclusion that elections
trump ideology remain, as observed in Figure B.4, the predicted count of labor and
capital interest group participation across different levels of ideological proximity,
conditional on election season. It is important to note that the consistency of the
models is expected. The estimation of the STM using spectral initialization allows
for some thematic consistency across topics, and the specificity of the names of the
bills helps limit the possibilities.
IG Part. (Bill) Labor Part. (Bill) Capital Part. (Bill) Academia Part. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.093∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗ −0.052 −0.143∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.038) (0.035) (0.031)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.023 0.018 0.026 −0.019
(0.020) (0.037) (0.034) (0.030)
IG Participation by Committee 0.009∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004)
Executive Bill 1.107∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 1.996∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.180) (0.168) (0.147)
Chair Party of President 0.502∗∗∗ 0.183 0.528∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.143) (0.138) (0.113)
plur maj party −0.049
(0.090)
Constant 0.049 −1.671∗∗∗ −1.662∗∗∗ −0.984∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.140) (0.138) (0.111)
N 2393 2393 2393 2393
θ 0.364∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.142∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.142∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.236∗∗∗ (0.018)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Negative
binomial model that accounts and corrects for over-dispersion. The unit of analysis is all bills that reached committees (whether they were
lobbied or not). The ranking variables are based on a K = 20 structural topic model estimation.
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Figure B.3: Predicted count of interest group participation across different levels of issue salience,
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Figure B.4: Predicted count of labor and capital interest group participation across different
levels of ideological proximity, conditional on election season.
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Appendix C: Multilevel Modelling
As a robustness check for Chapter 5’s negative binomial estimations, I reevalu-
ate some of the models using a multilevel negative binomial approach, to control for
topic specific and committee effects. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the models have
a number of variables with little or no variation across committees, periods, and
party. Some effectively control for period-specific effects (e.g. total number of inter-
est groups invited to a committee over a period), others are highly correlated with
party and committee-specific effects (e.g. topic ranking). Overall topic ranking, for
example, is fairly stable across time, and bills from a same topics will usually end up
in the same committee. Thus, adding committee-specific, party-specific, or period-
specific effects can be problematic for model convergence. For the basic model in
Table 5.5, adding committee-specific effects or cohort-specific effects, for example,
do not allow the model to converge and yields no results. Even when taking out
the committees with very little activity, the committee-specific effect model does
not converge (but coefficients are estimated and reported). Alternatively, I estimate
a multilevel negative binomial model with random intercepts by topic of the main
models as a robustness check.
Table C.1 show the results of the multilevel negative binomial model with
173
random intercepts by topic (random intercept are not reported). Our main variable
of interest, ranking by topic for the party of the committee chair, maintains its
predicted directions and is statistically significant. Compared to our main model,
the coefficients are slightly lower when using the multilevel model. Likewise, the rest
of controls have the same sign and statistical significance as the models in Table 5.5
from Chapter 5. Likewise, the multilevel negative binomial model with random
intercepts by committee are reported in Table C.2. Note that the model did not
converge, and the results come with a warning.
IG Part. (Bill) Labor Part. (Bill) Capital Part. (Bill) Academia Part. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.053∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ 0.043 −0.026
(0.025) (0.046) (0.042) (0.036)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.067∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ −0.018 0.007
(0.028) (0.053) (0.049) (0.040)
IG Participation by Committee 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Executive Bill 1.023∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 1.499∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.185) (0.181) (0.154)
Chair Party of President 0.191∗∗ −0.010 0.025 0.486∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.147) (0.156) (0.125)
Chair from Maj/Plural. Party −0.222 −2.212∗∗∗ −1.740∗∗∗ −1.616∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.321) (0.295) (0.276)
N 2282 2282 2282 2282
Log Likelihood −3664.210 −1401.317 −1429.387 −1784.243
AIC 7344.420 2818.635 2874.775 3584.486
BIC 7390.283 2864.497 2920.637 3630.348
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Multilevel
negative binomial model, with random intercepts by topic. Random intercepts omitted. The unit of analysis is all bills that reached committees
(whether they were lobbied or not).
Table C.1: Multilevel Count for Interest Groups Attending Committees
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IG Part. (Bill) Labor Part. (Bill) Capital Part. (Bill) Academia Part. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.025 −0.083∗∗ 0.048 0.027
(0.023) (0.041) (0.041) (0.034)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.060∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ −0.018 0.011
(0.024) (0.041) (0.044) (0.036)
IG Participation by Committee 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Executive Bill 0.984∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 1.536∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.153) (0.177) (0.146)
Chair Party of President −0.071 −0.211 −0.099 0.046
(0.090) (0.151) (0.166) (0.134)
Chair from Maj/Plural. Party 0.289 −1.762∗∗∗ −1.505∗∗∗ −1.447∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.370) (0.281) (0.330)
N 2282 2282 2282 2282
Log Likelihood −3580.450 −1306.108 −1422.960 −1732.824
AIC 7176.900 2628.215 2861.921 3481.648
BIC 7222.763 2674.078 2907.783 3527.510
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Multilevel
negative binomial model, with random intercepts by committee. Random intercepts omitted. The unit of analysis is all bills that reached
committees (whether they were lobbied or not).
Table C.2: Multilevel Count for Interest Groups Attending Committees
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Appendix D: Ideological Proximity and Interest Groups Participa-
tion
Table D.1 estimates the restricted model of ideological proximity and interest
group participation used in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.
IG Part. (Bill) Labor Part. (Bill) Capital Part. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Distance of Sponsor to Chair −0.494∗∗∗ −0.127 −0.372∗∗ −0.253 −0.579∗∗∗ −0.132
(0.092) (0.118) (0.150) (0.208) (0.162) (0.207)
Distance of Sponsor to Floor Median 0.304∗∗ −0.101 0.278 −0.092 −0.723∗∗∗ −0.782∗∗
(0.123) (0.161) (0.196) (0.277) (0.229) (0.316)
Chair Party of President 1.403∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.189) (0.192)
Sponsor to Chair * Chair Party of President −0.725∗∗∗ −0.225 −0.799∗∗
(0.174) (0.295) (0.316)
Sponsor to Floor * Chair Party of President 0.758∗∗∗ 0.559 0.182
(0.233) (0.390) (0.450)
Constant 1.080∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ −0.850∗∗∗ −1.273∗∗∗ −0.376∗∗∗ −1.059∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.077) (0.096) (0.129) (0.098) (0.129)
N 2093 2093 2093 2093 2093 2093
θ 0.220∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.264∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.099∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.109∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.093∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.105∗∗∗ (0.008)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. Negative binomial model that accounts and
corrects for over-dispersion. The unit of analysis is bills that reached committees and were lobbied by all (Model 1 and Model 2), labor (Model 3 and Model 4) or capital
(Model 5 and Model 6) interest groups. For bills introduced by the executive, the assigned ideal position was the median position of the party for that cohort.
Table D.1: Effect of Ideological Distance of Bill Sponsor on Interest Groups Participation, Re-
stricted Model
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Figure E.1: Density Plots Describing the Ideological Location of House members. PSC and
CREO fixed on the right. F-Line describes the median voter in the House floor.
M-Line describes the median voter of the Majority/Plurality party. Shorter lines
describe the committee chair position in each standing committee, 1979-2019. Jitter
was not added to committee chair position, so lines overlap (e.g. 2013-2017, 2017-
2019). No estimates for 2007-2008 for lack of Congress.
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Appendix G: OLS Robustness Check
As a robustness check, I estimate the main models from Chapter 5 using
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation, rather than negative binomial. While on
the one hand the nature of the dependent variable (highly skewed count) violates
the assumptions of OLS, the use of negative binomial also assumes that the shape
of the distribution of the data generation process is best represented by the negative
binomial distribution. Still, OLS helps to reaffirm that the direction and magnitude
of the effect is not an artifact of the model. The dependent variable for Model 1 in
Table G.1, the main model, is participation by any interest groups in a committee
debate. The other three models (Model 2 - Model 4) only count labor, capital, and
academic interest group participation. The main variable of interest is the rank of
the topic of the bill by the party of the chair. Note that the ranking goes from 1
(highest) to 15 (lowest), thus we expect a negative coefficient. The direction and
magnitude of the main model, Model 1, are similar to those found from the negative
binomial estimation in Table 5.5.
Model 1 and Model 2 in Table G.2 present estimates of interest group partici-
pation in committee debates. Meanwhile, Models 3 through 6 describe the estimates
of labor and capital group participation. Again, this align with the estimates from
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IG Part. (Bill) Labor Part. (Bill) Capital Part. (Bill) Academia Part. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.122∗ −0.015 −0.025 −0.0003
(0.067) (0.015) (0.026) (0.028)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.226∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.009 0.087∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.015) (0.026) (0.028)
IG Participation by Committee 0.049∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Executive Bill 3.580∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 1.703∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗
(0.319) (0.070) (0.126) (0.132)
Chair Party of President 1.063∗∗∗ 0.039 0.410∗∗∗ 0.095
(0.233) (0.051) (0.092) (0.097)
Chair from Maj/Plural. Party −0.589∗∗ 0.011 0.079 −0.693∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.052) (0.093) (0.098)
N 2394 2394 2394 2394
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. The unit of
analysis is all bills that reached committees (whether they were lobbied or not).
Table G.1: Explaining Interest Group Participation in the Ecuadorian Congress, 1979-2018. OLS
Estimation.
Table 5.6. The effect of ideological proximity to the committee chairs is presented
in Figure G.1, matching Figure 5.6 from Chapter 5.
IG Part. (Bill) Labor Part. (Bill) Capital Part. (Bill)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Distance of Sponsor to Chair −0.753∗∗∗ −0.108 −0.094∗ −0.048 −0.167∗ −0.042
(0.229) (0.308) (0.050) (0.067) (0.093) (0.124)
Distance of Sponsor to Floor Median 0.453 0.568 0.079 0.051 0.053 0.160
(0.321) (0.426) (0.070) (0.093) (0.130) (0.172)
Rank of Topic by Party of Chair −0.118 −0.120 −0.012 −0.012 −0.026 −0.026
(0.074) (0.074) (0.016) (0.016) (0.030) (0.030)
Rank of Topic by Period 0.195∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.002 0.001
(0.075) (0.074) (0.016) (0.016) (0.030) (0.030)
IG Participation by Committee 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
Executive Bill 3.505∗∗∗ 3.436∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 1.688∗∗∗ 1.677∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.341) (0.074) (0.074) (0.137) (0.138)
Chair Party of President 1.370∗∗∗ 1.973∗∗∗ 0.090 0.114∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗
(0.258) (0.316) (0.056) (0.069) (0.104) (0.128)
Sponsor to Chair * Chair Party of President −1.430∗∗∗ −0.102 −0.276
(0.460) (0.100) (0.186)
Sponsor to Floor * Chair Party of President −0.279 0.063 −0.247
(0.638) (0.138) (0.258)
Constant −0.398 −0.620∗∗ 0.014 0.007 0.125 0.063
(0.284) (0.292) (0.062) (0.064) (0.115) (0.118)
N 2093 2093 2093 2093 2093 2093
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. The
unit of analysis is bills that reached committees and were lobbied by all (Model 1 and Model 2), labor (Model 3 and Model 4) or
capital (Model 5 and Model 6) interest groups. For bills introduced by the executive, the assigned ideal position was the median
position of the party for that cohort.



































Figure G.1: Invitations to Committee by Interest Groups Type Conditional on Party of Chair
and Legislative President; Ecuadorian Congress, 1979-2019. Median Floor voter (f)
set to 0.0. Committee Chair (c) set to 0.4.
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Finally, I present the interactive effect of elections (6 months prior) and our
main variable of interest (Table G.3). For off-election months, the effect of issue
ownership is maintained. In election season, the effect for each unit change is in-
creased. Unlike the negative binomial estimation from Chapter 5, the interaction is
not statistically significant, but the direction and magnitude are maintained.
IG Part. (Bill)




Rank of Topic by Period 0.229∗∗∗
(0.067)




Chair Party of President 1.034∗∗∗
(0.236)





Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, with
confidence levels reported as follows: ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p <
.05; ∗p < .1. The unit of analysis is all bills that reached
committees (whether they were lobbied or not). The
Election dummy is coded 1 for any bill debated 6 months
prior to an election, and 0 otherwise.
Table G.3: The Effect of Election Cycle on Interest Group Participation. OLS Estimation.
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